FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE SLENDER MARGIN OF SAFETY

By Sir Anthony Eden

SPEAKING at a meeting of Young Conservatives in London this fall, I said that the free world was confused and in considerable danger—greater danger, as I believed, than at any time since 1939. Events since that date have reinforced this warning. The West is not doing well in the cold war because fundamentally it is not united. It has a common purpose, but no common plan. The initiative is too often with the Communist powers. It is true that they do not always use it intelligently, but we should not take too much comfort from that. News of failures on the part of Communist governments does not reach their peoples in the form and with the consequences applicable in Western countries. The Communist sapping and mining will go on, and the frontal attack upon us will be repeated.

The margin of safety is now slender. The West has not the defense in depth which it had even in the darkest days of the war. In 1940, when Hitler's forces had swept through Europe past the Channel ports to the Atlantic Ocean, Britain and its Commonwealth partners stood apparently alone. I write "apparently" because westward there was still a mighty power, its faith and its resources unimpaired. Today, the reserves are all engaged, some perhaps not to the best advantage. The free nations have to think and work much more closely together, and do it soon, or the free world will lose out. To be aware of this danger is not to suggest that it need be accepted; but to understand the nature of our peril is a necessary preliminary to meeting it. The purpose of this article is to consider how such a state of affairs has come about and what we can do to mend it.

The death of Stalin marked the end of an era. For a time it

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seemed as if it would also mark the dawn of a new hope. Stalin's rule had been cautious, powerful and ruthless. Under his direction the alliance of the Second World War became the calculated antagonism of the cold war. When that rule ended, it was uncertain for a while what manner of men would follow him, and momentary optimism was strengthened by events. The most important of these was the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria in the summer of 1955, the only concession of real significance made by the Communist powers since the war. It might have heralded other changes, since the stationing of troops in Hungary, for instance, had been accepted by Russia's wartime allies only while Hungary was the corridor to occupied Austria.

The criticism of Stalin's conduct of affairs indulged in by Mr. Khrushchev, who was the more pungent personality in the partnership with Bulganin which succeeded Stalin, also encouraged expectation of less rigid policies in the Kremlin. At least it seemed wise to meet the new men and probe the possibilities. The outcome was the first summit, in July 1955. Apart from some momentary help in relaxing tension in the Far East, this meeting marked no sufficient change in Soviet temper, while at the Foreign Secretaries' Conference which followed in the autumn, Molotov's embattled negatives were again those of the Stalin era. Since then successive events, through Hungary to the predictable failure of the second summit, have unmistakably reaffirmed Soviet policies and purposes. There can be no excuse for failing to understand them now.

Khrushchev believes that the days of the free world, or, as he would describe them, of the capitalist imperialists, are numbered. He will do what he can to shorten their term, pressing existing advantages and probing for new ones in every continent. When the Kremlin now speaks of peaceful coexistence, we all understand that this means communizing the world without war. It does not exclude the use of other methods where non-forcible means do not bring success. To be fair, the aim of the international Communist movement is not concealed. It is to overthrow every existing authority, religion or economic system which stands in the way of bringing the world under Communist power and control. In pursuit of this objective all tactics are legitimate and all double talk is justified. Thus it is possible for Khrushchev to speak at the General Assembly of the United Nations about the aim of the democracies, meaning the totalitarian Communist

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powers, to liberate all colonial peoples everywhere. He can do this with acclaim, despite the fact that the Soviet Government is itself in political default to the United Nations. Four years ago that Government refused to accept any one of the United Nations resolutions in respect of Hungary, or even to admit its Secretary-General or his representative onto Hungarian territory. In 1960 the Hungarian dictator, imposed by Soviet arms at the expense of thousands of Hungarian lives, goes to the United Nations in Khrushchev's train and is accepted as that unhappy country's representative. It only remains for Mr. Kadar to make a speech against colonialism.

As a result of these tactics, the Soviet leaders hope to persuade some easily deluded persons to forget inconvenient facts. Since 1940 the Western European powers have voluntarily agreed to the independence of 18 different countries with a population of more than 600,000,000 people. During the same period the Communist countries have brought under their rule 12 previously free countries with a population of more than 120,000,000. The Communist deed is even more harsh than these figures tell, because many of these nations had long lived their own free and independent lives, contributing their part in a tolerant civilization. Yet some of the so-called neutral governments can inveigh unblushingly against Western colonialism without reproof, while borrowing Western money without hesitation. In such conditions it is hardly surprising if newly independent nations are confused. There may be confusion in our thought too.

In the early days of October 1956, before Britain and France intervened, the American Secretary of State could see colonialism in the Anglo-French reaction to the seizure of an international canal, even though the plan to restore international control had been endorsed by the principal maritime nations, including the United States. In 1957 Indonesia seized Dutch shipping and held it without compensation. Today the United States finds itself accused of imperialism in Cuba and its extensive properties are grabbed. Robbery does not cease to be such because it is the goods of another nation that are seized in the name of nationalization or its equivalent. There is no present reason to suppose that these practices will lack future imitators elsewhere, yet we have no determined policies as to how to act towards them. For instance, the World Bank rightly declines to make advances to nations which are in financial default, yet no such condition is

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imposed upon nations which are in political default on their international engagements.

In the last three years, the denial of passage through the Suez Canal, previously enforced illegally against Israeli shipping, has been extended to Israeli goods in transit in the ships of other countries; this despite the many pledges given by the highest world authorities in 1957. According to these, interference with Israeli shipping was not expected to continue, and, if it did, the United Nations would deal with it. Such optimistic expectations have not been fulfilled. The lesson is clear to read. If breaches of international conduct are condoned in one part of the world, they are sure to be repeated in another. To meet these occasions as they multiply and are enthusiastically cheered on by the Communist powers, agreed policies as to financial aid and many other matters will have to be devised by the victims.

All previous experience of militant dictatorships shows that they cannot be bribed from their courses. On the contrary, the more lavish this treatment, the more attractive do the smaller but hungry autocrats become to Communist dictatorships with ambitions for world dominion. But the firmer the resistance to unreasonable demands, the more respect will be won, and respect is a more powerful magnet than money.

The free nations must convince themselves that the Communist dictatorships are determined to seize every advantage to increase their power and press it remorselessly to the end. For this they will abuse any instruments to hand, including the United Nations. The Communist threat to the remaining liberties of the free world is absolute. Unless the West understands and accepts this, its policies will be ineffective and its survival in peril. But even the resources of the West are not inexhaustible and their percipient use is essential; economic appeasement is no more pardonable than its political counterpart.

A realization of this truth does not mean that we should refuse diplomatic contacts or political discussion with powers behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but it does mean the exercise of the utmost caution as to how and at what level these contacts should be made. Summit conferences should be the exception and not the rule. In certain circumstances they can be useful for general discussion, or to set a climate for negotiation. They are not suitable for detailed diplomacy or for the negotiation of specific problems. These are tasks for Foreign Secretaries or for the

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normal methods of diplomacy. The fact that Moscow is impatient of such methods does not mean that we should forego them. There was nothing in the experience of the second summit to encourage a third without detailed preparation and indications of chances of agreement, of which there is no sign.

If the West is to conduct itself to the best advantage against the new offensives which we expect from the Communist powers, certain essential conditions must be observed. First, we have to abandon wishful thinking as an influence upon our action. It may be that in the course of time differences between the two most powerful Communist states, Russia and China, will grow and even lead at length to serious political conflict. No man can be sure that this will happen, still less foretell how long it will take. It would be fatal to freedom to base policies on such an expectation. Internal conditions in Russia, and the demand for a greater share of the improved conditions of life which the West now enjoys, may one day exert an influence upon the Kremlin's policies. None can tell when or how important that influence may prove to be. Once again it could be fatal to base any policies upon it.

The only premise upon which the free world can prudently found its decisions and form its practices is that the cold war will continue, that the purpose of the Communist rulers is to dominate the world, and that free men everywhere must organize their lives and effort to combat that determination, if the faith they cherish is to survive. Faced with this challenge, the free nations must unite and integrate more closely than ever before in war or peace. This will not be easy to do, for it requires a pooling of resources, economic as well as political, to an extent we have not yet begun to realize. We have to agree on plans and execute them jointly in every continent, by methods which we explain together, if not in the same words, at least in the same tone and with the same purpose.

It is not possible to limit our joint policies to Western Europe, but it is indispensable to stand firm there. If Communist power were to gain control of the human and industrial resources of this area, its domination of the world could hardly be resisted. But to be firm and united in Europe is not enough. Asia and Africa present greater complexities. Here it is necessary to speak plainly. The bogey of colonialism has done fearful damage to the Western alliance. It has created misunderstanding in the United

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States of the policies of the Western allies, who were once great colonial powers. It has created anxiety among those allies when interests, which seem to them vital not only to themselves but to the free world, appear to be regarded as expendable by the United States.

This state of affairs can be brought to an end only by some sacrifice of opinion and authority on either side of the Atlantic. My own country, to take only one example, has for long been working on plans in Africa to bring the peoples there to self-government. France has done the same in the greater part of her former African territories. If the policies we have declared and the successive actions we have proposed to give effect to them are approved in the United States, there should be the closest unity in their execution in the remaining colonial territories. Neither you nor we must attempt to forestall the other, nor to get credit at the expense of the other, nor to belittle the sincerity of the other. Our policies and the help we give, financial and economic, should be related and complementary. All this is difficult to do, but it has to be done if Africa is to emerge into a new life and not be an example of the disunity of the West, creating opportunities for Communism. It has also to be done if the suspicions which today weaken the Western alliance are not to undermine it.

First the United States has to consider the policies which the former colonial nations are pursuing to further the self-government of their territories. If there is agreement upon these, Western unity would be helped by United States action to work out in company with the colonial nations the degree and timing of economic aid or direct financial assistance. Certainly this would have to be related to the activities of the World Bank, but there is room for both. For a former colony to make a success of its independence, education in government, science and industry is indispensable. But this education cannot be forced beyond a certain pace and can be paid for only if there is a taxable capacity in the country. This in turn means a coördinated and enlightened investment policy pursued over the years. Neither education nor income alone is enough, as the Congo has shown. Both are needed and neither can be skimped or we shall have more Congos.

The joint effort of the United States and Britain has to be improved in another sphere. The demand is not extravagant if it is understood that we are engaged in a contest for the survival of

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a free civilization, calling for as sagacious and complete a use of our resources as did the Second World War. At that time what we had to say to the world was attuned. It should be now. A confusion of voices weakens our message, which is still fundamentally the same, and the sum of its impact on uncommitted nations, if intelligently related, can be much more than the influence of our separate efforts. To realize this, some central coördination is necessary.

The mechanics called for to give effect to closer relationships are important, but they are not impossible to contrive. There should be some organization, probably in Washington, perhaps in Paris to be near NATO, led at a high level, which would make possible the integration of our political and economic policies and their propaganda content and methods, to a greater extent than is provided by the joint standing group in military affairs today. An example of what can be done is the Organization for European Economic Coöperation, a little advertised but most effective promoter of prosperity. Its authority, scope and opportunity will be enlarged beyond reckoning if, as we hope, the United States and Canada now become full members of its successor organization. A closely allied effort in the atomic world and in that which reaches beyond it into space should be made, comparable to the one created between the United States, Canada and ourselves in the war. I doubt whether military planners on either side of the Atlantic are content with the extent and quality of their coöperation; they should not be. The Western alliance needs a joint group to plan policy. That group should reappraise military policies and requirements now that there is a balance of nuclear power. NATO should be associated with this work and the findings should be made available to that body. No single power can go it alone as well as it can go it in company.

Most serious is the health of NATO, which is not robust. This is in no sense the fault of its politically experienced Secretary General, M. Spaak, or of its Commander, General Norstad; both men have been attentive and loyal. The fault lies in events outside their control. At the time of writing (November 1, 1960), there are four nuclear powers in the world; there may soon be more. The deterrent is possessed individually by two members of NATO and seems imminent in a third; it is not surprising that there should be a desire that the alliance as such should command some part of it also. With the probable extension of nuclear power

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outside NATO, we must expect this desire to grow, and it is perfectly natural that it should. NATO needs body, and would have it if it could become a nuclear power. Admittedly, such a proposal presents difficulties, not least in the imperative necessity that may arise for prompt action, which a spread of authority could weaken fatally. Nor must the part played by conventional forces be reduced, or these allowed to dwindle to an extent which would make the organization unrealistic.

On the other hand, it should be possible to work out plans which would give to NATO membership as a whole the sense that it has direct control of some nuclear power. There are indisputable objections to handing over the command of formidable nuclear weapons widely to individual NATO members, but these difficulties could be met by integrated international nuclear units which might be recruited from different NATO countries. There may be other alternatives. The essential is to determine methods which would give the alliance renewed life and meaning. This is necessary if we are to deal effectively with a psychological weakness which is undermining confidence. No single member of NATO likes to feel that for his protection he is dependent upon the decision of one, two or maybe three powers to come to his aid at the critical hour, or it could be the critical minute. Mr. Henry A. Kissinger writes of the problems of peacemaking after the Napoleonic Wars, and gives a warning which is applicable today: "To be dependent on the continued goodwill of another sovereign state is demoralizing, because it is a confession of impotence, an invitation to the irresponsibility induced by the conviction that events cannot be affected by one's will."[1]

I have no doubt that some of the feeling against the United States, which unhappily exists and is probably growing in a number of Western nations, is due to the sentiment that the survival of NATO members depends upon action principally by one member employing, or threatening to employ, weapons which most of them have not got. This idea may be unreasonable, but it is important to be rid of it. An alliance can only mature or decay. The essential is to give NATO the body it lacks today, and some revival of its authority is the only way.

Even more important than this better planning and better execution of our plans is the need for a revival of the faith of the free world. Our material resources are still greater than those of

[1] "A World Restored." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957, p. 316.

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the Communist powers, and the ultimate result cannot be in doubt if our belief is as strong. This is not only a crisis of policies for the West. It is also a crisis of confidence in its own values. If we can reinforce this confidence, we shall still need the unity to express it. If we do not draw closer together quickly, we shall drift until we are apart suddenly. This is the choice. The alternative is more deadly than any we have known. To quote the words of Sydney Smith written in the summer of 1804: "A greater contest than that in which we are engaged, the world has never seen; for we are not fighting the battle of our country alone, but we are fighting to decide the question; whether there shall be any more freedom upon the earth."

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SECURITY WILL NOT WAIT

By Maxwell D. Taylor

IN the recent Presidential election, national defense per se did not become a major campaign issue. Both candidates expressed confidence in our present military strength but recognized the probability that larger military expenditures would be required in the future. The issue was also present in the background of many debates on foreign policy and was very much a part of questions asked about the state of our world-wide prestige.

Mr. Kennedy, the President-elect, was particularly explicit in stating his belief that Soviet military power is growing faster than our own. He has also recognized the importance of balanced strength capable of coping with any form of military threat. He has indicated something less than confidence in our defense organization and has shown an intention to initiate substantial changes, including a reorientation of strategy.

As one who has long urged a reappraisal of military policy and strategy, I can only applaud this intention of the new Administration to come to grips with the many fundamental problems involved in strengthening our national defense. I have one important reservation, however, and that has to do with the time factor. Having lived through some of the defense reorganizations of the past—all of them far less comprehensive than the next one should be—I would expect that the most competent minds in the Government will feel the need for months and even years of planning and work to bring about all the necessary changes.

Even if the new policy-makers are imbued with the utmost sense of urgency, they are certain to find many cogent reasons for proceeding slowly before taking important decisions. Quite properly, they will want to be sure of their facts; the Pentagon briefings will be many. They will soon discover—if they do not already know—the defects in our strategy-making machinery in the National Security Council and the Department of Defense and may decide to improve the machine before asking it to produce. They may want to return to fundamentals and establish national aims before trying to decide on a military strategy which in all logic should be designed to support those aims. These are

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all perfectly good reasons for prudent men to take time out before setting about important changes.

But the fact is that, important as these considerations are, action on our military situation cannot wait long upon them. The Pentagon can never close down for general repairs. The requirements of security bear inexorably upon us, demanding prompt solutions. The military trend is running against us and decisive measures are needed to reverse it. Any long-term reappraisal of military policy and strategy-making should be paralleled by immediate actions based on present conviction and available knowledge—actions which, at the same time, will be consistent with the likely outcome of any comprehensive review of national policy. This is the only way to telescope the lead-time of military planning and execution into acceptable dimensions.

Under these conditions, the policy-makers of the new Administration will find themselves at the outset in a situation far from ideal but, I believe, not impossible. It is the theme of this article that planning and decision can proceed if there is agreement on certain basic principles which can be given to the military planners for guidance in initiating a new military program. There is no lack of competent professionals of all services capable of taking such a statement of principles, analyzing its implications and giving it the expanded expression necessary to set the wheels in motion throughout the Pentagon. The staffs of the Joint Chiefs and of the services have been wrestling with most of these problems for years, often in disagreement among themselves but ready to proceed in any reasonable direction clearly indicated by responsible civilian leadership. They will move promptly now if they receive the basic guidance.

What are the principles which need to be asserted and accepted as the platform for a new military program? The most obvious one, perhaps, is that world conditions have changed drastically since the adoption of the so-called New Look in 1953 and its supporting strategy of massive retaliation, and that a new program is needed which will take the changes into account. Such a program needs to be based on a flexible military strategy designed to deter war, large or small, and to assist the West in winning the cold war.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize for the benefit of the military planners that deterrence is the primary objective of all our military efforts. There has been little argument on this score in the

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past although for a time there were proponents of the thesis that ability to deter general atomic war carried with it the ability to deter all war. Apparently this fallacy has largely subsided; but in making a new start the policy-makers should affirm unambiguously the need to prepare specifically for limited and cold war as well as for general war.

The planners will readily understand the decision to face up to the problem of limited war. Plans are on file in the Pentagon, unapproved thus far largely for fiscal reasons, covering the requirements of such things as the modernization and expansion of forces needed in limited war, the requirements of airlift to give mobility to these forces and organizational changes to improve their readiness. These plans can be brought up to date and presented for consideration in comparatively short order.

The need for specific consideration of cold-war requirements may require spelling out in some detail. The military view has generally been that over-all strength in being is the main contribution which the Armed Forces can make on the cold front. This is undoubtedly true, but there is a relatively unexplored field of possibilities in relating military strategy and armament to the reaction of allies, neutrals and potential enemies.

Nor should the planners be put to work without some guiding comments on the economic factor. While no one seems inclined in the present atmosphere to place a dollar limit on security, they should be reminded of the economic facts of life and warned against assuming unlimited resources for their military program. It will have to compete with the requirements of many other national programs directed at goals other than security and must therefore be able to withstand hard scrutiny by the fiscal powers. It can do so only if it is based on verifiable military requirements with a demonstrable relation to the deterrence or winning of war —cold, limited or general. The planners should be prepared to make such a defense of their eventual recommendations.

Once the planners have received a few basic decisions and made some common-sense assumptions which will remain valid in the course of any long-term reappraisal, they can press ahead with reasonable assurance of being pointed in the right direction. I have no doubt that the resulting effort will produce many stresses and strains within the military staffs involved; but that will be inevitable no matter how much time is devoted to preliminaries. Although it may be rash to prejudge the outcome of

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this pragmatic approach, the program would seem to me to require provision for the following principal elements:

(a) An invulnerable, long-range missile force with a second-strike capability, *i.e.* the ability to inflict crippling damage on an enemy even after absorbing a surprise nuclear attack.

(b) Adequate and properly equipped mobile forces to cope with limited war, *i.e.* conflicts short of general atomic war between the two nuclear power blocs.

(c) An effective system of alliances.

(d) Procedures for assuring the most effective use of the resources committed to the program.

If called upon to justify the need for these elements, the planners could advance the following reasons and explanations:

The purpose of preparations for general atomic war is to assure that no such war will ever be fought. In all probability this purpose can be achieved provided there is an approximate balance of destructive capability between the two power blocs which will make the deliberate choice of general atomic war unthinkable to either.

There is such a balance today, but it is becoming unstable. It has already begun to incline in favor of the Soviets because of our lag in developing a reliable, protected missile system. Consequently, the security program which we are designing now must stress as a matter of urgency the achievement of such a system to restore the stability which is being lost. To do this, we need a missile system with the characteristics of reliability, immediate readiness for launching and protection from surprise attack.

To enjoy this security against surprise attack, our new missiles need the attributes—singly or in combination—of mobility, concealment and "hardening" of their bases. Major launching areas should have the protective cover of an active anti-missile defense such as that which the Nike-Zeus anti-missile would afford. To avoid the needless destruction of centers of population, all launching sites should be far removed from our cities. The Polaris submarine-launched missile, when operational, will have all of these characteristics whereas our present land-based operational missiles have virtually none of them.

While we are often inclined to stress numbers in our efforts to close the missile gap, we usually fail to recognize the importance of the defensive elements of a "second-strike" missile system. Actually, a few hundred reliable long-range missiles are all we

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need, provided they are invulnerable to surprise attack. Complete invulnerability will never be attained; but if we employ all the defensive measures mentioned above in intelligent combination we shall have a reasonable expectation of possessing enough missiles to survive a surprise attack and of still being able to strike a crippling blow in retaliation. That is to say, we will have achieved a "second-strike" capability.

One can hardly overstress the need for an anti-missile missile for the tight defense of a limited number of vital areas. In an emergency, such a weapon would allow us to hold our retaliatory fire until we were sure that we were truly under hostile attack, secure in the knowledge that essential government controls would survive, that communications would continue and that most of our protected missiles could still get off the ground and onto target. The United States has been woefully remiss in not pressing the production of the Nike-Zeus missile in order to obtain this critical advantage. We may expect any day to find that the Soviet Union has beaten us to such a weapon and has thus gained a vital technical and psychological victory.

The second element of our security program—adequate and properly equipped mobile forces to cope with limited war—is of equal importance with the invulnerable atomic missile force. Unless we find reason to believe that the Soviet bloc has renounced the use of all forms of military force to achieve its ends, the need for such a mobile force must increase as the danger of a planned atomic aggression by the Soviet Union recedes in the face of our visible readiness to retaliate in kind. But, despite the clear evidence of the increased danger of limited war, the United States has deliberately restrained the development of "adequate and properly equipped mobile forces" in its preoccupation with meeting the ever-increasing cost of weapons for general war.

Our weakness in this field has been obscured by the fact that there has never been an agreed procedure for determining what forces are needed for limited war. The fact is that we have undertaken military commitments to more than 40 nations without having established a procedure for verifying that our military capabilities have a reasonable chance of meeting these obligations if they fall due.

Apart from the unsettled question of size, there is the problem of modernizing the equipment of limited-war forces. The Army's financial requirement for modernizing its equipment has been

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estimated at about $3 billion a year for five years. There is a corresponding bill for the modernization of those portions of the Air Force, Navy and Marines which could be used in limited war. No such funds have been forthcoming. As it is, the Army is still supplied largely with World War II equipment and has not been able to afford the improved ground and air mobility obtainable from equipment which has since become available. Further, very little urgency has been given to the production of very low-yield atomic weapons, the only kind likely to be used in limited war.

While the tactical mobility of our limited war forces leaves much to be desired, it is in the field of strategic movement that we need to make a major effort. The aircraft at present available for troop lift are obsolete and inadequate in numbers; they are not prepared to move significant numbers of troops on short notice. Our security planners will have to give much thought to this need for strategic mobility of ground forces in limited war. They will have to reconcile the considerable cost of a replacement program for obsolete transport aircraft with the financial demands of other parts of this program. They may well conclude that the stockpiling of heavy military equipment in certain strategic points about the world will promote both economy and rapidity of military reaction.

Since World War II we have come to recognize the global nature of our security problems and the consequent need for effective allies joined to us by common goals and interests. We have long since abandoned the idea of "going it alone." An adequate security program, then, should have the collateral effect of strengthening our alliances, reducing the causes for disagreement and division among us, and enhancing the confidence of our friends in us and in themselves.

To achieve these results, we need to make our commitments to our allies only after careful thought, but then in unambiguous language. A vague promise to help "in accordance with our Constitutional provisions" or similar terms is not very encouraging to a country living on the Communist periphery, thousands of miles from the United States. But even explicit promises will not suffice unless the military preparations of the United States show clearly an ability to come quickly with help of a sort which will save and not destroy an ally in danger. Hence the need for the "adequate and properly equipped mobile forces" which our security planners have placed high on their priority list. Properly

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equipped, from the point of view of threatened allies, means without complete dependence on the use of atomic weapons, particularly of those with an indiscriminate capacity for mass destruction—the very contemplation of which may make surrender seem less terrible than rescue through their use. Thus a prerequisite for our limited-war forces is a capability for prolonged combat *without* the use of atomic weapons.

The self-confidence of our allies will depend upon their ability to defend themselves, at least long enough for our help to arrive. The primary purpose of a military aid program should be to provide the means to establish this self-confidence. Our planners should verify that all military aid which they recommend will contribute to this purpose, bearing in mind that there will never be enough to go around for all claimants.

In seeking to strengthen our alliances, the security planners will recognize that a frequent cause for friction between us and our allies is the presence of American bases and garrisons on their soil. Particularly, bomber and missile bases for use in general atomic war are increasingly unwelcome, as Khrushchev rattles his missiles and threatens to direct them against those targets. Our ground forces are somewhat more popular abroad as they promise help with conventional weapons and afford day-to-day evidence of our willingness to share with our friends the hazards of living under the Communist guns. Nevertheless, they too provide their share of local incidents to upset normal relations abroad. The fact is that our overseas deployments are very expensive and the number should be progressively reduced as they lose military justification.

As a matter of policy, our security program should require an annual review of the overseas bases and a defense of their continued necessity by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As our long-range missiles based in the United States and at sea achieve reliability, the need for overseas bases for bombers and missiles tends to disappear. Likewise, when we have limited war forces properly trained and equipped for rapid strategic movement, the purely military need for overseas garrisons at present strengths will also diminish. Our policy on this subject should be clearly and openly stated, and the withdrawal of forces should be undertaken voluntarily well in advance of the development of local pressures.

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II

Using these arguments, our military planners might justify to their civilian superiors the implementation of a new military program to meet the changing balance of world power. If their views were generally accepted, the planners would then be asked for an estimate of costs. This would bring out the long-standing defects in our system for formulating the defense budget.

The fact is that up to now it has been very difficult to find out what kind of defense the United States has been buying because of the way in which the defense budget is formulated. In spite of the fact that modern war is no longer fought by Army, Navy and Air units acting as separate forces, we none the less still budget vertically in terms of these services. If we were called upon to fight, we would not be interested in the services as such. We would be interested rather in task forces—those combinations of Army, Navy and Air Force which are functional in nature, such as the atomic retaliatory forces, overseas deployments, continental air defense forces, limited-war expeditionary forces and the like. But we do not keep our budget in these terms. Hence, it is not an exaggeration to say that we do not know what kind and how much defense we are buying with any specific budget.

As a matter of fact, it may be argued that we do not know how much defense we have at any given moment. This arises from the fact that there is no appraisal of current war-making capacity as a routine act of the executive branch of the Government. Although we have undertaken many political commitments abroad which carry military implications, there is no accepted procedure for evaluating military strength in being in relation to those obligations. We lack a system of politico-military bookkeeping to assure that commitments and capabilities are kept in balance.

When our policy-makers have come to appreciate the need for revising the method of making our defense budget and for setting up a system of bookkeeping to keep commitments and capabilities in balance, they may feel dismayed and inclined to delay action. My earnest hope is that, as I said earlier, they will realize that they cannot afford to pause to reform and refine procedures. They should be encouraged to do with the procedures they have. On their own initiative, they are quite capable of producing a directive which will provide an adequate base of departure for the future development of the new military program.

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Such a directive would at the outset state the premise that the objective of the military preparations of the United States is to create respect for the strength of the United States without arousing fear of its misuse. That respect should be sufficient to deter military attack on the United States and to discourage aggression in any area of its interest. If deterrence fails, our strength should be sufficient to impose appropriate punishment upon the aggressor. In short, our military strength should be such as to impress possible enemies; it also should be such as to encourage friends and neutrals without awakening fears because of the nature of our weapons or the way in which we might use them.

This kind of military strength would consist of two parts. One, as already noted, would consist of the capability for deterring a general atomic attack on the United States and for dealing a crippling second strike against the aggressor if deterrence fails. The weapons system for retaliation would be composed primarily of long-range missiles with atomic warheads, firing from mobile or secure positions removed from centers of population. To add to its deterrent effect as well as its ability to survive, the system would be provided with an active air and anti-missile defense.

Concurrently, and with equal priority of effort, the Department of Defense would be told to organize and train the Armed Forces so that they will have the capability for sustaining combat on the ground and at sea, placing primary reliance on the use of non-atomic weapons. These forces would be assured of strategic and tactical mobility to permit prompt and timely intervention in any area of our vital interest.

In order to assure the execution of these tasks, the Department of Defense will need to redefine the roles and missions of the military services so as to fix clearly the service responsibility for the organization, equipment and training of the forces required. This revision should not be allowed to delay the implementation of other parts of the program.

To support the necessary forces, the directive would authorize the Department of Defense to plan on receiving an annual sum approximating 10 percent of the Gross National Product. It could then prepare annually for the President a five-year military program which would define and justify goals for all categories of operational forces required in this period. Those goals would be based upon the estimated military threat and the extent of our political commitments having military implications.

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The directive would also make clear that it is the policy of the United States to continue to furnish military aid to allies on a selective basis related to the strategic requirements of the common defense. However, it would also include the reminder that as the United States missile force grows and the strategic mobility of its limited war forces increases, the United States would, in consultation with its allies, progressively reduce its overseas bases and deployments.

The suggested directive contains more of substance than might seem at first glance. It should be supplemented, of course, by decisions on such matters as the conditions for the use of atomic and chemical weapons, civil defense and the reserves to be maintained in men and materials. It then would produce, with maximum economy, the forces which our planners have determined we must have in order to provide a flexible response to many forms of military threat without dependence on massive retaliation as the primary strategy. With, in addition, an indication of the funds to be expected for defense purposes, in terms of a percentage of the Gross National Product, the Department of Defense would be able to produce a mid-range defense plan for the guidance of the military services.

The proposed directive would impose on the military services a requirement to obtain approval of force goals in terms of operational functions. A joint review by the Secretaries of State and Defense to verify that military forces in being are consistent with current commitments would become an annual event on the calendar of the National Security Council.

But the question may be raised whether such a program if adopted would not launch a new arms race with the Soviet Union and generally aggravate the world situation. Such a question should be answered, I think, in two parts, the first referring to general war and the second to the requirements of limited war.

The technological race with the Soviets to obtain maximum effectiveness in missiles, warheads and space vehicles is going ahead now at full speed and the proposals made here should have little immediate effect on either its pace or direction. I doubt that the Soviets are neglecting anything which might help them maintain the lead which they are generally conceded to have. What would be accomplished on our side would be a better use of resources by the elimination of obsolete bomber and missile systems with their attendant costs and the replacement of them by an

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advanced, protected missile system of finite but sufficient size to cover the targets which deterrence requires that we be able to destroy. The ultimate result would be a decrease in the number of delivery vehicles rather than an increase—a form of disarmament which might offer political advantages. Likewise, the new emphasis on the protection of our missiles could be used as evidence of our defensive posture whereas our present unprotected retaliatory force makes no sense except as a first-strike force. I have already alluded to an important factor which works against a race in missile numbers. Each side knows that a limited number of megaton weapons on target will destroy the enemy's war-making capacity. They may disagree as to what that number is, but when each has reached what he estimates to be sufficient, there is no reason to race for more. But the technological race for better quality and for scientific breakthroughs in the weapons field appears to be with us for at least as long as the present world political situation lasts.

Nor can I see that any adverse effect is likely to arise from the effort to improve our limited-war capabilities, apart from the propaganda storm which the Communists will direct at any positive action on our part. The gap between the 175 divisions which the Soviets are usually credited with having and the present 14 United States divisions is too great for legitimate concern on their part over an increase on our side of, say, six divisions. The proposed modernization program is merely a belated effort, following the Soviet pattern, to give our ground forces the best equipment which modern technology affords. To do less is a dangerous omission which is unfair to our soldiers and to those of our allies who will share the hazards of combat on the ground.

From the foregoing discussion I conclude that there is every reason to set out forthwith upon a new military program which will produce with minimum delay forces adequate to meet our commitments and capable of supporting our national objectives. Since these forces would not rely on any one weapons system they would permit a strategy of flexible response and offer our civilian leadership many alternatives in policy and action. These forces should be built, let me emphasize again, without awaiting better guidance and more sophisticated procedures. They are needed at the first possible moment in order to assure that the military power of the United States commands the respect indispensable for the maintenance of the peace.

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THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS

By Jean-Marie Domenach

THE *pronunciamento* is not in the French tradition. Neither General Bonaparte nor Marshal Pétain nor, in 1944, General de Gaulle relied on the Army when he seized power. On occasions when military chiefs came into conflict with the Government they always ended by obeying it. The revolt of the generals and colonels in Algeria in May 1958 was therefore an entirely new phenomenon. Will it remain an exception? Or is it true that the Army has become master of the destinies of France? Is it going to rule the State from now on, directly or through its agents? To find an answer to this question—an answer that holds the key to the whole future of France—it is essential to understand why and how the Army came to intervene as it did in politics.

II

After the French Army had gained a sense of unity in the victorious fighting of 1944–45 it found itself almost at once engaged in Indochina. There it had its initial traumatic experience. While most of the French people were thinking only of how to forget the miseries of the Occupation, the Army found itself locked in a difficult war of a new sort. During seven years, thousands of miles from home, it developed a special mentality and doctrine. It faced a fanatical enemy, but it did not have the faith and support of its own people. It felt that it was forgotten and misunderstood; and when at last it had to evacuate Indochina, it believed it had been betrayed.

By a tendency natural enough in men who have faced death, the Army little by little came to feel that it, and it alone, had lived real history. While the West was enjoying the pleasures and comforts of peace, they in the front line, a mere handful of men, had been taking the full shock of Communist aggression. Probably the Roman legions who fought on the *limes* while Rome gave itself over to pleasure felt the same compulsion to reform the Empire.

An original reason for the divorce of the Army from the State was the conviction that the war was permanent. Officers in Indochina felt that the Second World War had been transformed into

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a Third World War and that while the West failed to understand this they were living it in all reality. It was not an open war; it was a many-sided operation which called for the fullest utilization of practical and psychological resources and only occasionally resorted to arms. The balance of terror which paralyzed the great world powers left the field open for "revolutionary wars" which the Soviet Union launched by remote control at chosen weak points. Some colonels went so far as to assert that limited wars were the only type of military conflict which remained possible aside from a war of instantaneous atomic annihilation.

When the Algerian insurrection broke out in 1954, it could be interpreted easily enough in accordance with this strategic theory. Indeed, it offered an excuse for not dwelling on the specific causes of this insurrection, and in particular on French responsibilities for it. Further, it seemed legitimate to demand Western solidarity here, too, in the name of defense against Communism. After Asia, Africa. Had not Lenin predicted that the Bolshevik Revolution would reach Europe by a gigantic flanking movement? And after Africa it would be South America's turn.[1]

We need not discuss this thesis, but merely note that the Army, left to its own devices, ended by defining a strategy which necessarily implied a policy as well. Normally it is the State which designates the enemy and sets forth the objectives in war. In this instance, basing itself on its experience in Indochina, the Army decided that it was not engaged against a specific enemy but, in the common interest of the West, against international Communism. This conviction carried the germ of the revolt. What was involved was a tactical episode in a world war; any retreat, any armistice, strengthened the enemy—the enemy which it was the Army's mission to conquer.

Thus the Army took on the shape of an autonomous power, not in order to support a political party or the aspirations of a dictator, but on the contrary in order that it could remain faithful to its mission to carry out to the very end the orders which it had received, to save the nation from itself, to protect the West

[1] For example, here is the conclusion of a talk given at SHAPE in November 1957 by General Allard, Army Corps Commander in Algeria: "The Soviet Union has succeeded in crystallizing the defense of the free world on one objective—to persuade the adversary not to resort to total war. In this way many people are misled into believing that its principal line of effort is not the direct East-West axis but a vast enveloping arc passing through China, the Far East, South Asia, the Middle East, Egypt and North Africa, ending up by encircling Europe. This now has almost come to pass; all that remains for Communism to attain its goal is to snatch Algeria from France."

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even if it did not know its peril. In this perspective, the idea of abandoning Algeria was as unthinkable as it would be to abandon a strong point in the middle of a battle.

III

In the course of its contact with the Communist enemy the Army had learnt not only the necessity of waging war to the bitter end but also how to wage it. A regular army had been beaten by a semi-clandestine army of partisans; and we know how carefully, how stubbornly, every army in the world draws the lessons of lost wars. The war in Indochina taught that the most modern army is not worth anything if it is not backed up by political action. According to Mao Tse-tung, the revolutionary army is only one fraction of the forces mobilized; it rests on a fanatically ideological mass and is entirely enveloped by agitators. To fight it you must place yourself on its own ground. This demands first that against the revolutionary faith you must be able to oppose a contrary faith of a comparable dynamism; second, that alongside traditional military procedures you must employ modern techniques of mobilizing the masses and manipulating opinion (dual authorities, control by cells, obsessive propaganda, brain washing, etc.).

Their humiliating experiences in defeat or in the Viet Minh "reëducation camps" confirmed many French officers in the correctness of the theories of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. As a result, some captains and majors on their return from Indochina set up a new service in the general staff which they called "psychological action." It remained only to put into effect against the Algerian insurgents the methods which they had learnt from the Communists in Indochina. One celebrated parachutist colonel summed up the Army's task in Algeria as follows: "What we have to do is organize the population from top to bottom. You may call me a Fascist, but we have to make the population docile and everyone's actions must be controlled."[2]

This phenomenon deserves to be studied. Already after the First World War, in conditions not unlike those which followed the Second, Fascist and Nazi theoreticians had decided that in order to fight Communism effectively one had to adopt its own methods; this led to the suppression of democracy. The officers of "psychological action" have followed something of the same

[2] Colonel Trinquier, to the Associated Press, September 1958.

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road, though in a less radical and systematic way. They too began by adopting a sort of Leninism, limited to method—"I am a Communist without doctrine," said Colonel Trinquier. Thence they were led to try to develop a political doctrine that could inspire propaganda and mobilize energies. Unlike the Fascists, however, they have not found this doctrine—or rather they have found several doctrines; furthermore, unlike Italy or Germany in the 1920s, the French situation did not lend itself to being crystallized in a totalitarian mold. This is the reason that, after having fought the democratic forces in May 1958 and having been obliged to surrender, these officers were not able to find a substitute and had to appeal to a personality who could reassure public opinion.

We note in passing that in the name of efficiency the battle against Communism took over little by little the enemy's methods. The first consequence was conduct contrary to human dignity and there followed a progressive denial of the ideals for which the battle was being fought. The second consequence was really to create the peril which was being denounced. To liken the Front of National Liberation to Communism was an aberration, but the result was that the F.L.N. was thrown back on the Eastern bloc and Ferhat Abbas finally went to Moscow and Peking looking for help. Thus both in method and in strategy the activist section of the French Army entered into a sort of dialectical collaboration with the Communist enemy. All of which, of course, is only a specific example of a problem that the democracies have had so much difficulty in facing up to for the past 30 years—how to respond to totalitarian methods without adopting them, and how to adopt them without becoming contaminated by their spirit. The answer of the military activists is regrettable, but we must admit that the problem is difficult.

This difficulty became manifest at once. Totalitarian policy is stable; democratic policy is changeable and therefore offers an adversary opportunities for manœuvre. Changes in the governing majority, the fall of governments, successive definitions of different objectives—these phenomena army leaders found incompatible with their assigned task.

Then democracy was put to the test on the score of ideological consistency. Revolutionary movements like Communism and nationalism enjoy a unified vision; they synthesize interests, sentiments, ideas. Democracy does not fight for a single idea but

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for the right of people to have ideas. Against the nationalist slogan "independence," the Army, on its own authority, set the slogan "integration," a policy which it deduced from the necessities of its form of combat and which it forced on the Government; and when General de Gaulle proclaimed "self-determination," the army chiefs protested because they had to have a formula which symbolized a unified will and which could be described in simple terms. "We won't have our men killed," they said, "in order that the Algerians may be given the right to vote F.L.N."

Their "war of ideas" required a single idea, fixed and clear. From this position the Army arrived somewhat experimentally at political action. Its chiefs sensed that the old principles of patriotism and discipline were not enough to set up against "subversive war;" and in order to fulfill their mission they demanded that the State define a policy and hold to it. As the State was weak and divided, the Army naturally substituted itself for the State; in its ten years of continuous combat it had worked out a coherent conception of permanent interests and of the objectives of guerrilla war.

IV

The State itself prepared the Army to make this substitution. In fact, as the Algerian rebellion became worse, the Government continuously extended its administrative and police powers. The decisive step was taken in January 1957 when the Resident General in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, a Socialist, gave over full power in Algeria to General Massu. This delegation of power, an act of enormous importance, was carried through simply by prefectorial decree; almost secretly the civil authority transferred the ungrateful task of maintaining order to the shoulders of the military. The "battle of Algiers" followed. Relying on his parachutists, General Massu succeeded in strangling terrorism, at the cost, however, of imprisoning, torturing or irregularly executing thousands of persons. It was a success for the Army, but it was won by doing serious wrong to the rights of man. The hypocritical State refused to assume any responsibility.

At the beginning of 1958 more than half the French Army, in all about 600,000 men, were stationed in Algeria. Besides the combatants, who formed a small minority, the Army included police units (parachutists and quasi-secret military police called

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D.O.P.), a considerable propaganda outfit (psychological action, newspapers, radio) and a full-scale politico-administrative organization (S.A.S. and S.A.U.) which took in hand both the urban and the rural population. The Army built roads, regrouped the evacués, distributed food; military men became mayors, agricultural advisers, teachers, political propagandists. When the Europeans rose on May 13 in fear that they were to be made the victims of a negotiation with the F.L.N., the Army limited the revolt, moderated it and oriented it toward "integration" and Franco-Moslem "fraternization." It was at this moment that the Army took a position which was thenceforth to weigh so heavily on French policy. Strictly speaking, it did not revolt; it placed itself between the two sides. It did not declare for one or against the other; on the contrary, it presented itself as arbitrator between the opposed factions. Instead of letting civil war loose, it pretended that it alone had prevented it; it formed the link between the Europeans and the Moslems, between Algeria and France. In this way the Army did not assert itself against the State. It asserted itself as though it were the State, or at least the provisional replacement of it in a time of crisis.

This non-violent tactic, strange for an Army, was successful because the civil power had already resigned and shown itself to be only a powerless and divided faction. The story of these days in May 1958 shows that the military leaders proceeded only to the extent that they felt certain of being followed by the great majority of French opinion and in this way found democratic support for the legitimacy of their action. Also, they never sought to set up a military government and hastened to rally to the régime of General de Gaulle. One therefore cannot speak of a *putsch* or of a *pronunciamento*. The fact remains that for three weeks the Army took the place of the Government and by skillful pressure obliged it to capitulate. Even if the Army did not wish to seize the State, it evidently had secured a new power; a sort of unwritten delegation of power authorized it to intervene in crises when the Government admitted that it was unable to maintain national unity and carry on the war.

V

The head of the Fifth Republic was quick to assert the civilian legitimacy of his régime and made patient efforts to deprive the Army little by little of its political powers. Officers were made to

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retire from administrative and political organs which they had been directing; the most political of the generals were transferred out of Algeria; the "Action Psychologique" was officially discontinued. Simultaneously, instead of accepting the Army's slogan of "integration," General de Gaulle set for it the objective of creating the necessary conditions for the Algerians to exercise self-determination.

Now, after two years, can it be said that the Army has resumed its traditional place in the State? Can one say that the Army obeys the State? In appearance it has submitted, or rather it has allied itself with the authority born out of its revolt. However, many facts make clear that it continues to play a decisive political role.

Not without grief did the principal army leaders in Algeria follow the orders of the Chief of State. In January 1960 General Massu openly declared himself hostile to self-determination[2] and his departure from Algiers provoked a commotion which was a reproduction in miniature of May 13. In September, General Salan, who had headed the Army in Algeria in May 1958 and who had come back to Algiers in a civil capacity, also rose up against General de Gaulle's policy. These are grave symptoms, for they concern two officers who had been the most fervent partisans of General de Gaulle's return to power.

But there was something more disquieting still. The Army may momentarily have given up trying to impose its policy but it continues to be a political force, a massive pressure group with which the State constantly has to reckon. Thus it has been impossible so far, in spite of General de Gaulle's orders, to bring to justice the persons responsible for the death of Maurice Audin, Professor at the University of Algiers, who disappeared after being tortured by parachutists. The Army stands together to cover its own. Although "Action Psychologique" was suppressed it has been reconstituted under another name. Units of uncertain allegiance continue to carry out police operations that are often of a most cruel sort. And when complaints are made to General de Gaulle about the abuses of certain officers he replies: "And do you suppose that they obey me?"

[3] "The Army no longer understands this policy. . . . So far it has not shown its power. At the right moment it can impose its will." (Statement to the German journalist Kempski, January 15, 1960.) These words show how conscious the Army was of its political power; their gravity consists in the fact that they were spoken by an Army Corps General, an old comrade of General de Gaulle and considered the pillar of Gaullism in the Army in Algeria.

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Events at the beginning of 1960 help us to estimate the extent of the Army's political role. One section of it, notably the parachutists, tried in January to renew the operation of May 1958; they allowed a riot to develop in order to be able to intervene as arbitrator between the Government and the European rebels. But this time the majority of the Army did not follow suit and the Government won. However, General de Gaulle did not wish to exploit his victory, even though he had the support of virtually all of French opinion. Almost at once he left for Algeria in order to reassure the Army. The result of his tour of officers' messes was a severe blow to hopes for peace. In the same way it was army pressure which led to the failure of the Melun *pourparlers* last June. The military's demand for the surrender of arms deprived General de Gaulle's propositions to the F.L.N. of all meaning; and he demonstrated to the Army's satisfaction that the *pourparlers* were limited to the military conditions of a cease-fire and did not infringe on policy.

The conclusion is inevitable that the Army continues to exercise an occult political power which can be called the right to arbitrate or veto.[4] The Army obeys, but its obedience is conditional: it obeys to the extent that the State conforms to the national interest, and of this the Army considers itself both the repository and the interpreter. The principal military leaders still believe that they are invested with a sort of national magistracy, superior to the civil power and indeed limiting that power's field of action. Besides, they are obeying a man rather than an institution—a man who, they do not forget, is in their debt.

The political role of the Army therefore is not revolutionary, nor even really active. There certainly are revolutionaries in the Army; many officers who came into contact with the miserable condition of the Moslems developed a sort of patriotic socialism, sincerely generous and anti-colonialist.[5] There also are reactionaries, who borrow their principles from Catholic conservatism and dream of reorganizing France on an authoritarian and corporative model. Various secret societies ("Armée-Nation," "Les Templiers," "Catena") maintain contact between the Army,

[4] Raoul Girardet, "Pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire dans la France contemporaine," *Revue Française de Science politique*, March 1960.

[5] They are influenced by the group, "Patrie et Progrès." For example, a colonel nationalized a certain number of land holdings and had them developed according to the strictest principles of the Chinese commune.

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para-military groups, police elements and extreme rightist politicians, with the aim of seizing power. Certain associations of reserve officers are in reality political clubs; officers on active duty keep them on the alert in defense of French Algeria. But although these activities are disquieting, the most dangerous plotting—between the Army and the Algerian "ultras"—has been considerably reduced by patient government action and by excesses of extremist leaders which turned the Army against them.

In essence, then, the political role of the Army remains negative: it is an invisible pressure, a permanent blackmail, exercised in the name of the superior interests of France and of the West. No longer does the Army tell the State what it must do but what it must not do. It fixes the limits beyond which it will not feel itself bound to obey. These are, first, if French sovereignty in Algeria were abandoned; second, if a Popular Front government were formed in France.

VI

Thus the Army exercises an indirect political power of a new sort. General de Gaulle knows it and tries to divert the Army bit by bit from its complete preoccupation with Algeria. He wants to make it into a modern army, equipped with an atomic deterrent power, in which technicians will rapidly get the upper hand of the political generals. But how to achieve this goal while the war in Algeria goes on? And how to end the war in Algeria while the Army blocks negotiations? So far, General de Gaulle has not made a frontal attack on this dilemma. His preoccupation has been to achieve peace while avoiding a revolt or break in the Army. The recollection of its disobedience and schism in 1940 haunts him and, it is sometimes said, paralyzes him.

How long can this ambiguous situation continue? The subterranean pressure of the Army on the State creates a deep uneasiness. The Left holds the Army responsible for the continuation of the war and questions the legitimacy of a régime which depends on the military and does not dare impose its will upon it. An extreme example of the general uneasiness was the insubordination of a number of students, given public approval by an impressive list of professors, writers and artists. Thus the insubordination of certain army chiefs is answered by the insubordination of a group of intellectuals.

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Is a brutal reckoning inevitable? It is important to note here that the Army is not to be considered as a unit. Among the officers, about a third seem determinedly hostile to the Government. The recent breakup of the Mali Federation, the disorders in the Congo, strengthen their conviction that independence leads to secession, anarchy and thence to Communism. However, many officers are still faithful to the apolitical tradition and are prepared to obey. The mass of the Army—the soldiers and non-commissioned officers, as well as the reserve officers—will not take part in a *putsch,* will even oppose it, at least to some extent. Their attitude follows public opinion, and in January 1960, as we have seen, this chose to follow the Chief of State against a military insurrection. In addition, the trade unions have made known their determination to respond to any attempted *putsch* by a general strike. France, pushing ahead towards modernization, is not inclined to submit to a military dictatorship. And the Army will not move if it feels that it has the majority of the country against it.

At any rate, there is no military leader at present who can take over the Army without a contest and rely upon it to defy the Government. Among the three Marshals of the last war, Leclerc and de Lattre de Tassigny, the two with the most prestige, are dead. The third, Alphonse Juin, has proclaimed his hostility to the policy of self-determination with special vigor because he himself is of Algerian origin; but he has limited political sense and does not seem to have either the qualities or the defects which push a military leader to seize the State.

It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Army will give up its peaceful pressure and again intervene with force. However, as the Algerian conflict continues, the Government will soon find itself facing a choice. For France, this war is on the way to being won militarily and on the way to being lost politically. The Army will not stand by passively and see its military successes wiped out by a political victory of the F.L.N., nor will it ever resign itself to abandoning to enemy reprisals the 160,000 *harkis* (Moslem auxiliaries) whom it has enrolled and the Moslem civilians who have collaborated with it. The Army would consider this much more than a political impossibility—it would be a crime, a betrayal of a word of honor. Equally certain it is that if General de Gaulle had to leave office before the end of the Algerian war the Army would intervene in the choice of his successor; no government

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could be installed without the Army giving its proxy. In this way its indirect power would become a formative power.

The scope for negotiation is therefore narrow. One thing is certain. Intervention by the United Nations or any political solution considered humiliating for France would result in a revolt by the Army or at least a split in it; activist elements would join forces with the European "ultras" to create a very grave situation not just for France but perhaps for world peace.

The political action of the Army thus depends on how the situation in Algeria evolves. But it depends even more essentially on the institutions of France. French democracy has, so to say, evaporated; public opinion is passive, the parties count for almost nothing. Consequently, the body of the State and the living forces of the nation face each other lacking any interpreter. On one side the Army; on the other the university, the trade unions. This is a state of latent civil war and it cannot be prolonged indefinitely without coming to a head. If the French people are not successful in forming a modern and stable democracy, the Army will continue, openly or covertly, to bring pressure to bear on national policy. If the people are successful, the Army will resume its proper place—a place which, we must admit, it was encouraged to leave by the weakness and vacillation of the civil government.

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THE MEANS SHORT OF WAR

By Willy Brandt

TWO compelling factors have given decisive impetus to international affairs since the end of World War II: the idea of self-determination and the explosive development of technology. Even the elementary opposition of East and West had to accommodate itself to the world-changing forces set free by the end of colonialism and by the work of the natural scientists. Under other circumstances the antagonism between East and West easily might have led to a wide-open conflagration. Instead, whenever a fire did flare up, it was smothered. The custom became not to solve problems, but rather to put them on ice and not run an unmanageable risk. Korea, Indochina, the 1953 uprising in the Soviet zone of Germany, the Suez crisis and Hungary have been stations on this often bitterly distressing but probably unavoidable road of self-preservation.

In the light of this situation, nations now are seeking new rules for the "game" of international power politics. Yet experience has shown how foolish it is to expect salvation by changing the techniques of negotiation. Disputes over methods—about secret diplomacy, summit conferences or executive tête-à-tête visits—really should be secondary considerations. More than tools are required to shore up the world's damaged power equilibrium.

There are bound to be setbacks in the process of finding rules that will do justice to the new state of affairs. East and West have to learn that even a conference blown up so unceremoniously as the one to have been held in Paris does not stop the world, a few months later, from talking about another climb up to the very same summit. Since war is not to be, what follows miscarried negotiations are new negotiations.

The world thus will have to accustom itself to continue seeking a balance of forces under conditions that mean neither peace nor war in the traditional sense of the terms. This assumes protecting what each side possesses at the moment. The effort to develop new rules of the "game" is based very largely on a policy of seeking to maintain the military status quo.

At the same time, we know that the dynamic forces making for constant change cannot be suspended by freezing military positions as they now stand. The next 20 years will probably change

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our world even more profoundly than the past 20 years have done. The novelty of the situation lies in the requirement that such sweeping change now become possible without suicidal conflict. In other words, the established military status quo is the point of departure for overcoming immobility. It creates the conditions needed for a controversy with Communism that engages all means other than those of war. A military status quo will finally enable us to climb out of our trenches for the decisive political engagements which we are best equipped to win.

II

The Berlin problem should be viewed in this light. Berlin is not merely the divided capital of an arbitrarily divided nation. Nor is justice done to Berlin by seeing it solely in a European relationship. Berlin is the free world's most prominent outpost. Western prestige and the credibility of Western guarantees constitute a highly capitalized moral investment in Berlin. To lose such an investment would mean more than the loss of a relatively small territory and its freedom-loving people.

The Berlin issue is a product, not the cause, of existing tensions; hence, there is no way of settling it in isolation. The only way to deal with it is as a part of those tensions. Any attempt to solve the Berlin problem by itself will lead to disillusionment.

Of course, a patient can throw away the thermometer and imagine he has gotten rid of his fever. The malady still remains. If that is true, then those who must look for new rules to regulate the conflicts in the relations between East and West cannot begin by abandoning the basis of that conflict, the status quo in Berlin. The cost of altering that would not be confined to the population involved, by depriving them of their right to self-determination; it would also cost the Western alliance the esteem in which it is held in Europe and in the whole world. It is precisely in Berlin that the rules of the "game" have to be tried and tested. Here is the place to have a demonstration of whether the Soviet Union will abstain from unilateral action to violate legally binding agreements.

A review of the new two-year-old Berlin crisis provides us with some interesting insights in this respect.

Western firmness stood the test of the Soviet Prime Minister's initial ultimatum. The Soviet Union recognized that it cannot drive the Western powers out of Berlin by means of coercive

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threats. This Soviet realization is important; it helps preserve the peace. Subsequently, the Communists used a new tactic, which brought them certain gains; and they still continue to apply it. One could call this a phase of guerrilla warfare waged with deceitful phrases and chicanery.

On his way home from the abortive Paris meeting, the Soviet Prime Minister stopped over in East Berlin to make a public statement about West Berlin and his "Peace Treaty with Germany." The present situation would have to be maintained, he said, until the heads of state met again. Behind the screen of this statement and the subsequent reassuring remarks made by Mr. Khrushchev at the United Nations in New York, the German Communist régime took the initiative with a series of moves that appear inconsequential but actually are highly significant.

It began at the end of August with regulations undermining the principle of free movement within Berlin; West Berliners are not yet affected, but since then West German visitors must obtain special permits to enter the Eastern sector of the city. Over 1,000 other West Germans were prevented from driving to Berlin at all. Then West Berlin products were confiscated on the highway to West Germany, and German Communists in the Soviet zone announced that they alone would decide what might be transported on the routes leading to Berlin. Other measures aim to separate West Berlin from the Federal Republic. Thus West Berliners are no longer permitted to travel in East-bloc countries on Federal Republican passports. The presence of West German government offices in Berlin has been declared "illegal," and it supposedly would be a "provocation" for the parliament of the Federal Republic to hold a session again in West Berlin.

The purpose is not only to injure Berlin and isolate her from West Germany; above all, it is an attempt to isolate her from her guardians, the Western powers. Furthermore, the seemingly technical nature of the measures chosen and individually applied is not such as to arouse strong interest throughout the world. Yet each move realizes a specific part of the Soviet proposal for a "free city," and together these steps constitute an attempt to build up a *fait accompli* before a new conference on Berlin has been convened.

The Communists want to annul the right of free access to Berlin. They are trying to destroy the web of communications by which West Berlin has tied itself to Western Germany with the

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consent of the Allied authorities. Berlin's day-to-day existence depends on these ties. Finally, the Communists deny the validity of four-power agreements for both parts of the city. In notes to the Soviet Union the Western powers have declared that they will not put up with this course of events. In addition, the Federal Republic has terminated the agreement on so-called interzonal trade between the two parts of Germany. As these lines are being written, it is not clear whether these reactions will suffice to compel the Communists to desist from their present actions.

To make them do so will require joint policies among the three Western powers and between Bonn and Berlin. The Soviet Government must be impressed with the fact that no unilateral modification of the situation will be tolerated. On whatever level new negotiations take place, they should not begin at the compromising point where they were temporarily suspended in Geneva last year. The only proper point of departure for new negotiations is the situation that existed before this new Berlin crisis was contrived.

Negotiations could produce supplementary agreements based on those that already exist. Such negotiations should above all guarantee the smooth and unhindered operation of traffic between West Berlin and Western Germany. Any change in the legal basis for the Western powers' presence in Berlin is unacceptable: that not only would mean forfeiting original rights, it would also set in motion a retreat which inevitably would have the gravest consequences. It goes without saying that Berlin is ready to contribute its share of suggestions in the interest of relaxing tensions. However, no one can expect that Berliners will agree to proposals which undermine the foundations of their existence.

My citizens and I want nothing so much as the chance to go on living normally and working to build a better future, as we have managed to do for so long under extraordinary circumstances. But we are determined to remain free and to prevent further Communist expansion at our expense. If there is any place in this world where the intellectual and moral values associated with Western culture have stood the acid test, that place is Berlin.

III

Throughout Germany today Berlin has become *the* national symbol, the theme that moves the German people—more so, in

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fact, than German reunification, for people sense that this goal can be reached only in the course of a longer historical development. A false decision regarding Berlin would infuse a creeping poison into people's thinking in both parts of Germany, with consequences that are unimaginable.

One of the most striking things about democracies that work is that by the conscious exercise of restraint they avoid putting the fundamental problems of national life at the dead center of all party differences, and that instead they show concern for problems of method and priority. In the Federal Republic far too little attention was devoted in the past to reducing party differences to manageable proportions. Now the Federal Republic has reached a stage of maturity that permits her to follow the example of other democratic states; this would be called for even if the present international situation did not require it.

The Federal Republic cannot trade its position in the Western community for another; on this point, the way things stand in the world, it simply has no alternative. It is logical and inevitable for Germany's great democratic parties to have a great deal in common, at least where fundamental questions of foreign policy are concerned. Experience shows that the world wants to hear a unified answer from a nation on its most vital problems; indeed, a nation usually has a chance of being heard only if it can produce uniform and consistent answers.

The policy objective of any German government must be the restoration of unified government for the country. It has become more difficult at the present time to pursue this goal. The long-cherished belief that the German question would be settled automatically—because West European integration and rearmament supposedly would add up to German reunification—has proved to be a delusion. But even if Germany is not the central issue of international affairs, it does remain a major problem. German foreign policy must develop far more initiative than it has hitherto shown in contributing its share to Western deliberations; the Federal Republic must search, jointly with her allies, for ideas and new openings to solve the German problem. Our people cannot retire from history and wait until someone calls them back with the message: Now is the best time to reunite your country. Seventy million Germans are pressing for reunion; they cannot be reduced to mere historical objects, nor can Germany be shut out of the world and declared an international reservation.

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Should the German Social Democrats take office in the fall of 1961, something already true will become evident to the whole world: our Federal Republic is not an adventurous trespasser seeking a short-cut on the field of international relations, nor is she a wanderer between two worlds. The Federal Republic will remain a reliable ally and lasting friendship with the United States will remain the cornerstone of her foreign policy. We shall shoulder the consequences of our obligations under the alliance, although that does not mean abandoning our obligation and right to see to it that joint decisions take our viewpoint into account.

Certain considerations are basic to every effort to break the deadlock on the German problem. Here what applies to Berlin applies to the German question as well: an isolated solution should not even be sought; it could only mean a pretended "solution." Any progress with the German problem requires that progress be made on the other questions of disarmament and East-West relations. There is no value in fixing a rigid sequence for this; what is needed is that the allied powers make progress in dovetailing the questions, gearing the timing and the substance of each with the others. Since German reunification is next to unobtainable under conditions of international high-tension, any German suggestions on disarmament also constitute a contribution to reunification. If any nation has a strong interest that the international situation shall cease to rest on fear, it is Germany.

IV

The German people's intention to restore unified government in their country does not conflict with their readiness to make what can be decisive contributions to European integration. As experience has shown, in this kind of historical progress haste does not produce the best results. European integration is compelled to proceed on the convoy principle; all must move at a pace set by the slowest partner. But that is better than causing a breach in the unity attained so far.

In recent years economic consolidation has preceded political integration. Two different groups have been formed in the process. Six continental nations are determined to set in motion a process that should lead them finally into a European federation. Another group felt it had sober cause not to agree to this course. It now seems that the danger of a dualism in Europe be-

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tween the six countries of the European Economic Community and the seven in the Free Trade Area can be avoided. However, the reason for this is not economic. Primarily it is because France's political leaders do not seem to believe that they can abandon the classical attributes of national sovereignty; hence, it does not appear that integration will be fully realized in the foreseeable future. This may be regrettable, but it might have one favorable consequence: the chances now seem better for a strategy which aims to develop the greatest possible mutuality among the largest possible number of countries. I am convinced that a concentration of material resources, a joint development of scientific capacities and a coöperative effort in the field of research will produce sufficient momentum to carry Europe over the hurdles of tradition onto a higher level of coöperation.

A Western weakness is revealed in the fact that the highest degree of integration achieved by a large number of nations is in the field of defense. An elementary striving for security proved stronger than the recognition that effective union is necessary in the economic and political fields. There is no justification for weakening the North Atlantic Alliance; rather, it must be strengthened as a means of coöperation and integration. As a highly integrated instrument of defense, NATO could also solve problems of armament control and support efforts to keep the atomic club as small as possible.

Nuclear weapons should not become an instrument of German politics. On the other hand, neither can West Germany take the position that it is morally reprehensible to handle such weapons and that it rests solely with our allies to think about what must be done to prevent a one-sided shift in the balance of military power. The strength and armament of the Bundeswehr must accord with the Federal Republic's obligations toward its partners in the Atlantic community. The advice of military experts is needed to determine these matters; but the decisions must be made by the political leaders. The responsibility lies entirely in their hands.

Armament and disarmament are simply two sides of a page dealing with the same theme: security. That is reason enough for a Ministry of Defense to be more than a Ministry for Rearmament. Since Germany has particular reason for wishing that mankind's survival shall not be left to chance, the Federal Republic should make its own contribution, if not to the ambitious theme

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"disarmament" then at least to partial objectives like the limitation and control of armaments. This does not imply any intention of giving German foreign policy a new orientation, but simply of making Germany more clearly conscious of its role in the Western community, where it must provide stimulation for stronger activity by the West as a whole.

V

In the matter of the underdeveloped countries, the Federal Republic has failed to formulate consistent policies and to undertake binding obligations. It must install a well-conceived and well-balanced program in place of the haphazard and insufficient activities which it has undertaken so far.

The end of colonialism in its classical form is a definite fact of our century. It is no longer a question of principle but only of time before all colored peoples have achieved independence. To aid them to the extent they desire assistance would be a gigantic task even if the Pope were in the Kremlin and there were no such thing as an East-West conflict. Even under other circumstances the contrast between unspeakable poverty in most countries of the world and unprecedented prosperity in others would be enough to drive mankind relentlessly into conflicts.

The tensions between East and West complicate the problem. The principle of self-determination for which the West stands assumes that it is to be applied everywhere. This means repudiating colonialism in every form and recognizing the right of the colored peoples to pursue whatever course they choose. Naturally, we are not precluded from making clear to the new nations that they will not be able to follow a path of independence if the scales of power between East and West are not in approximate balance. Any serious shift in this balance to the detriment of the West would automatically carry a threat to the so-called neutral world.

Aid to the underdeveloped countries is not a vehicle for seeking allies in the cold war, but for winning friends. Moreover, respect for the distinctive characteristics of other peoples and for their different cultural values prevents us from presuming that the political, economic and sociological institutions and practices of highly developed industrial countries can be transplanted whole to underdeveloped areas. We can simply show the peoples there how certain models and methods work under our conditions; and we can offer them assistance with the central task they have to

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perform for themselves: the creation of new institutions that suit their domestic conditions and traditions, while also making use of technical knowledge and modern methods of organization.

Multilateral aid programs are preferable whenever possible; but there will be occasions when it proves wiser and more effective to proceed on a bilateral basis. Germany has done far too little by way of exploiting the credit that fell into her lap, as it were, by reason of having lost her position as a colonial power as early as World War I.

Development aid cannot consist primarily of lending money for the purchase of capital equipment or goods in Europe or America. Wherever possible, priority should be given to investment in the underdeveloped countries themselves. Here the object will be to create a sound relationship between modernizing the agricultural economy and promoting real industrialization.

Assistance to education at home should take precedence over training in industrial countries abroad. The latter type of assistance should be confined to students and engineers or to those who have already had some higher training or experience at home. Often more important than offers of financial means is technical assistance through men who are prepared to devote several years to instruction and training in underdeveloped countries.

Germany has particular cause to hope that the right of self-determination will prevail as an idea and prove itself in practice, for this will support the application of the principle in Europe and in particular to the German people. Here is an aim that our friends in Africa and Asia will understand and approve.

VI

The Kremlin has challenged the West to economic, scientific and intellectual competition against Communism. To neglect this challenge would be capitulation. We may accept it, in full confidence of our strength on this terrain. What now is called the East-West conflict is primarily one between states with democratic systems on the one side and the Soviet Union, China and their Communist satellites on the other. The intellectual appeals of Communism are a secondary factor today. It is not ideology that gives Communism its appeal. If Soviet or Chinese armies had not opened the way, Communism could hardly have seized another country. This indicates that security is the major question.

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The notion of Communist military superiority is a fiction and, what is perhaps even more important, despite many grand speeches, Soviet leaders themselves have no sense of military superiority which could make them consider an atomic war worthwhile. It is decisively important for the West to do everything in its power to make sure that no change can take place in this regard. The West must remain so strong militarily that no man in the Kremlin would even imagine that he has a military advantage; were this to change, we would be exposed to so massive a front of blackmailing pressures that there would indeed be a genuine danger of war.

It is no less vital to recognize what conclusions the Kremlin has drawn from the fact that a balance of power does indeed exist. These conclusions are that the struggle between East and West must be carried out in the fields of economics, science, social justice and living standards—in sum, by creating conditions of life that are as nearly perfect as possible. Whoever does better here, declares Khrushchev, will have a bloodless victory, because the victor will have convinced the rest of humanity that his system is superior.

Many people in the West have failed to comprehend this program. Some let themselves be infatuated by the disarming sound of the policy; others are led by its apparent contradictions to doubt that it is serious. We cannot understand it unless we take it as the Communist leadership means it: a struggle by all means short of war. Recently, the cold war has been given a new name: peaceful coexistence. It would be naïve to imagine that under this rubric the Communists exclude pressure, extortion and the breaking of all diplomatic forms. The Berlin ultimatum of 1958 was as consistent with peaceful coexistence as the attempt to undermine the Congo or Khrushchev's onslaught before the United Nations. The principle that applies for Communist policies is this: all holds are permitted, only knives and knuckle-dusters are prohibited because if someone is to get killed it might be you yourself.

It would be just as erroneous to conclude from the ruthlessness of Khrushchev's methods that when he talks about competing for higher production and a better standard of living it is only propaganda. To a substantial degree propaganda is always political advertising. But even the most importunate soap advertisement does not justify anyone in doubting that soap exists but only in being suspicious about its claim to quality.

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After several decades of inflationary spending, in which the Communist leaders used as legal tender simply a future promise to pay, they are now under pressure to make a few first hard-currency payments that will actually mitigate living standards within the Eastern bloc. The new social strata which have grown up in the Soviet Union manifest "bourgeois" traits and inclinations. They are hardly a source of revolutionary unrest, probably not even of genuine opposition; but they are calling for better treatment in exchange for producing what the régime requires. In the long run, superior quality of performance presumes the performer's interest in making an effort. The Soviet slogan about "catching-up and overtaking the West" means three things:

(1) If Communist leaders were certain that their peoples were marching toward "Communism" like true believers, without knowledge of Western living standards, they would have no reason for proclaiming objectives drawn from the West. By making the Western standard of living the standard and goal for Communist programs they confess that the Communist world is behind the West and that the West will not fold up in obedience to some uncanny automatic law. The Soviet Union has accepted the Western performance as its standard for how civilized a state may be; in this acid test Communist doctrine is threatened with disintegration.

(2) With his slogans for a better standard of living, Khrushchev has to a certain extent tied himself down. The objective of catching up with and overtaking the West raises the aspirations of Soviet citizens for a better life, and this imposes a constraint on their leaders.

(3) With this slogan the Communists have ventured into the realm where Western abilities are strongest and Communist performance is weakest.

The "catch-up and overtake" propaganda puts Communist policies and Communist promises under the sway of the Western way of life, and no Iron Curtain has been tight enough to prevent the "infiltration" of its innumerable manifestations. Attempts to root out such "tendencies" have been desperate, pitiful and absurd. Expressions of Americanism are combatted by Communists at the same time that they try to overtake America. But most grotesque of all is the fact that combat of this kind is an ideological requisite of the system simply because the apparently untiring desire for such everyday things as jazz and blue jeans con-

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fronts Communism with an unplanned and uncontrollable human impulse.

It has become a favorite sport to ridicule the prosperity of the West. There is nothing shameful about being prosperous when wealth has been accumulated honestly and is fairly shared. Nor need prosperity bring weakness. At the very time that people in the West fear the ideological compactness of the East and imagine they must somehow construct a "counter-ideology," we find the East proclaiming our well-being as its standard for measuring progress and in part even as its model.

People in the Federal Republic of Germany are like people anywhere. The relationship between welfare and freedom is not more complicated here than it is elsewhere. The better the individual is faring the more readily he seems prepared to settle for things as they are. But what applies to citizens of the West also is true in the East. The simple desire for material advancement does not sustain a revolutionary fighting spirit and instead cultivates a desire to live in peace and to be left in peace. Comparing East and West today by standards of prosperity and freedom, we can conclude that we have both and the East has neither. Communism propagates and promises prosperity alone; it does not even promise freedom.

I am convinced that we can take up Communism's challenge. While we preserve the peace, we must find the rules of the "game" that grant us the free hand we need—economically, politically and intellectually—in the contest which is now called peaceful coexistence. It is a match we can win.

In the coming months Berlin will be a test both for the Kremlin's protestations of peaceful intent and for the resoluteness of the West. Statesmen face weighty decisions in 1961. My fellow-citizens in Berlin and I enter this year with accustomed equanimity. We have confidence in our friends and trust the pledges they have given this city. We are aware of our own resources as well. The Berliners defy Communist onslaughts against their freedom in the only way an unarmed people can. They have never blustered with other people's weapons, and they do not intend to do so in the future. The Western world should simply know that it can depend on the Berliners, come what may.

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AFTER DETECTION—WHAT?

By Fred Charles Iklé

THE current debate on arms control and disarmament puts great stress on the problem of how to detect violations of whatever agreements may be reached. To this end inspection schemes and instruments for detection are developed, their capabilities and limitations discussed, and efforts made to test and improve them. Indeed, the technical question of detection dominates not only the domestic debate but also the international disarmament negotiations.

Yet detecting violations is not enough. What counts are the political and military consequences of a violation once it has been detected, since these alone will determine whether or not the violator stands to gain in the end. In entering into an arms-control agreement, we must know not only that we are technically capable of detecting a violation but also that we or the rest of the world will be politically, legally and militarily in a position to react effectively if a violation is discovered. If we focus all our attention on the technicalities of how to detect a violation, we are in danger of assuming that our reactions and sanctions will be adequate.

A potential violator of an arms-control agreement will not be deterred simply by the risk that his action may be discovered. What will deter him will be the fear that what he gains from the violation will be outweighed by the loss he may suffer from the victim's reaction to it. In other words, even if we can develop an inspection system that makes the probability of detection very high, a nation contemplating a violation will not be deterred if it thinks it can discourage, circumvent or absorb our reaction.

We have learned (almost too late, in the case of the nuclear test ban) that an opponent may thwart our detection techniques by evasive techniques of his own. We should also realize that he may thwart the consequences of detection—which we count on to deter violations—by military or political stratagems. We must study, therefore, not only what our opponent may do to avoid detection, but also what he may do to escape the penalty of being detected.

Let us discuss the question of what may happen when an evasion is detected under four general headings: (1) the reaction of

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world opinion; (2) the political reaction by the injured country; (3) various military measures that the injured country could undertake in an effort to restore the situation that would have existed without an arms-control agreement; and (4) military and political measures that would go beyond this "restoration."

II

World opinion, it is sometimes argued, will help to enforce disarmament agreements. World opinion supposedly will turn against the violator, provided he is discovered and "convicted" in an internationally accepted forum. He will lose prestige and influence in the uncommitted countries. In addition, various world-wide political reactions are expected to work to his disadvantage.

"World opinion" is such an amorphous concept that one finds it difficult to determine just how it can injure a violator of arms-control agreements. Speeches or resolutions in the United Nations, or critical editorials in the world press, are not likely to hurt him very much. One reason world opinion is so impotent is that its memory is so short. If the world's reaction cannot be translated immediately into substantive political or military changes damaging to the violator, it will lose all force.

The Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution illustrates the point. This gave an exceptionally violent shock to world opinion—in fact, more violent than many possible violations of arms-control agreements are likely to be. This is particularly true since evidence of a violation might often be equivocal and involve technicalities hard for the public to understand. Some of the most cherished beliefs of the West and also of the uncommitted countries were flouted in Hungary: a popular revolt against a dictatorial régime in a small nation was crushed from outside by a large power. Agreements were broken in the most flagrant fashion. One was the promise given by the Soviet-installed Kadar Government to the Jugoslav Government not to take punitive action against Imré Nagy when he left sanctuary in the Jugoslav Embassy. Another was the invitation extended to General Maléter and other delegates of the legal Hungarian Government to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet forces—a trap to catch and execute them. Yet if one tries to list the penalties that world opinion imposed on the Soviet

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Union and the Kadar Government for these violations of its most sacred norms and of several important articles of the United Nations Charter, there is very little to record. There was a slight loss in the strength of Communist Parties in Western Europe (confined mostly to intellectuals on the fringe of the Party), but the loss is no longer noticeable. The strain on President Tito's relations with Moscow and the strengthening of NATO ties (particularly with Iceland) were largely ephemeral. Kadar has not been officially recognized as Hungary's legal representative in the United Nations; but he has been sitting in the General Assembly.

Other recent events have aroused world opinion, such as the Peking régime's violent repressions in Tibet and its violations of the Indian border. Yet in February 1960, only a few months after indignation in India had reached its peak, the Communists increased their vote in Kerala from 35 to 43 percent. And many of Communist China's neighbors continued to favor her admission to the United Nations.

Perhaps significantly, when Khrushchev discussed the nuclear test ban before the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, he chose to emphasize the reaction of world opinion as a deterrent to disarmament violations. By arguing that it was a sufficient deterrent, he tried, in effect, to brush aside the problems of inspection and control. But even if one assumed that the reaction of world opinion constituted an adequate sanction—an assumption challenged above—inspection would still be essential. A violator who does not risk being detected obviously does not need to fear world opinion. In any case, the West has paid insufficient attention to the stratagems which a detected violator can pursue to avoid or mitigate whatever action an aroused world opinion might take.

Many devices are available for this purpose. Thus the violator can frustrate the international inspection system and prevent it from reaching an official finding (study of Communist obstruction of inspection in North Korea reveals a large bag of such tricks). Or he can blame the other side for having violated the agreement first, and thus confuse the issue, or even generate an adverse political reaction against the injured party. Or he can accuse the other side of fabricating the evidence as a pretext for breaking the agreement or for covering up some other misdeed. Or he can assert that the agreement is

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obsolete in view of what he claims are changed political or military conditions and denounce it unilaterally prior to the intended violation (this would be analogous to the Soviet declaration that the Four-Power Agreements on Berlin were no longer valid). Finally, if some unfavorable reaction in world opinion is unavoidable, it may turn out that the violators "will cover themselves with shame"—as Khrushchev argued when he spoke about the nuclear test ban: "If some side violates the assumed commitments, the initiators of this violation will cover themselves with shame, they will be branded by all the peoples of the world." Yet, six weeks before making this assertion that a nuclear test ban would be enforced by world opinion, Khrushchev had this to recommend: "International reactionary circles are still trying to discuss the so-called 'Hungarian question' in the United Nations. Let them keep it as a souvenir if this consoles them."

Not only may the violator be contemptuous of world opinion, but he also may justify his acts on the grounds that they are demanded by the welfare of "the people" or by History—History being his conception of a superior morality that takes precedence over world opinion. "Had we not helped you," Khrushchev told the Hungarian Communists, "we would have been called stupid, and History would not have forgiven us this stupidity."

III

To be effective, a sanction must be applied as a result of governmental decisions by the injured countries. In democratic countries, government decisions are influenced by active public opinion, or, more precisely, by the conception of public opinion held by the government leaders. In these circumstances, democratic governments might experience serious political difficulties in reacting effectively to a detected evasion:

(1) The injured government must acknowledge the fact that there has been a violation. If the violation is open and well-publicized, no difficulty exists. But if evidence of the violation is equivocal or based on secret intelligence, the government may be reluctant to acknowledge the evasion or feel unsure of its ability to convince public opinion. For example, an admission that the control agreement had failed might be ex-

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ploited at home by the political opposition, particularly if the agreement had been made originally by the party in power. In such a situation some decision-makers may favor an interpretation which casts doubt on the intelligence data relating to evasion or which belittles the importance of the evasion. Responsible decision-makers seldom distort evidence deliberately.[1] But the interpretation of complicated information is often a matter of judgment and discretion; hence subtle biases may decide the issue. Responsible officials would be particularly disinclined to accept equivocal evidence about an evasion of a disarmament agreement if they had previously been forced to defend the agreement against partisan charges that it might be violated. Yet a democratic government could institute only minor penalties against an evasion without informing legislative bodies and the public about the exact situation and explaining the need for drastic retaliatory or corrective measures.

(2) The injured government must be willing to increase military expenditures and to offend pacifist feelings. Now the reaction to a localized or minor violation need not disturb the defense budget appreciably (the new military equipment needed to counteract the North Korean violations of the rearmament clause was not a heavy burden); but the breaking of a major disarmament agreement will almost certainly require new military measures, perhaps a full-scale program of rearmament. The decision to react firmly and regardless of expense will be a hard one. Public opinion may not approve, especially if the evasion occurred gradually or if it merely consists of a resumption of some activity that had been discontinued—such as testing. If knowledge of the evasion is based exclusively on clandestine intelligence sources that cannot be revealed, the opponent's denial may find receptive ears among domestic opposition groups.

We have already questioned the effectiveness of world opinion as a sanction against arms-control evasions. It is ironic that it may be domestic public opinion—or rather the government's conception of it—that actually prevents effective sanctions being taken. The classic instance of this, and one that may have been a con-

[1] When Germany violated rearmament restrictions in the 1930s, Winston Churchill suspected that "somewhere between the Intelligence Service and the ministerial chief there has been some watering down or whittling down of the facts." (Speech of May 22, 1935, in "While England Slept." New York: Putnam, 1938, p. 190.) Prime Minister Baldwin's later admission suggested that there might have been something deliberate about this "watering down," and perhaps at the highest level.

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tributing cause of World War II, was England's reluctance to rearm in response to Hitler's violations of the Versailles rearmament restrictions. With what he called "an appalling frankness," Prime Minister Baldwin explained in 1936 why his own government had been unable to react:

> You will remember at that time [1932–33] the Disarmament Conference was sitting in Geneva. You will remember at that time there was probably a stronger pacifist feeling running through this country than at any time since the war. You will remember the election at Fulham in the autumn of 1933, when a seat which the National Government held was lost by about 7,000 votes on no issue but the pacifist. . . . I asked myself what chance was there . . . within the next year or two of that feeling being so changed that the country would give a mandate for rearmament? Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain.[2]

(3) The injured government must accept the new risks created by its reaction to the violation. It may see more than the domestic difficulties involved. For example, it may have embarked on long-range policies which seem more promising and important than counteracting an accomplished evasion, and it may hesitate to jeopardize them.[3]

It has been argued that all countries will be deterred from violating a major arms-control agreement in present circumstances because to do so would set off an unrestricted arms race that would eventually lead to disaster for the guilty as well as the innocent.[4] But this is an assumption which may not be shared by a country set on violating the agreement. Its leaders may reason that the very prospect of an unrestricted arms race might itself inhibit the injured party from reacting to the violation. And in fact the injured party might feel it safer to write off the violation as a loss rather than risk new dangers by a policy of rearmament

[2] Baldwin's reply to Churchill as quoted in Churchill, "While England Slept." New York: Putnam, 1938, p. 333.

[3] Churchill was aware of this when he was pleading for a more effective response to Hitler's treaty violations: "Then it is said—and I must give this explanation of the extraordinary fact—that 'we were laboring for disarmament,' and it would have spoiled the disarmament hopes if any overt steps to raise our Air Force had been taken." Speech of May 22, 1935, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

[4] For example, the Committee on Science and Technology of the Democratic Advisory Council wrote on March 14, 1960, about the nuclear test ban: "A nation which violates such an agreement automatically sets into motion an arms race from which there may never be an end."

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—especially if it now finds itself in a weaker military position as a result of having complied with the agreement.

This dilemma is most serious. For example, the nuclear test-ban conference adopted an article on March 19, 1959, upon the insistence of the United States and the United Kingdom, affirming a country's "inherent right" to withdraw from the treaty if its provisions, "including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system," are not being fulfilled. This article might be of cardinal importance in connection with China's accession to the test-ban treaty, because part of the control system would have to be installed in China. But would it give the Western powers much leverage against Chinese obstructionism? In the absence of a known instance of illegal testing, would the West be willing to withdraw from a test-ban treaty with the Soviet Union, resume testing and risk accelerating the arms race merely because the "timely installation" of the control system was being prevented by China?

(4) The injured government may have to reach agreement with allies before it can react. All disarmament agreements of current interest involve the United States with one or more of its allies. It is usually a difficult task to prepare a joint negotiating position vis-à-vis a Communist opponent. Agreeing on a Western response to a violation will raise anew the problem of allied coördination. The stronger and more explicit the reaction proposed, the more difficult it will be to achieve agreement. And all the problems of domestic public opinion and partisan politics discussed above will be evident in the allied nations whose coöperation is required.

IV

The military sanctions against evasion of an arms-control agreement can either be confined to measures that restore the situation that would have existed without the agreement or they can go further. Let us call the former "restorative measures." If the violator resumes testing, the injured country will do likewise; if the violator reoccupies his part of a neutralized zone, the other will move back into his; and if the violator rearms, his opponent will rearm to the same extent.

The problem of deterring violations has often been oversimplified by assuming that a detected evasion would automatically be taken care of by the cancellation of the agreement and the appli-

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cation of such "restorative measures." But three conditions have to be met if "restorative measures" by themselves are to be an adequate deterrent:

(1) The potential violator must fear the risk of being detected.

(2) He must also fear that a detected violation will cause an unwanted response by the injured country.

(3) He must not expect a violation to bring him an irrevocable advantage that would outweigh whatever gain he derives from abiding by the agreement.

The importance of the first condition is fully recognized. The second condition depends on the political factors we have just discussed. Both these conditions are needed for deterring an evasion by any type of sanctions, whether "restorative" or "punitive." Here we are interested in the third condition, because if it is not met, "restorative measures" alone are inadequate.

This third condition is not met, for example, if an agreement comprises several arms-control measures in such a way that the separate measures, taken individually, favor either one side or the other. The agreement remains in the interest of both parties only if all measures are observed. Violation of a part of it cannot be deterred by the threat of "restorative measures" confined only to this particular part. Additional sanctions are required. Otherwise the violator can break just those control measures that are not to his advantage. He will stand to gain if his violation remains undiscovered or ignored; and he will also gain if the violated part of the agreement is cancelled, because the residual agreement will then be more to his advantage.

This is precisely what happened with the Korean armistice. The clause prohibiting the introduction of new military equipment was violated by the Communists from the first day, but cancellation of this clause by the United Nations Command did not come until four years later. So the Communists gained on the first count. They also gained on the second count (after the United Nations eventually instituted "restorative measures"), because the residual armistice agreement was more favorable to them than the original agreement. (It was they who had been primarily constrained by the cancelled rearmament clause.)

It might be argued that an arms-control measure can survive only if all its separable components are equally in the interest of both parties. If this argument is true, the future for disarmament agreements is bleak. It is hard enough to arrive at over-all

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agreements that will not, over time, seem disadvantageous to one side or the other. But individual components of an agreement are inevitably of unequal value to opposing nations. For example, in addition to the Korean armistice, several of the current proposals for disengagement zones are composed of very unequal provisions.

There are other situations where the threat of "restorative measures" would be insufficient to deter an evasion. The violator may gain an irrevocable technological lead or an irreversible strategic advantage. As has often been pointed out, if American and Soviet troops were withdrawn from Western and Eastern Europe, the United States might find it difficult or impossible to return in the event that Soviet troops moved back in. Western alliance arrangements might have lapsed, the American troops might have been demobilized, and in any case they would have to be transported a greater distance—not to mention the American public's unwillingness to send "the boys" back overseas, particularly under a threat of nuclear war.

To sum up, "restorative measures" will not deter a nation contemplating a violation of a disarmament agreement in those situations where our third condition is not met, namely, when the violator expects to gain less from abiding by the agreement than from abandoning it. Indeed, a potential violator might enter into agreements solely in order to seek gains by violating them. He would calculate that there would always be a chance of his escaping detection or that "restorative measures" might be delayed or frustrated for political reasons. And if he lost out on these chances, a mere return to the status quo would leave him no worse off than before he entered into the agreement. The violator, in fact, would be playing a profitable game: "Heads you lose, tails we're even."

V

Where the threat of "restorative measures" is not enough to deter evasions, additional penalties are required. But to deter a would-be violator effectively they must be credible.

By far the most important and practical penalty would be a general increase in the military effort, going beyond what would be required to restore the pre-agreement situation. (A threat to start a war would not be equally credible and would therefore be less effective.) Suppose the aggrieved nation in-

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creases its defense budget by $20 billion. (As a result of the North Korean aggression, the United States increased its national security expenditures from $13 billion to $52 billion.) If the violator does not follow suit, he will become relatively weaker than he was before breaking the disarmament agreement. If he does follow suit, he would, in effect, be "fined" the equivalent of $20 billion, though of course both sides would bear this burden.

The injured country may be able to step up its defense effort in ways that do not require a large increase in the budget and still impose significant penalties on the violator: for example, by changing the deployment and readiness of weapons, or by resuming military activities that were voluntarily limited beforehand. However, in doing this the injured party must be prepared to run the risk that such a "punitive" increase in its defense effort will renew or accelerate the arms race. Actually, the violator may wish to avoid an arms race with so determined an opponent; he may be unwilling or unable to pay his full "fine" and have to accept a loss in relative military strength.

Those who wish to prevent the violation of arms-control agreements must deter potential violators by their evident determination to make a double sacrifice. In the event a violation occurs they must be ready to assume a greater economic burden for defense, and they must risk a step-up in military competition. The willingness to make such sacrifices involves less, however, than would be required to deter limited aggression. To do that successfully a country must be willing not only to accept increased defense costs if deterrence fails, but also to suffer casualties and face the risk that the limited conflict may expand.

Political sanctions are likely to be less effective than an increased defense effort, although they may play an important complementary role. What they might be is difficult to predict in the abstract. If the potential violator is cautious, this uncertainty may help to deter him; if he is adventurous, like Hitler, he will gamble on his ability to meet and overcome the political reaction.

The remaining question is how to make the penalties of evasion seem more inevitable and severe and the gains more dubious. Parliamentary governments are more likely to take strong action against a violation if they are supported by public opin-

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ion. The evidence of violation must therefore be such as to impress the public as authoritative and impartial. A finding by an international organization will be influential in this regard, especially with public opinion outside the countries directly affected. An international body, however, has many weaknesses that can be exploited by a violator. Ideally, one would want the best of both worlds: the greater authenticity and dramatic impact that an international inspectorate provides, and the flexibility and versatility of national intelligence systems. One should at any rate avoid entering into arms-control arrangements that are administratively closed to intelligence information. The current draft treaty for the nuclear test ban sets up a rigidly confined scheme from which intelligence information is essentially excluded.[5] The Antarctica treaty, on the other hand, provides for complete freedom of inspection by anyone without any international mechanism (except suggestions for arbitration in the event of "disputes").

The deterrence of evasions could also be strengthened if parliamentary governments took steps to simplify and speed up their decision-making procedures. The United States Government, for example, has sometimes adopted enabling legislation to facilitate quick Presidential action, in order to disabuse a potential aggressor of the idea that partisan conflict or public quarreling about constitutional limitations or the issue at hand might inhibit an effective response. The Formosa resolution of 1955 is an example of Congressional authorization for the President to take action on the basis of his finding alone. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 authorizes the President to act upon a decision by an international body, the United Nations Security Council. To strengthen a disarmament agreement both types of authorizations might be useful, and a good time to enact the appropriate enabling legislation would be when Congress ratifies an arms-control treaty.

The power and influence of the legislative branch of the government might be brought to bear in other ways so as to increase the likelihood that the reaction to an evasion would be prompt and strong. Special parliamentary committees might

[5] Both the Soviet and the Western drafts allow the parties to select their annual quota of on-site inspections freely from among seismic disturbances that meet certain criteria. However, should a violation be unaccompanied by such a disturbance (*e.g.* a muffled underground test), the violator would not have to permit an inspection and the international control system would remain closed to all other evidence.

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assume an explicit responsibility for all arms-control agreements, and stand ready to mobilize legislative support for any necessary response to some breach of a treaty. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which has privileged access to classified information and is on intimate terms with the executive, offers appropriate administrative precedents. Thus Congress might create a "Joint Committee on the Observance of Arms Controls" to demonstrate its determination to make arms-control agreements succeed.

An effective response will often require coördination and agreement among allies. The difficulties which this involves might be lessened by making arrangements in advance for joint action. First, in order to ensure agreement as to the fact of evasion, all evidence could be evaluated by an inter-allied agency permanently set up for this purpose. To minimize considerations of domestic politics, it should not have the responsibility for recommending any action. The next step by the allied governments might be a relatively minor one, on which agreement could easily be reached, namely to give publicity to the committee's findings; for example, they might forward a report on the evasion to the United Nations or to an international control system provided by the disarmament treaty. From this point on, the allied governments having jointly held and publicized their interpretation of the violation would feel under more compulsion to reach agreement on the effective sanctions needed.

It may be argued that allied governments cannot be "tricked" into such a procedure, because if they are opposed to or afraid of vigorous action they will avoid taking the first step: the evaluation of evidence. This argument would have force if the procedure were to be determined *after* the violation had been charged. But it is proposed here that by a preparatory agreement the Allies shall firmly establish the procedure at the time they conclude the arms-control treaty, when they are still fairly confident that the other side will adhere to it, hence are less opposed to a firm commitment for joint action against what seems a remote contingency.

All these political measures must be planned to the accompaniment of whatever military preparations will be necessary to deal with violations of the agreement. For instance, under an agreement that prohibits only the testing of certain weapons, both sides will remain free to continue research and develop-

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ment. The country that is determined to abide by the agreement cannot afford to neglect this research without opening the way for a potential violator to gain and then exploit a technological lead. Unless the public understands this fact, parliamentary governments will be handicapped in maintaining a research effort for weapons whose testing has been prohibited. The same problem would also arise under an agreement which does not prohibit the development of a weapon but does prevent the deployment of it—for example, a ban on placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

A program to deter evasion of arms-control agreements, like the one suggested here, does raise some additional problems for which an analogy can be found in the strategy of deterrence against nuclear attack. First, there is the problem of carrying out a threat if deterrence fails, that is, of imposing sanctions in the event of evasion or of retaliating in the event of attack. An advance commitment to carry out the threat is rational and necessary for a policy aimed at deterrence; but carrying out the threat after deterrence has failed may be undesirable or even irrational. Second, a policy of deterrence has to cope with accidental violations of the agreement, just as a policy of deterrence against nuclear attack has to control the risk of accidental war. In the former case, both sides will wish to correct the unintended violation and preserve the agreement; in the latter, both will want to avoid or correct an "accident" before it leads to full exchanges of violence. Third, there is some resemblance between the advantage of a first strike in mutual deterrence against nuclear attack and the advantage of gaining time through an evasion in certain arms-control agreements. None of these analogies is exact, of course. But they do suggest that ideas in the literature on deterrence can be as relevant to the prevention of violations in arms-control agreements as they are to the prevention of war.

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ITALY AFTER ONE HUNDRED YEARS

By Clare Boothe Luce

MODERN Italy was born a hundred years ago, on March 17, 1861, when unity under Victor Emmanuel II of the House of Savoy was proclaimed by the Italian parliament assembled in Turin. This marked the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire in 500 A.D. that the inhabitants of the Italian peninsula had been gathered together as a free and independent nation.

Prince Metternich, in his Memorandum to the Great Powers, written in 1814, said, "Italy is only a geographical expression." Yet, during centuries of disunity Italy was incomparably more than that. Her cultural identity had long been achieved by the towering geniuses she had produced: Dante, Michelangelo, da Vinci, Galileo, Raphael, St. Thomas Aquinas, Marco Polo, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Catherine of Siena, Christopher Columbus and scores of other great philosophers, theologians, artists, scientists, musicians and explorers. Indeed, throughout the Christian centuries that followed the fall of Rome the cultural impact and influence of Italians on the life of the West were the very matrix of Western civilization, the strongest fount of its religion, its laws, its humanities and its arts.

The American and French Revolutions, and the stormy days of Napoleonic conquest and reform, inspired Italian patriots to believe that under united leadership Italy too could be free to guide her own destiny. In the early nineteenth century, the *Risorgimento* emerged as the answer to Metternich's contemptuous challenge, and the first evidence that nationhood was already burgeoning in the hearts of many Italians.

Decades of bitter struggles against foreign invaders and despotic and corrupt Italian rulers (often foreigners) were rewarded with victory when Italy's first great republican military and political leader met with the valiant Victor Emmanuel II at Naples and agreed to unite Italy under the House of Savoy. The resulting unification, in 1861, was only partial. The Papal states were incorporated into Italy only a decade later. Thus, from the *Risorgimento* to the consolidation of the modern Italian nation took roughly a half century.

The centenary of the birth of the unified Italian nation offers

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us an opportunity to review the progress—or lack of progress—it has made during its hundred years, and, with special reference to the past decade, to ask these questions: How strong is Italy today? How united are her people? And if today there are weaknesses or disunity, what are their causes? These questions are asked by Americans who have profound sympathy, affection and special gratitude to Italy. For while the world owes a common debt to Italian civilization, Americans have a special feeling for her: one of her sons, Christopher Columbus, discovered America. But before attempting to answer these questions, we must examine the economic and political bases of modern Italy.

II. ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN ITALY

Modern Italy's economic difficulties have stemmed from three basic factors: (1) the scarcity of good soil and abundant sweet water in all but her northern regions, preventing the growth of the strong agricultural economy which is the base of a sound industrial economy; (2) the lack or scarcity of basic raw materials, inhibiting industrial growth; (3) the shortage of capital for investment.

It is fashionable to list "overpopulation" as an inherent Italian problem. But Italy's land area is 23 percent greater than the United Kingdom's, her population almost three million less. And today her birthrate is 6 percent lower than that of the United States, and about the same as that of France, Norway and Switzerland. What Italy has always had and continues to have is a chronic unemployment problem, due to the combination of the above basic structural weaknesses.

In 1861, Italy was economically the least developed of the European countries. A land of large *latifundia*, properties were owned more often than not by absentee landlords. By general European standards, poverty was appalling and illiteracy high —about 75 percent.

By 1921, over-all illiteracy fell to 27 percent. But in southern Italy and its island possessions it stood at 48 percent. Industrialization grew, but very slowly even in the 1910s and '20s which witnessed an explosion of technological progress elsewhere in the West. The increase in semi-skilled workers, with some class consciousness, and the evolution of competent, farsighted managerial talent were equally slow. Also, the class conscious, the ambitious, the enterprising, emigrated in great numbers. Between

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1900 and the outbreak of World War I, millions of Italians left their country to seek a better life in other countries—over 3,150,000 came to the United States.

The depression which followed World War I deepened the poverty among the agricultural workers to penury, boosted unemployment in the badly hit, weak and somewhat haphazard industrial complex in the North, and opened the road in 1920 to Fascism. There can be no question that Mussolini's "corporate state" made some welcome and much-needed reforms and, in its initial days, revived a sense of individual hope and public purpose in the new nation. But far from improving the economy as a whole, many of Mussolini's economic innovations compounded Italy's difficulties. Indeed, some of these problems that have plagued postwar Italy are directly traceable to remnants of Mussolini's economic structures.

To Italy's inherent and man-made problems in this field must be added the devastation of World War II. One-quarter of Italy's railroad tracks, over one-third of her bridges and one-half of her power plants were destroyed; two-thirds of the country's highways were rendered unusable. In 1945, her industrial output was less than half of what it had been in 1938. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, beginning in 1945, Italy had to start rebuilding her economy on the ruins of 80 years of effort.

Between 1945 and 1948, massive American aid helped vastly to restore the basic means of production and transportation, and the rapid infusion of Marshall Plan aid gave a great forward impetus to the Italian economy. But the Italians themselves deserve full credit for stopping, in 1949, a runaway inflation, for a generally wise utilization of American funds, for exhibiting a prodigious willingness to work hard, and above all, for recognizing at long last the imperative necessity of tackling institutionally and on a long-range basis the economic problems of southern Italy.

Italy's postwar economic progress should not be exaggerated. There is still a great deal that needs to be done to correct basic structural defects and to narrow the gap in living standard between the industrialized North and the underdeveloped South. Nevertheless, the average Italian lives better today than at any previous time. A few data will show how fast Italy is advancing.

Since 1953, Italian income and Gross National Product have grown at the average annual rate of about 6 percent. The annual growth rate in the United States during the same period has been

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between 2 and 3 percent (depending on the economic expert consulted). In Europe only the growth rate of the German Federal Republic has exceeded Italy's.[1]

In 1959, the index of Italian industrial production was 157.9, and moved from 164.4 to 187.8 during the first five months of 1960 (1953 = 100, seasonally adjusted).

At the end of 1954, Italy's gold and convertible foreign currency holdings amounted to $594 million; this rose, by December 1958, to $1,780.8 million. And within one year, 1959, they reached $2,711.8 million—or an increase of almost a billion dollars. On March 31, 1960, these reserves stood at $2,761.1 million; today they are estimated at over $3 billion, which is exceeded only by the United States, West Germany, Canada and Britain.

There has also been a small but steady improvement in Italy's stubborn unemployment situation: the number of registered unemployed fell from 2,181,000 in 1953, to 1,873,000 in 1959. In May 1960, it was 1,655,000—the lowest figure since the establishment of the Republic.

Measured in terms of either money wage or real wage indices, wages have increased steadily. In both agriculture and industry, wages have risen faster than living costs in the last few years. In money terms, the income of employed labor rose from 4,649 billion lire in 1953 to 7,433 billion lire in 1959.

Boom-time Italy is attracting much investment capital. Noting that Italy's industrial output is about 77 percent higher than in 1953, investors throughout the world have been drawn to her enterprises and equities. Foreign investments in Italy passed the $2,220 million mark in March 1960, and have continued to grow at an annual rate of $240 million. Ten years ago such progress would have been hailed as a miracle.

III. ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Today, then, Italy's friends see a nation which, while still relatively poor as compared with other Western European countries, is more prosperous than ever before.

A respected member of the United Nations, an effective mem-

[1] According to the latest available statistics, Italian national income in 1956–57, 1957–58 and 1958–59 rose by 7.1, 6.4 and 6.8 percent respectively, in current prices. In terms of constant prices, the growth was 5.6, 4.1 and 5.8 percent respectively. G.N.P. rose, during the same period, by 8, 6.1 and 7 percent respectively, in current prices. In monetary terms, national income rose from 10,798 billion lire in 1954 to 16,908 billion lire in 1959, while G.N.P. (at market prices) rose from 12,469 billion lire in 1954 to 17,734 billion lire in 1959.

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ber of the Common Market, Italy is excluded from no international organization of prestige or importance. A valued NATO partner, armed to the point that her own resources plus NATO aid permit, she stands in no more danger of attack from any quarter than does any of her European neighbors.

The scope of this article will not allow comment on the extraordinary vigor of modern Italy in the field of culture. But not since the *Risorgimento* has there been more dynamism in Italian painting, music, literature, design, architecture—and all the plastic and graphic arts. Contemporary Italy's productivity in art and her cultural influence (a most sadly underrated factor in assessing the "prestige" of nations) certainly are today as great as, if not greater than, those of any other Western nation.

Thus, viewed as an economic or cultural unit, Italy presents a bright picture. But viewed as a political entity, the landscape is murky and fraught with startling paradoxes.

Italian citizens today enjoy freedom of movement and assembly, of speech, of religion, of equality before the law—all guaranteed by her democratic constitution. Nevertheless, they continue to support political parties whose avowed goal is to change —either by evolution or, if opportunity presents, by revolution— not only governmental policies, but the very structure of the State. The parliamentary conflict created by these parties precipitates successive cabinet crises and a chronic instability in the government. One of the most Catholic of nations, host to the Holy See, Italy harbors the only avowedly Fascist party in Europe and the largest Communist party in the world outside the Iron Curtain. And a small percentage of her people wish the restoration of the exiled Monarchy. What, Italy's friends ask, are the explanations of these extraordinary political paradoxes?

Any explanation of the complex Italian political phenomena, given in a few hundred words, will justifiably be open to a charge of superficiality. Nevertheless, a generalization might be made wide enough to hit the target if not the bull's-eye of truth.

This generalization is that Italy's current political confusions reflect the unhappy historical fact that the Italian people have no cherished tradition of a viable form of truly democratic government. In the 100 years of Italy's independence, Italians have not known any form of government which, over a period as short as one man's normal life-span, has been successful.

It is relevant to note here that in the ten centuries before Ital-

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ian independence no such government existed for even half a century in any part of the peninsula. The pre-history of unified Italy was marked by endless internal struggles among emperors, popes, dukes, margraves, which invariably brought hardship to the people. Their causes were frequently trivial: a family quarrel among rulers, or their personal greed for land or their ambition for crowns or honors. The troops of Italian rulers, quartered on the people without consent, were often captained by aliens and largely made up of mercenaries. In their fratricidal strife, rulers often sought alliances and the intervention of foreign troops, thus time and time again opening the peninsula to foreign domination and exposing their people to looting, marauding, hunger and death. These facts, as Machiavelli pointed out more than five centuries ago, retarded the growth of patriotism, the spirit of unity and "sense of state" in both rulers and the people.[2]

Centuries-old Italian ruling habits of divided loyalties and shifting allegiances, of sudden and stupefying betrayals in "affairs of state," plus the ubiquitous presence of the foreign invaders, had psychological consequences for both the rulers and people of the Italian peninsula. They unfortunately nurtured in them the spirit of factionalism, opportunism, expediency, of *combinazione, sacro-egoismo* and *sauve qui peut.*

The very foundation of Victor Emmanuel II's monarchy (a coalition of republican and monarchic forces) was less a positive assent to the political unity of the people than a negative popular reaction to the unending repressions of foreign invaders. To the extent, however, that the establishment of the Monarchy *did* represent popular assent to unification, it was the first triumph over the ancient spirit of Guelph and Ghibelline and the first manifestation of "the sense of state" that the Italian people had known since Roman times. Said Cavour, a great statesman and great diplomat, in 1861, "We have made Italy. We must now make the Italian people." As Cavour so well understood, political unity—mutual confidence between government and governed —had to be consolidated if the new State were not to perish.

While the Monarchy itself endured for 85 years, parliamentary

[2] The Italian peninsula, before 1861, had been invaded by Greeks, Germans, French, Swiss, Austrians, Spanish, Turks—indeed by almost every nation in Europe and around the Mediterranean, including (in 1796) Russia. Since 1861, Italy has been invaded by Austria, Germany, France and, spearheaded by the United States, by armies of the World War II Allies—though not by those of Soviet Russia. Compare this with British history: although repeatedly attacked, Britain has not been invaded since 1066.

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government lasted only 60 years—until the end of World War I —that very war into which their Prime Minister had plunged the Italian people without consulting them. By 1920, resurgent factionalism in parliament, postwar depression and Communist hooliganism proved too much for Prime Minister Gioletti's government which, lacking a majority in parliament, had begun to founder. And Gioletti, tempted by the old spirit of *combinazione,* sought to arrange a parliamentary majority with a small but noisy group of 35 Fascist deputies led by an ex-Socialist from Romagna named Benito Mussolini. Although Mussolini when he first appeared in that same year had only three deputies out of 536, four years later he had the Italian Government firmly in hand. The Monarchy—cherished symbol of independence—was formally preserved. But parliament was dissolved; and until 1943, the real government was vested in a political oligarchy—Mussolini's Fascists. World War II swept away Mussolini and Fascism; and by a national referendum in 1946, the discredited Monarchy which had tolerated if not supported Mussolini's "one-man war" was replaced by a constitutional republic.

In brief, in its century of national independence, Italy has been ruled under three basically different forms of government: parliamentary monarchy (1861–1924), authoritarian dictatorship (1924–1943), and constitutional democracy (1946–1961). If we are to understand at all the confusions in the Italian body politic today about forms, institutions and instrumentalities of government, we must sympathetically ponder this fact: any Italian over 30 years old today has lived under three types of government. (Perhaps, one should say four, the fourth being that most unpopular form—a military government of the conquerors, 1943–1946.) And no Italian born in this century can say he has experienced so much as a 20-year period of peace.

Under the young Monarchy, the people suffered the repressions of the Austrian occupation and the bloody struggle to dispossess the occupants. The Monarchy had hardly begun to mature in the affections of the people when, as we have noted, it called upon them—or rather ordered them—to endure the losses of World War I and its aftermath, which produced Mussolini.

The first surge of hope that Mussolini brought to the Italian people—the hope of peace and economic progress—was gradually dampened by their realization that instead of solving their basic problems he was compounding them by costly imperialist adven-

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tures in North Africa. In the end, Mussolini led the unwilling Italian people to the most crucifying defeat in their history. And under the subsequent Allied occupation they suffered not only the spiritual humiliation of defeat but its physical agonies: hunger, cold, homelessness. Plainly, Fascist dictatorship had failed dismally, and monarchy, which had tolerated Fascism, was also compromised in the eyes of millions of Italians.

The Republic came into being, as the result of a popular referendum on the Monarchy held in 1946, during Allied occupation. If we wish to understand the present political paradoxes of Italy, it should be recognized that, at the time, the birth of the Republic seemed to millions of Italians a Caesarean operation. The referendum gives evidence that a new form of government was gestating, but many feel it was delivered prematurely by the Allies. The referendum went *against* the Monarchy. But this was not to say—as some naïve American policy-makers said at the time—that it had gone clearly *for* democracy. In that referendum, 10,719,000 Italians voted for the Monarchy, 12,717,000 against. But, of that latter number, 6,000,000 Communists voted against the Monarchy primarily to establish a proletarian dictatorship oriented to and guided by Moscow.

It is interesting to speculate what form of government the Italian people would have today if in 1946 they had been given a clear choice among the three types of government which at that hour appealed to them: parliamentary monarchy, Western-style democracy, or a Soviet republic. The Monarchists would probably have won both a plurality and a majority of the votes, and this for a simple and understandable reason: although the Monarchy had tragically failed to insure peace and progress, it had two great virtues of a modern state—it had been created by the will of the people themselves and it had endured for almost a century. And the loyalties of men tend to cluster about that form of government which they themselves have brought into being and freely supported over the years, in good times and bad.

The political ambiguities surrounding the birth of the Republic were deepened rather than clarified by the United States economic support extended to the proponents and exponents of the Republic in the postwar years. This aid, while it convinced all the Italian people of American friendship, did not necessarily convince all the electorate that Western-style democratic government (free enterprise capitalism) would work in Italy. On the

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contrary, it tended to raise the painful doubt in many minds—a doubt constantly fanned by the Communists—that their government could not work without continued massive American aid. Accordingly, profoundly grateful though the Italian people were (and still are) for this aid, their gratitude was not transformed into nation-wide loyalty and enthusiasm for their Western-style government, led by Alcide de Gasperi and supported so generously (and sometimes too conspicuously) by the United States.

The natural desire of a proud and patriotic people (which the Italians notably are) is for that form of government which will lead the nation to the maximum amount of economic independence. That is to say, they desire a government which not only promises but produces the greatest measure of self-sufficiency and self-made prosperity for all citizens. The hope which the extreme left-wing Italian parties encourage in the people today is that their brand of socialism and their structures of government will do the most to develop rapidly and to the fullest Italy's economic resources and to distribute the fruits most equitably among the people. Their appeal (and the appeal of their fellow-extremists, the Fascists) is cleverly and continually addressed to the Chauvinist spirit, to the do-it-yourself-for-yourself desire that rests in the hearts of all patriots.

In order to understand fully the divided political loyalties of the Italian masses today one must also understand their profound fear of war. The nation is only 100 years old, and for 82 years it has been repeatedly plunged into conflicts by its rulers. And the worst were the two world wars in which their rulers opportunistically made "strong alliances" with foreign powers.

All Italians are united today in wanting a form of government —and government leadership—which, while maintaining an adequate defense of the country and encouraging international friendships, will not engage the nation in war by personal fiat, as repeatedly happened under the Monarchy and under Fascism, or commit Italy to wars from which she will emerge, whether "victorious" or defeated, bitterly impoverished.[8]

[8] Under Article 5 of the Kingdom's constitution, the King was authorized to make alliances without consulting his advisers. Most of the wars of "unified Italy" were initiated by executive decision either with a minimum of parliamentary debate or without any consultation with parliament, and in total disregard of public opinion: this was the case with regard to the Monarchy's nineteenth century adventures in East Africa, ending at Adowa in 1896; war with Turkey in 1911–12; Italy's entrance into World War I; and under Fascism, the war against Ethiopia in 1935–36; the intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39); and final catastrophe, Mussolini's entrance into World War II on the side of Hitler.

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In the atomic age, sheer survival—the most understandable form of *sacro-egoismo* and *sauve qui peut*—legitimately raises the question of what form of government and what leaders espousing what policies can best keep Italy out of a third world war which would be a war of complete annihilation.

Today, there is a firm consensus among the Italian people that a democracy—a government of elected representatives responsible to public opinion and, above all, responding to it—is the best form of government to keep the peace. This they have got. In short, unlike the economic question, the peace question poses itself less in terms of what government structure can keep Italy out of war, and war out of Italy, than what government *policies* can best do so. Here again, the conscious (if fallacious) appeal of Communism and pro-Communist-socialism is to a common desire: stable peace. In so far as left-wing leaders are successful in persuading the people that their leadership and their policies will keep Italy at peace, whereas pro-Western leaders and policies (especially NATO commitments) will inevitably lead to war, they are successful in holding their voters.

Foreign observers, watching the Republic's continued—indeed almost miraculous—economic progress since American aid ceased, and noting that in pursuing present pro-West foreign policies Italy's "power position" has grown ever stronger and that her people have had 15 years of uninterrupted peace, feel that these questions of what form of government and what policies can best bring peace and economic progress have surely answered themselves. It is not so. In order to see why these questions are still wide open in Italy, we must study briefly the parties and their programs now represented in the parliament, reminding ourselves constantly of two things: (1) that the present composition of the Italian parliament still reflects the political ambiguities and confusions surrounding the war, the referendum and the birth of the Republic, and (2) that allied makers of foreign policy did too little between 1943 and 1948 to clear up these ambiguities.

In short, when contemplating the paradoxes of Italian political life today, we shall do well to remind ourselves that the policy-makers in the immediate postwar years facilitated the return of Togliatti from Moscow exile, and tolerated, if not encouraged, the constitutional inclusion and the active participation of Communists in the first government of the new Republic and in many public institutions, most notably in the trade unions.

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IV. THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM

The main political currents in Italy, as reflected in the last national election in 1958, are represented by eight parties which among them hold all but a few of the 246 seats in the Senate and the 596 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. These eight parties constitute "the government spectrum." The choice of this word is probably dictated by a somewhat universal tendency to position political parties on a horizontal line, moving from right to left. In Italy, the constant use of the word "spectrum" may also be an unconscious association of political ideas with color, evoking on the extreme Right the black shirt of the Fascists and on the extreme Left the red flag of the Communists.

In fact, in Italy as elsewhere in the world, the "geometry" of politics is not plane but spheroid. A better description of Italian parliamentary forces would be to call them the circle of the parties or, even more accurately, the parliamentary kaleidoscope. Certainly, political extremes generally meet; and every shift of the positions of personalities within the political circle, and every jog given the government by internal political or economic events, tends to change all inter-party relations, forming a new political pattern. Let us, then, thinking in circular rather than linear terms, consider how the present parliamentary pie is sliced.

1. The Italian Socialist Movement (M.S.I.), always referred to in "spectrum" terms as "the extreme Right," are neo-Fascists. The party has 8 senators and 24 deputies. It polled 4.8 percent of the popular vote cast in the 1958 elections. The M.S.I. advocates an updated Fascism, is stridently "nationalistic" and passionately anti-Communist in its utterances. Nevertheless, on legislative questions, the party has of late voted with the Communists, or "extreme Left," thus demonstrating the circular movement of Italian political forces.

The strategy of these neo-Fascists is a revival of socialist, nationalistic dictatorship. This determines their parliamentary tactics of disruption and discord, meant to create a situation of crisis in the government that would require their own inclusion, thus opening the door for them to take over the reins of state by evolution or coup d'état. Implicitly they collaborate through these tactics with Communists whose own parliamentary behavior has the same goal.

2. The Monarchist Party (now renamed the Democratic Party, P.D.I.) has today 7 senators and 25 deputies and repre-

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sents 4.8 percent of the vote cast in 1958. It asserts that the Monarchy was overthrown in the 1946 referendum largely because of American diplomatic and economic intervention (*i.e.* "foreign intervention") on the side of a Republic, and also because of the 6,000,000 Communist votes against the Monarchy.

Pragmatically, the Monarchists seem to realize that the monarchial question is rapidly fading, even in the poorest areas of the South and in the Islands, historically the seats of greatest popular sentiment for royalism. Patriotic, nationalistic and inspired by the spirit of Cavour, who wisely favored strong and tested alliances for Italy, the Monarchists generally support the pro-West foreign policy, albeit with complaints that the government does not insist more on her rightful position as a "great power" on the world scene. The Monarchists have sometimes sought and always welcomed a cabinet crisis which might lead to their own permanent inclusion in the governing Center forces. But, unlike the extremists, they have no wish to engender a crisis so deep as to bring down the government altogether. It is likely that eventually their votes will be absorbed by the Christian Democratic and the extremist Socialist parties, depending on which pursues economic policies and organizational work that attract them.

3. The Liberal Party, led by Giovanni Malagodi, marks the place where the Italian "Center" begins. A conservative group of 4 senators and 17 deputies, it represents 3.5 percent of the votes cast in the 1958 elections.

This party regards itself as the political heir of both Cavour and Garibaldi, and is pro-Western on foreign policy. Sincerely anti-dictatorship and anti-Socialist, it is also, for historical reasons, decidedly anti-clerical. It therefore tends to view all the other Italian parties with varying degrees of suspicion. Despite its anti-clericalism, it generally comes down on the side of the ruling Christian Democrats on critical questions involving the survival of a Center government.

Programmatically, the Liberals advocate a mixed economy: *laissez-faire* combined with prudent "government planning" and the minimum of welfare legislation. Their voting base is among the white-collar and professional classes (doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc.). Their future popular support depends on the enlargement of their still very small middle-class base.

4. The Christian Democratic Party, led by Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, has 123 senators, 273 deputies, and comprises

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the largest single slice of the government circle. It represents 42.4 percent of the 1958 vote. The C. D. party, founded in 1919, was ably fostered by the priest, Don Sturzo, and was welded into a significant political force by the Republic's first Prime Minister, the late Alcide de Gasperi. It has governed Italy since 1948, generally in uneasy alliance with the other three Center parties.

The C. D. party is committed to the Republic and, in theory, to a free-enterprise economy. In practice, however, it pursues a confusingly "mixed economy," some laissez-faire, some free enterprise, and substantial amounts of socialistic and welfare legislation. The political factions and currents in the party are as mixed as its economic programs and proposals. Ideologically, these currents run to the *inside* limits of the pro-Communist-Socialist Left and the pro-Fascist Right. Since de Gasperi's death, no leader with comparable prestige has emerged, and the party has consequently been increasingly torn by internal personal conflicts and quarrels with the other Center parties, occasioned not only by sincere disputes over economic legislation and political directions but also by the persistence of the ancient spirit of *sacro-egoismo,* factionalism and *combinazione* in some of its leaders. The lack of what in America is called "party spirit," on which sound party programs and organization so largely depend, has too often precluded the formulation or execution of firm domestic policies and organization work among Italian voters. All of this has resulted in what Italian political observers characterize as *immobilismo* —or government immobility.

Nevertheless, it must be said that *immobilismo* in the Italian Government is attributable only in part to confusions and cross currents within the C. D. ranks. It also reflects the general mood of the Italian public whose views have not yet solidified about "the virtues of free-enterprise democracy" versus "the vices of socialism." American policy-makers have long considered the Christian Democratic party as the safest exponent of political and economic democracy in Italy. More accurately, it could be said that it is democracy's most trustworthy custodian. However divided C. D. leaders are on economic programs, they are honestly united in the political purpose to preserve Italy's republican institutions from destruction by the extreme Right or Left, and to maintain Italy's pro-West orientation, two goals which are fortunately the goals of the vast majority of the Italian people. Meanwhile, the party marks time—*immobilismo*—while waiting

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until public opinion (and its own) is clarified about the best and safest methods of enlarging its electoral base and of making significant economic advances.

The C. D. party is loudly condemned by its extremist opponents as being overly sensitive to two external pressures: that of the Vatican, and that of the United States. Both do indeed support the C. D. party; but certainly the pressures which the United States is supposed to exert on the party or its leadership are grossly exaggerated.

In all democracies the pressures to which a government responds, and must respond if it is to remain in power, come from the electorate itself. In the 1958 election, as noted, the C. D. party received 42.4 percent of the vote. All parties to its right combined, including the neo-Fascists, garnered only 12.1 percent, whereas the parties to its left reaped about 45.5 percent. If the C. D. party has drifted around the circle to the left, it is because the maximum pressure—or rather the pull—comes from the far greater number of Italians who vote for left-wing economic and political solutions than for right-wing solutions.

Since the Fanfani government lacks a clear majority in the parliament, its stability is not assured without the firm support of the Liberal party to its right and the two Center parties to its left; these do not see eye to eye on economic programs. The party's best chance to break out of *immobilismo* is to increase its own strength by at least 5 percent in the next General Election at the expense of the extremes, the small Right and the large Left.

5. The Republican Party, led by Randolfo Pacciardi, has the smallest piece of the political pie. It has no senators, only six deputies, and received only 1.4 percent of all the votes cast in 1958.

The party's historical roots, like those of the Liberals, lie deep in the *Risorgimento* movements of Garibaldi and Mazzini. However, as the Republic for which these heroes and their followers fought has at last been established, the party's historic *raison d'être* has gone, and with it the hope of ideological mass support from the voters. Moreover, it lacks any economic program which has not already been preëmpted by one party or another in the Center forces. Its small group of followers is motivated by historic sentiment or wartime loyalties to its leaders.

This tiny party and its leaders are firmly pro-Western. Small though it is, it is a valuable party in the present political picture, since every vote the C. D. party can get, without compromising

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its own democratic ideals, is crucially necessary to maintain it in power, and to prevent the *apertura a sinistra*—a political opening to the pro-Communist-Socialist Left—in order to make a government majority.

6. The Social Democratic Party (P.S.D.I.), led by Giuseppe Saragat, marks where the Center ends. It has 5 senators and 22 deputies, and stands for 4.5 percent of the popular vote. It is a splinter party which split from the Socialist Party in 1951, when the leader of the Socialists, Pietro Nenni, refused to break with the Communists.

Basically pro-West, Saragat's fundamental quarrel with the Nenni Socialists, and beyond them the Communists, is political and to some extent economic. The P.S.D.I. advocates a program much like Sweden's "middle way," or the classic "welfare state" promoted by the British Labor party. Its moderate economic stand, favoring Socialist evolution against Marxist-Leninist revolution, does not hold a great appeal to the dissatisfied masses.

Although their stand is not too far afield from Nenni's, Saragat and his small group of followers will not make common political cause with Nenni; they steadfastly refuse to adopt or even tolerate Nenni's pro-Moscow orientation. Many Christian Democratic elements would like to widen the base of government by including the Nenni Socialists, but on their own terms: that he renounce his political action pact with Togliatti. These C.D. elements have looked upon Saragat (and he looks upon himself) as the most apt political broker between them and the Nenni Socialists. However, Saragat has not yet been able to effect the basic deal involved in a safe "opening to the Left"—the separation of Nenni and his party from their long affiliation with the Communists, a coup which would indeed clarify the Italian political picture greatly for the better. When crucial votes or political manœuvres affecting the life of free, parliamentary democracy and a pro-Western foreign policy are counted, Saragat and his followers as custodians of the non-Communist left have found it necessary to come down on the side of the Christian Democrats.

7. The Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.), led by Pietro Nenni, has 35 senators and 84 deputies; 14.2 percent of Italy's voters supported it in 1958. Although it has lately been making noise about separatism, it remains so closely allied in its policies with the Communists that for all practical purposes the P.S.I.

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and the Communists must be considered as one grouping—the extreme Left.

Until recently, any difference between the practical policies and public utterances of Socialist Nenni and Communist Togliatti could be found only by resorting to wishful thinking. But although these leaders differ little between themselves, logic suggests that their supporters do make some distinctions between them. One might venture to guess that many of Nenni's supporters believe—or hope—that his fellow-traveling is tactical and designedly equivocal, and that once in power Nenni would be his own master—a Socialist "Italy Firster." Fearing war between the United States and the Soviets, and dreading all commitments to take military sides with one or the other, they cherish the hope that Nenni is fundamentally a neutralist. From time to time, he has made statements clearly intended to agitate this hope. But whether the hope would be justified if Nenni came into power, or even into the government, no one can tell. There is much evidence that it would not. For whatever reasons, personal or public, Nenni has never found it expedient to make a clean break with the Communist party in the areas of coöperation with labor, the co-ops and local administrations.

The bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolt, the invasion of Tibet, Khrushchev's missile-rattling at the summit, his somewhat schizophrenic behavior at the United Nations, have puzzled and shocked many of Italy's Socialist voters and, to the extent that they have done so, have put a strain on Nenni's alliance with Togliatti. But the strain has not been so great as to force Nenni to break it. Moreover, during the past 15 years not only Saragat but de Gasperi and a succession of C.D. prime ministers and political leaders, including President Gronchi, have sought without success to persuade Nenni to forsake his Communist alliance, as the necessary condition to entering the government.

For this reason, while many people believe that the electoral base of government must be widened if Italy is to end her period of instability and *immobilismo*, they also believe that Nenni's inclusion in the government, or even the unification of his party with the Center Socialist party of Saragat, might, under present circumstances, open the door to Communist dictatorship.

8. The Italian Communist Party (P.C.I.) led by Palmiro Togliatti has 59 senators and 140 deputies, and polled 22.7 percent of the last popular vote. It is the second largest party.

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The real strength of the P.C.I. lies in its cohesion, clarity of purpose and discipline. Without exception or a demurrer, Togliatti and his party members in and out of parliament have followed the line laid down by Moscow. The only difference which Italian Communists have with Marxism (as interpreted at any moment by Kremlin exegetes) is that they have publicly committed themselves to tolerate the freedom of the Church (outside politics) in Italy. There can be little question that this was a Moscow dispensation, recognized as necessary tactics in a country where even the most passionate Communists consider themselves "born Catholics" and desire baptism, marriage and burial by the hands of the Church.

Nevertheless, there has been, even within the monolithic Communist party, some dissidence and some small disaffection from it. Strangely enough, they have been occasioned less by the bloody suppression of the revolts in Hungary, East Germany and Poland than by an understanding of what caused these revolts: hunger and general economic failure. And lately, the belligerent pronouncements of Mao Tse-tung, based on his own (correct) exegesis of classic Marxian Leninism as a system for fomenting and exporting armed revolution, have caused some expressions of dismay among Italian Communists.

The Italians who vote for Communism desire for the most part neither war nor revolution. Traces of the passivity and skepticism which Italian eighteenth century poets lamented in their countrymen (as they made efforts to stir them to their initial battle for independence) still linger on in the Italian character. These traits do not make "revolutionary" Communists; and combined with the passionate love for peace which exists in the hearts of the Italian masses they have long hampered Togliatti's best efforts to arouse his followers to revolutionary fever or even to convince them that all things would be right once the Red flag flew over Italy. Communism is the one form of government Italians have not yet tried. But seeing about them everywhere, as they do, the ruins of mighty empires of the past, they are naturally not disposed to believe that any form of government is either perfect or invincible.

On the other hand, those Communists who are not subject to passivity, skepticism and peacefulness, who have more aggressive, fanatical and ardent natures, after 17 years of Togliatti's presence on the postwar Italian scene and 14 in the Italian parliament,

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are becoming somewhat disillusioned with the idea that a Communist revolution is just around the corner. If Italy's friends abroad note with alarm that after 14 years of the Republic one-third of the population still votes for the two pro-Kremlin parties, Togliatti's friends abroad must note with equal, or perhaps even greater, concern that two-thirds still do not.

The real appeal of the two pro-Communist parties lies in their promises to better rapidly the economic condition of the people once the reins of government pass into their hands. At the turn of the century, Prime Minister Gioletti said that the rich had so abused their power that "we have a large number of taxes paid predominantly by the poor, but not a single tax that is exclusively on wealth as such." This anomaly (not exclusive to Italy) has been corrected somewhat by recent tax reforms. But Togliatti and Nenni can still justly claim that the tax system is inadequate and unfair, and that while the lot of the poor is substantially better than it was ten years ago, the rich have never been richer; that the country still has close to 2,000,000 unemployed and nearly as many under-employed; and above all, as we have noted, that the gap between the acceptable living standards of the industrialized North and the barely subsistence level of the underdeveloped South is being narrowed too slowly despite enormous efforts by the *Mezzogiorno* program.

It has been said that if the Communist party had not existed at the war's end, poverty and unemployment in Italy would have permitted Moscow quickly to create it. One can argue this political assertion, but one cannot dispute the persistence of poverty in Italy, or that it could explain the present hold of the P.C.I. on a large section of Italian voters as the party of protest.

V. ITALY'S FUTURE

Viewing this "spectrum" or kaleidoscope, what conclusion can we come to about the future stability of the Italian Government?

Let it be emphasized again that the basic expectations which the Italian people have of any form of government is that it shall give them a long and concrete period of peace, and the feeling of moving forward in the economic field at their maximum capacity. And let it be repeated again that in relation to their past 100 years of history, the Republic and its present pro-West Center leadership have given the Italian people more of what they have wanted than any other. There is much reason to hope

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that this fact will be increasingly recognized, however slowly, by the electorate.

The outcome of the provincial elections held November 6, 1960, in which 90 percent of Italy's eligible voters cast their ballots is relevant in this connection. The Christian Democrats polled 40.3 percent of the votes, a higher percentage than that of the two pro-Communist parties combined (Nenni Socialists, 14.4, Communists, 24.5, a total of 38.9 percent.) The total strength of the four Center parties was 51.3 percent. Gains were made by the Communists but clearly not by their Socialist allies—a fact which may clarify Nenni's own views and have considerable consequences for the next general election.

Except for three conditions, one could venture a guess that the Italian Republic will endure, its pro-Western policies will prevail, and it will continue to make progress toward increasing the personal liberties of the people and their welfare under a "mixed economy."

The three conditions which would certainly threaten the existence of the present Italian state and its Center-force government are a general war, a worldwide depression or the failure of Europe as a pro-Western force. The seeds of these events are definitely not in Italy—wherever else they may be—but their emergence would swiftly jog the Italian kaleidoscope into a pattern which is unpredictable, except that a dictator of Right or Left would more than likely be found ensconsed on the ruins of the free Republic.

Despite the persistent if not chronic ambivalences and ambiguities of the political scene in Italy, one thing is clear: the progress the Italian people are now making after one hundred years of trial and travail is largely the result of their own valiant and extraordinary efforts.

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WEST AFRICA IN EVOLUTION

By Léopold Sédar Senghor

THE French Community, created by General de Gaulle in full agreement with Africa's true representatives, is one of the greatest achievements of our time. Besides being a masterly concept to which I and with me the majority of the leaders of Senegal are deeply committed, it also is one of those ideas capable of catching the imagination of the masses. Sweeping away the contradictions of the colonial system, it enables the former mother country and its erstwhile colonies to form a friendly cultural and economic union and thus forge a lasting link between Western Europe and Africa.

But if the Community was to evolve properly it could not remain frozen in juridical forms. Therefore paragraph XII of the French Constitution which defined the framework of the Community made the necessary provisions for a smooth and harmonious evolution.

Let me say right away that in my opinion the Community could not have been federal. History has many examples—among them the United States, the Soviet Union and Germany—to prove that a federation is really possible only between states that are at equal economic levels and have equal political maturity. A federation has a natural tendency to build up federal power at the expense of the member states. If one state dominates the others the federation becomes simply a screen to hide that domination. This is the view which I upheld in 1958 in the Consultative Constitutional Committee created by General de Gaulle.

The Constitution of the Community stressed the principle of equality among the member states; in legal terms this means that equality between France and the other states will be achieved as the Community evolves. Had this equality been incorporated in a federal framework, France obviously would have had to relinquish some of her prerogatives of sovereignty. Can one conceive of this being possible in view of the fact that France is economically 20 times as strong as all other members of the Community combined? However, this situation did not point necessarily to the extreme solutions advocated by some people who were more concerned with verbiage than with people's happiness. If federation was impossible, the alternative was not the breakup

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of the Community but its evolution in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Constitution.

In spirit, the Constitution is liberal and egalitarian; in letter, it allows for a legal evolution to keep pace with political reality. Thus under special agreements between the French Republic and the states which have become independent, various functions have been transferred to the latter, notably diplomatic representation, a function vital to the development of relations between the states of the Community and the rest of the world. These transfers within the constitutional framework have given the new states—de facto and de jure—all the prerogatives of sovereignty. In other words they have achieved independence, with all its mystical value—yesterday rejected and now ardently demanded by so many.

As the peoples of French cultural background and language evolve in this manner, the Community will become the same fruitful means of coöperation that the Commonwealth became among the states which are the descendants of the British Empire. The new bridges between Africa and Europe will be built without mental reservations on one side about colonial domination and without fears in Europe that she is about to be colonized in turn by her former colonies. Thus the economic and social development of Africa and Western economic expansion will both be advanced.

Two years after the foundation of the Community by the referendum of September 28, 1958, the Mali Federation, on April 4, 1960, deliberately chose independence within the Community, thus stating its desire to attain independence without a rupture with France and the other member states.

However, the Mali Federation was not able to resist the separatist tendencies which endanger any federation of states not of equal weight. Many centrifugal tendencies existed. The Soudan is much more heavily populated and much less rich than Senegal; the proportion of children in school there is much smaller; and its political leaders though not themselves Communists have been indoctrinated in the schools of the French Communist Party. For these reasons the Soudanese developed a sort of revengeful complex against the Senegalese. They schemed month by month to gain an upper hand over the Senegalese section of the African Federation Party, to put functionaries of their way of thinking into key positions and, in contradiction with the Federal consti-

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tution, to make Mali over into a unitary state dominated by them. Faced with Senegalese resistance, Modibo Keita, head of the Federal Government, resorted at last to the desperate expedient of a coup d'état. The reply was instantaneous. On the initiative of the Senegal Government the Legislative Assembly voted that Senegal should quit the Federation and proclaim its independence as a sovereign state. Since August 20, 1960, then, the Republic of Senegal has been an independent state. In its new role it will exemplify not so much a pan-African as an inter-African policy.

Senegal with its European (60,000), Berber, Arab and Negro populations, stands on the frontier of the white and black races. We are a true example of coexistence among several races and I would say also among several religions; for even though the majority of our population is Moslem, there are also Catholics, Protestants and Animists.

Senegal occupies a privileged geographical position since the city of Dakar is the gate to the South Atlantic. Its political position is also special. Unfortunately, the majority of the independent African states have not yet recovered from the effects of colonialism. Now that they have obtained their own independence, most of them start exuding the imperialism of their former colonizers and want in turn to colonize other African nations. So it was that the Soudan tried to use methods borrowed from the totalitarian régimes to "colonize" Senegal—and thus blew up the Mali Federation. In comparison, Senegal's attitude toward such matters is constructive. Several peoples belonging to the same races as we and speaking the same languages find themselves outside our borders. There are Senegalese living on the right bank of the Senegal River. The Gambians are racially the same as ourselves and speak the same languages. Despite this, we accept the frontiers of African states the way they are; and in any case we refuse to use violence to change them.

This is an extremely important fact today in view of the way in which the concept of African unity is being worked out. I am confident that the independent Republic of Senegal will be an example not only of peaceful coexistence but also of peaceful coöperation with the other African states and with other countries of the world. Guinea serves as an instance. In all my statements I have shown myself friendly towards Guinea. We Senegalese were the first ones to fight for Guinea to be recognized by France. Re-

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cently I repeated my offer to normalize our relations with Guinea and that offer has been accepted. As a result, Senegal and Guinea will exchange diplomatic representatives and negotiate commercial and cultural treaties.

We are glad that the member states of the Council of the Entente have changed their course recently. Like the countries of what used to be French Equatorial Africa, they have decided to follow the road of independence if not of socialism. They want to build an African Community—so as not to call it a federation—with us.

Senegal believes firmly in the renovated Community, the contractual Community. We are maintaining, with some changes, the vertical solidarity which throughout our history has tied us to France. At the same time, we shall maintain, with some changes, the horizontal solidarity which ties us to the French-speaking African states and, so far as possible, to the other states of Africa as well. In a word, there must be a new extension of our relationships vertically to Europe and to America, the child of Europe, and horizontally to the whole of Africa, even to Asia. This will be our positive contribution to the building of a universal civilization.

But let us turn first to Africa where our lot has been cast and where the population is mainly African-Negro and Arab-Berber. Here we come face to face with the problem of a United States of Africa. I shall not dodge it any more than the other problems, but examine it objectively, which means without succumbing to the lure of empty words. Like President Bourguiba, I believe that a United States of Africa is not something to be achieved overnight. I feel free to say this since I was one of the first to talk about it. Some ten years ago when Ousmane Socé and I were at the Consultative Assembly of the European Council we signed a draft of a resolution envisaging the creation of a United States of Africa. But let me emphasize again, it is not something to be brought into being overnight.

There are several reasons against it. The first is that continentalism is actually a form of autarchy. Like all autarchies, it denies the interdependence of peoples and in consequence collaboration between them; thus it makes for impoverishment. Africa cannot do without the other continents, especially Europe and America, except at the price of increasing its relative backwardness. At the last Pan-African Conference at Tunis there was talk about an

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African Common Market. Have the difficulties in the way of such an undertaking been adequately weighed? Actually, the African economies are more competitive than complementary. We spend our time appealing to the idea of solidarity between the developed and the underdeveloped countries, between the rich and the poor. Are not such appeals in contradiction to the tendency toward autarchy? The second difficulty in the way of achieving Pan-Africanism is our lack of realism, our wordiness. Resolutions are voted which are not followed by actions. If the resolutions were more realistic we could perhaps begin to apply them. The third reason is that the actual deeds of the independent African governments contradict their Pan-African statements.

In fact, it is paradoxical that at the very time some of the newly independent African states pretend to champion African unity they quarrel about their frontiers and claim pieces of neighboring territories, support émigrés and phantom governments at great expense, see Fifth Columns everywhere. Of course, there is no law against hoping that certain frontier rectifications may become possible before long with the consent of the people concerned. But in the moment of achieving independence this is hardly an essential problem.

What we must do first of all is analyze our situation as it presents itself at this point in time. We shall have to evaluate the various components which make up our mixed civilization and disentangle the skein of the component parts as we go along. Each element, be it European or African-Negro, will be historically analyzed, traced back to its exact place of birth, given the time and circumstances of its development. Only in this way shall we be able, if it is a European element, to adapt it to our African personality, or, if it is African-Negro, to adapt it to the twentieth century. For let us not forget that what we are aiming at here in Senegal, outpost of West Africa, is to create a modern nation: an African-Negro civilization, certainly, but one that meets the requirements of the present day.

The responsible government and party politicians of Senegal have recognized this for more than ten years. They have begun to trace out the African road to socialism based on the seminal cultural values of both Africa and Europe. I emphasize cultural values for they are the leaven of all civilization. Our recognition of this has determined the social and economic evaluations on which we are basing our development plans for Senegal; and

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when various choices have to be made as we go along, we shall make our decisions on the same humanistic grounds.

To build a nation, to erect a new civilization which can lay claim to existence because it is humane, we shall try to employ not only enlightened reason but also dynamic imagination. In the first place, we shall go back to the sources of African-Negro and European civilization in order to grasp what is essential in both —their spirit, their ferment. Thus inspired, we shall seek to create new forms and institutions—cultural, political, social and economic—suited to our present situation. Once we have put forth our full effort of heart and spirit and intellect, once we have achieved this inner revolution, the rest will be given to us in addition—that is to say, the capital, the technicians and the techniques. France has already offered to supply them.

Above anything else, however, the future of our nation depends on our own efforts—on our collective and individual efforts and the sacrifices we are willing to make. As I have often warned, independence in its first stage is solitude. It is a people's coming of age. As the African-Negro proverb says: "It is no good calling on God for help before you have tilled your field." The Senegalese nation will be our own handiwork or it will not exist at all.

Senegal's independence will cost two billion C.F.A. francs[1] extra at the start, and this sum will increase from year to year. Our first task is to find an equivalent amount from new resources. There can be no question of increasing the burden of taxes, nor of cutting salaries and wages as some of the independent African states have done, and there also will be no question of slowing the rate of investment to any important extent. Thus in order to increase the national revenue we shall be obliged to reduce the country's standard of living. There are limitations to what we can do, however, if the public services are to function properly. Civil servants will therefore have to change their habits in the direction of greater precision, greater discipline and a rationalization of their working methods. They will do so because they are aware of the revolutionary fact that they are no longer working for somebody else, for a colonial administration, but for themselves, for a national state in which they are, after all, privileged members.

But thrift and greater efficiency in the public services will still

[1] About $8,000,000. The franc of the Communauté Française d'Atlantique is equivalent to the old West African franc. Hence one new French franc equals 50 C.F.A. francs.—Ed.

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not be enough. The whole national economy must be restudied. The market economy will have to be abolished and replaced by a rationally planned economy. Hence, an inventory is being made of resources, deficiencies and potentialities. Already the guide lines of local and national planning are becoming clear. Without waiting for the plans to be put in final form, our government, at the initiative and under the supervision of the African Federation Party, is starting to construct the new national economy. It must press forward without yielding to either the blackmailing power of money or the demagoguery of self-seeking individuals or opponents. It is not our plan to set up a so-called "popular" democracy or a liberal laissez-faire régime. We aim to hold firmly to a middle-of-the-road socialism which is liberal and undoctrinaire—one which socializes all that should be socialized, beginning with the rural economy, but no more than that.

As I said at the Youth Seminar of the African Federation Party, Senegal must stand as an exemplary African state in the concert of nations. In spite of destroying our traditional institutions and most of our works of art, France has left us with a positive asset: a cultural, political, social and economic infra-structure. And with ideas. So far, these are but means to an end. Luckily, although African-Negro values are emaciated they are not uprooted. As we accumulate what means exist, as we adapt them to our needs rather than trying to create them whole, as we give them life and set them in proper order, and all this in a spirit of humanity and mutual tolerance, we shall reëstablish our civilization, or rather —as is my hope—create a new one. Senegal ought to be a research laboratory, a vast workshop, where new creations take form, the product of a new spirit, a new effort of heart, mind, will and imagination. Thus, along with real independence we shall have acquired the right to speak as a sovereign nation; thus, and only thus, shall we make a positive contribution to peace, to world civilization.

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NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR THE WEST

By Alfred C. Neal

THE fact that foreign policy was a dominant issue in the 1960 Presidential election is probably evidence enough that our foreign economic policies should be critically reëxamined, particularly as they apply to the developing countries. The gap between the economic philosophies of the developed and underdeveloped countries seems to be widening and in most of Asia, Africa and Latin America the expectation of rapid economic development has not been fulfilled. The fact that some of the most dedicated and optimistic practitioners of development call for a large increase in economic aid to achieve an average increase in income of only $2 to $6 per head per year in the developing countries is evidence not only of the intractability of the problem but also of a desperate need for drastic changes in our thinking.

A French economist who had been through the best graduate schools both in his own country and in the United States, and who has had several years' experience with the economic development problems of Middle Africa, recently offered a disturbing appraisal. "Nothing that I have learned," he said, "is of the slightest use to meet the problems of economic development of these countries. And most of the present priorities that everybody gives to their problems are wrong." There is indeed considerable evidence to support the view that the critical breakthroughs in this field of knowledge and policy have yet to be made. The following personal observations, some of which will be anathema to my professional colleagues, represent an attempt to point out some new paths of policy.

The goal of foreign economic policy is to contribute to our foreign policy objectives. From this point of view, the most important goals of foreign economic policy are these:

(a) to promote maximum unity, strength and sustained growth in the free world and especially among our strongest allies. These are mainly the Atlantic countries and Japan, which are the great reservoir of capital, technology and skills in the free world;

(b) to influence developing countries in so far as possible toward the kind of liberal economic system of which we are now

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part, and away from that of the Soviet bloc, by realizing the rapid development which can be derived from coöperation with the liberal system of the West;

(c) to frustrate the Soviet bloc's plans to expand their influence and to put bloc members under pressures which may weaken the ties among them.

To make the maximum progress toward these goals requires that the foreign economic policies of the West and, in particular, of the United States, take at least three different directions. One is suitable for the industrialized countries of the free world, another for the underdeveloped countries and a third for the Communist bloc. In addition to foreign economic policies, defense and research and development policies can make economic contributions to these objectives in ways which cannot be detailed here.

To have three different foreign economic policies is, of course, heterodoxy. Tradition in this field is against the idea. The core of our foreign economic policy has been to ask and to give nondiscriminatory, most-favored-nation treatment in trade policy, to frown on international commodity agreements and quota arrangements, and to deal with development assistance on a country-by-country basis, usually bilaterally. These and similar familiar views are, I suggest, entirely inadequate in an era of cold war.

II

Economic relations among the industrialized countries of the free world can best be governed by traditional foreign economic policies, namely: liberal trade relations, convertible exchange at fixed rates, national treatment for private investment without special tax incentives or subsidies, and equal taxation of foreign and domestic businesses. These arrangements are familiar and have now largely been reattained (with certain exceptions, the most notable being the treatment of and by Japan). Their contribution to the growth and prosperity of the West has been demonstrably great, especially in Europe in recent years.[1]

Yet the industrialized countries still lack coördination of their national policies toward each other and toward the rest of the world. One example is the split in Europe. It is coming to be more

[1] Supplementing these traditional liberal arrangements are a number of relatively new international institutions: the International Bank and the Fund, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, the United Nations Special Fund and the Inter-American Bank. Other supplements are supplied by national lending agencies such as our own Export-Import Bank.

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clearly recognized that the GATT provisions permitting free-trade areas and common markets clearly did not have in mind groups so large or so powerful as the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area. The present external tariffs both of the Common Market and of the leading members of EFTA will be highly discriminatory, both against the other group and against third countries, including our own. Moreover, since the E.E.C. is associating the overseas territories of its members, Britain is maintaining imperial preference and Portugal is giving its overseas territories metropolitan treatment, the split will be extended into Africa, Asia and even to some extent into Latin America. In each case, the overseas associates obtain from their "mother" country or group certain privileges not available from outsiders. So long as the discrimination and preferences remain of value to the members and associates of the two groups, neighboring underdeveloped countries of limited size will find little opportunity for unity and severely limited opportunity for development.

It is in the economic interest of the United States and of all third countries to bring the E.E.C. and EFTA together in a way which will minimize the degree of discrimination. (The political value of healing the split is obvious.) This requires the calculation of a nice balance between allowing sufficient discrimination to carry out the original purpose of the association and being so discriminatory as to split the industrialized nations of the world and their associated overseas countries into separate trading blocs. I have suggested, pending more complete knowledge of the average external tariffs in all of the areas affected, that an all-round reduction of the average tariff on industrial products to about 10 percent might strike this balance so far as the industrial countries are concerned.[2]

To achieve an average tariff level on industrial products of not in excess of 10 percent would require cuts in the external tariff of the Common Market, of Britain and of the United States of probably between one-third and one-half. Moreover, the kind of tariff cutting now required would seem to call for a change in the method of negotiating trade agreements. The United States should have, as the Common Market and the EFTA now have,

[2] A specific proposal must await the results of comprehensive tariff comparisons now being made in coöperative studies by the British PEP, the Federation of Swedish Industries and the U.S. Committee for Economic Development.

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the freedom to negotiate a reduction in the *average* of its tariff level by categories of products, preferably throughout the whole of its industrial classification.

If the United States is to be a leader in reducing tariffs to the extent required, it must give up the "no damage" rule in making tariff adjustments. This means that it must have machinery available, as the Common Market countries and Britain now have, for dealing with problems of distress resulting from import competition. In as much as the United States needs this machinery for dealing with much larger domestic problems of technological change, changes in demand and shifts in industrial location, the special provision dealing with damage due to import competition could probably be incorporated into a general measure dealing with distressed areas and displaced workers.

In leveling down tariffs and in implementing the proposed treatment of underdeveloped countries some special attention will have to be given to the competition of low-wage countries which concentrate on a narrow range of products. Within organized labor it is being proposed that a fair labor standards provision be used for this purpose. It would apply to imports produced by workers who are paid less than the prevailing wages in the *exporting* country. As export industries are usually high-wage industries, this provision is not likely to cause much trouble and it may be better than many alternatives that are being discussed.

But this provision, along with the adjustment program previously mentioned, will still leave a few intractable problems—such as certain lines of Asian textiles which are giving special trouble to the United States and Britain. These problems call for aid by all the leading industrial nations, the burden being more readily borne if it is shared. For just such problems as this, we now have the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development, the first organization to be roughly coextensive with the sources of Western economic strength and to have as its purpose coördination of that strength in all important fields. Through special task forces working with representatives of the exporting countries, the O.E.C.D. should be able to develop proposals for common treatment in such cases by all the developed countries. The explosive effects of advanced technology in a country with extremely low wages can be damaging to all—to the exporting country because it overexpands and to importing countries be-

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cause they cannot move people and resources out of damaged industries fast enough. Controlling the most serious of these cases by means of agreed quotas, which are temporary and expandable, may be the only reasonable alternative to the disruption of the whole trading system of the West. Fortunately, such cases are the exception: low-wage countries generally buy more than they sell; it is not they whose gold and dollar reserves are gaining; and, like Japan, they maintain high tariffs because they cannot meet world competition in their own home markets.

Another problem of the West is that in seeking to help the underdeveloped parts of the world, the absence of coördination has led to useless competition and misdirected effort. For better or worse, the grant programs and most of the investment programs of the West have been directed—both at the granting and at the receiving ends—by governments or by official agencies. While private investment can be coördinated through the market, official aid and investment must be coördinated by conscious effort. Decisions in several fields must be related. Grantor nations should maintain trade policies which do not frustrate their official aid and investment policies, and should have tax policies which are at least neutral with respect to their private investors in underdeveloped areas. Policies of the United States have not fully met either test. Products which are the result of our foreign investment have been subjected to quotas, as in petroleum, copper and textiles. Equal tax treatment for all foreign investment automatically channels private investment to "safe" areas and away from those subject to greater risks.

The most important decision, however, is whether to pursue bilateral or multilateral aid programs, or both. National lending and aid programs, especially from the West, are looked on with suspicion by underdeveloped countries as expressions of a new form of colonialism or imperialism. Competition among the various national and international agencies serves only to undermine credit standards and to dissipate money unwisely. "Projects," rather than development programs, are the result of the present lack of coördination.

It should long ago have become obvious that only the West is genuinely interested in development rather than political influence, and that therefore multilateralization of aid, which cleanses it of imperialist or subversive taint, is clearly to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the Soviets. One is tempted

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also to add that in the present state of the world, it is probably easier to achieve the advantages of a maximum *private* participation through a multilateral than through a national program (which in socialist eyes may be imperialist). This last possibility assumes, of course, that the directors of the multilateral agencies both desire and know how to get private participation.

One of the functions which the O.E.C.D. should perform is to coördinate policies of both national and international suppliers of aid, loan and investment funds to underdeveloped areas. But before examining this possibility, let us look at the elements of a foreign economic policy toward developing nations.

III

Because the problems of growth faced by developing countries are so different from those of the older industrial nations, policies toward them should probably be different too. Policies appropriate for underdeveloped countries must take into account two very important facts. The first is that the capital, know-how and technical assistance for rapid development can be supplied only by the industrialized nations and preferably those of the free world. The second fact is that an approach calling for liberal trade, convertible currency and development mainly through private investment is not currently practiced or popular in most of the underdeveloped countries of the world. To depart from these institutions in our treatment of the underdeveloped world is to give up very little. Moreover, our past insistence upon them has led to a widely believed charge that they work for the developed nations but against the underdeveloped. On these matters we must move our thinking out of the nineteenth century and see the world as it is. We can maintain old principles in relations with developed countries, but we need to give even more favorable terms to the underdeveloped.

The most important privilege which the industrialized nations of the free world can offer to the underdeveloped countries is *one-way free trade*. This means that underdeveloped countries would be permitted to establish tariffs to encourage their own development but would be granted free trade treatment by the industrial countries. They could earn as much foreign exchange for their development as free markets permitted.

The one-way free trade treatment which is proposed is essentially the same as that granted by the Common Market to its

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associated territories and by the British imperial preference system to underdeveloped parts of the Commonwealth. Such treatment, when accorded on so partial a basis, is likely to provoke resentment; more important, it prevents former colonial areas from joining together into common markets which are a prerequisite for economic development. If one-way free trade is offered by all the industrialized countries, it removes one of the worst aspects of discrimination created by the Common Market and maintained by Britain as a carry-over from earlier times. It gives the former colonial areas an alternative to binding themselves to the former mother country, but an alternative which provides still greater attraction for staying within the economic system of the West.

Once the unconditional most-favored-nation principle is breached, the use of another device which will be extremely helpful to the development of underdeveloped countries becomes possible. That is to make the free trade treatment by industrial countries conditional upon non-discriminatory tariff treatment by underdeveloped countries *grouped together* to provide a market large enough to support development. One-way free trade would be offered not to single countries, except possibly Brazil and India which may be large enough entities for development, but only to groups of countries practicing free trade among their members but maintaining a non-discriminatory external tariff in the interest of their own development. One-way free trade should thus be conditional, and should aim ultimately at bringing the underdeveloped region into full membership in the open, low-tariff system of the advanced countries. This is yet another task which can best be coördinated by the O.E.C.D.

It is too little recognized, especially by the new political leaders, that modern industrial development is heavily dependent upon what economists call "economies of scale" and "external economies." The first of these pertains to the size, and therefore potential output, of a plant. Most of the commonplace goods associated with a high standard of living (and high productivity) cannot be made in small plants and workshops. The reasonably economic size of a flat-rolled steel-products mill is about a million tons per year; for a bar mill, about half that. Similarly, petroleum refineries, automobile tire and synthetic rubber plants, automobile and tractor plants, all require large outputs to achieve reasonably low cost. The low income of underdeveloped countries

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and their low level of development make almost all of them too small a market to support such plants.[3] Without forming large customs unions among themselves, their development will be limited for a very long time to agriculture and the extractive industries, to the earlier stages of processing of their products for export markets, and to a few small-scale local industries (bricks, slaughtering) whose products enjoy the protection of high transport costs or perishability. This is precisely the kind of economy that their political leaders wish to escape from. Politically as well as economically, it is important that we help them to find avenues of escape that lead somewhere other than to the Soviet Union.

"External economies" are advantages which result from having a concentration of industries using similar services and products. Just as use of automobiles and trucks attracts facilities for repair, replacement and servicing, so machinery-using industries become more efficient when there is enough business to attract establishments specializing in repair, parts replacement and manufacture of machinery. Industrial complexes capable of generating significant external economies can be achieved only in large markets, and underdeveloped countries cannot furnish large markets except by combining their present tiny markets.

To bring about such arrangements will require a concerted effort and a great deal of sweetening in terms of external financing. Fortunately, the plan can be started with a single group of countries, which, by the visible acceleration of its development, could become a "demonstration area." It seems logical that the O.E.C.D. should take upon itself the task of developing the information and the recommendations that would be required to bring about both appropriate groupings of underdeveloped countries and appropriate development programs for the areas encompassed by the common tariffs. To do this job adequately the O.E.C.D. would have to establish a more or less permanent team of experts to be associated with each area for which a development program seemed appropriate. The area or regional team would be needed not only to advise O.E.C.D.; it would also provide a means for coördinating loans and aid by the international financial institutions, and for attracting private capital and

[3] The purchasing power of Ghana, for example, is about that of Rochester, N.Y., but its market is heavily concentrated in low-income items. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, has a purchasing power about that of West Virginia and its market is similarly skewed. It is instructive to consider to what a small extent industry is supported by the local market in places like Rochester or even the whole state of West Virginia.

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skills. In this way, the attack on the economic problems of a particular country could be made far more systematic and therefore more attractive to lending agencies and investors.

Use of an O.E.C.D. team, rather than a mixed team made up of "borrowers" and "lenders" or the various economic commissions of the United Nations, may not be the most popular way to coördinate assistance to underdeveloped regions, but it is likely to be the most practical. It assigns certain responsibilities to the "banker," and certain to the "borrower," but does not mix them up. It is the method which experience demonstrates to be the right one for expensive and long-range undertakings. It does not preclude—it requires—consultation and agreement with the recipients; it merely puts final decision in the hands of those with the power and means to implement decisions.

Mixed systems of public and private investment seem to be desired by most of the underdeveloped countries, and this should be recognized at the outset. However, enlargement of the market by formation of regional customs unions may make private investment to develop competition more feasible; the virtual necessity of giving a private foreign investor a monopoly in small countries has been a major obstacle to private development. The "contract approach" to development so persuasively advanced by Donald K. David, providing for private organizations to do a full package job, could be used effectively.

It is not recommended that the United States or other industrialized countries grant tax concessions to their nationals for investment in underdeveloped countries. Such an approach encounters domestic difficulties best summed up in the expression, "We are subsidizing the export of American jobs." Also, to the underdeveloped country a program of subsidized investment resembles imperialism and is therefore less welcome. It is suggested, however, that underdeveloped countries be encouraged to grant tax concessions to private investors and that these be recognized by tax treaties, which will ensure that the margin of preference granted by the underdeveloped country to the private investor will in fact be received and not taxed away by the private investor's own government.

With respect to investment funds supplied by the governments of the developed countries, it is strongly recommended that these funds be channeled through multilateral agencies to the maximum extent possible. Among other advantages, aid supplied

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through a multilateral agency serves dramatically to highlight the difference between aid from the West and aid from the Soviet bloc, which tends always to be on a bilateral basis.

In time, with a sufficiently large and successful aid program conducted by the West on a multilateral basis, the Soviet bloc will come under pressure to modify its own program, preferably in the direction of joining multilateral institutions. Therefore, while the West still has complete freedom of action, it should develop multilateral aid arrangements on a basis which will promote a liberal and open trade and payments system. No political strings should be tied to aid and the economic conditions should be dictated only by economic considerations.

Customs unions of underdeveloped areas will also help to stabilize foreign exchange earnings to some extent, but probably not enough. The problem of price instability of primary products should be met mainly in two ways. First, some of the difficulty will be overcome by the diversification which will follow from the grouping of countries into customs unions. The grouping by itself will serve to diversify the foreign exchange earnings of the area encompassed by the customs union; a country heavily dependent on copper, for example, may be combined with others which produce bananas, cocoa or coffee.

Second, with respect to mineral producers, probably the best remedy for instability would be to establish a scheme of international buffer stocks—specifically for copper, lead and zinc. These commodities do not presently enjoy a free market anyway, thanks to the United States quota system. If the buffer-stock scheme costs money it is money which would probably be spent for the benefit of the supplying countries anyway. The United States can improve its competitive position by giving up its national schemes in favor of an international one. The West would be well advised to refrain from price support schemes that it is not prepared to extend to all producing countries.

For foods and agricultural raw materials, buffer stocks may be ruled out by the nature of the commodity. It may well be that the ultimate relief for countries specializing in one or two exports of this type is diversification of agriculture which would occur under conditions of successful economic development. There remains, however, the problem of agricultural products of the industrial nations which are also produced by the underdeveloped —commodities like sugar, cotton, rice and wheat—which are sub-

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ject to national price-support programs. The mere naming of examples calls to mind the complexities involved in altering national programs to offset their damage to the conduct of a sensible foreign economic policy. Some national policies, like our cotton price support program, have provided powerful incentives to development of foreign production. Others, such as the disposal of U. S. surpluses under P.L. 480, may have contributed to development programs of other types but hardly to agricultural development in the recipient country or its traditional suppliers.

One cannot in any brief paper deal with these problems. It is possible, however, to suggest a principle for national agricultural programs which, if followed, would minimize conflict with foreign policy objectives. If the support program cannnot be international—and experience suggests that few such programs are likely to succeed—then the national program should be altered as soon as possible to permit world prices to be effective domestically. To subsidize foreign producers by means of U.S. domestic price supports and crop controls which raise world prices, and then to subsidize foreign buyers by cut-price sales in the world market, as we have done with cotton, seems not only to be bad foreign economic policy but also slow suicide for both domestic producers and users.

IV

The object of the foregoing proposals is to strengthen the industrial countries of the West, to hasten economic growth in the underdeveloped countries while drawing them into the economic system of the West, and to close off as many opportunities as possible for the Communist bloc to make trouble. In general, the economic policy most appropriate for dealing with the Communist bloc is a policy of completely controlled trade and payments subject to a centralized authority. Here again the O.E.C.D. may well provide the appropriate coördinating instrument.

Economic relations with the Soviet Union must be calculated, even as are the bloc's economic relations with the West. This means simply that neither the open trading system characteristic of relations among Western industrial nations, nor the one-way free trade relationship with developing countries, is appropriate for relations with the Soviet bloc. The planning and calculation of the bloc must be met by like means in order to minimize disadvantages or to maximize advantages in East-West trade.

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The power of decision over these relations cannot, under such circumstances, be left either with private enterprise or with single nations—if the West is to hold its own or to win.

The economic policies sketched in this article attempt to take account of the world situation as it exists today and as it is likely to exist for some time in the future. They explicitly recognize that there is a cold war, that the Soviet bloc is engaged in a battle of production with the West, and that there is a battle for influence in the underdeveloped parts of the world. They aim to make the most of the inherent strength of the West by establishing relationships among the free industrial countries which have demonstrated their capacity to succeed. Mechanisms and policies are suggested for underdeveloped countries which will facilitate their development along lines that will eventually win allegiance to the economic system of the West rather than that of the East.

Implicitly, these suggestions call for an enormous volume of financial and technical aid to the underdeveloped countries, not only because this is required for the development of the underdeveloped countries but because it will put pressure on the Soviet bloc. For each 1 percent of gross national product which the free industrial countries devote to aid, the Soviet bloc would have to devote probably 2 or 3 percent of theirs. Finally, in addition to putting economic pressure on the Communist bloc through raising the ante in the aid game, the rules of the East-West trade game should be stringently tightened.

It should be noted that most of the changes suggested here call for the modification or elimination of government programs which have been instituted for the particular benefit of private pressure groups. Tariffs, price supports, import quotas, tariff preferences in overseas markets and the like are not expressions of the efficiency of a private economic system. They are, in the long run, bars to efficiency. One major task of free governments in the contest with the Soviet Union is to prevent private interests from falling victim to Lenin's prediction that capitalists would sell to socialists the very rope with which socialists intend to hang them.

The basic issue in our foreign economic policy is whether we are going to fight the cold war to win it or not. If we are going to win it, we will have to base our policies upon the facts of today's world rather than upon the economic precepts of the nineteenth century.

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INDIA ON THE EVE OF ITS THIRD PLAN

By Barbara Ward Jackson

IN the last ten years, something like $21 billion of fresh investment has been pumped into the Indian economy. In the Third Five Year Plan, which begins next April, the same amount will be invested in half that time. Compared with the size of India and its population—some 431,000,000 living in just over a million square miles—an investment of $42 billions in 15 years is of course derisorily small. American private enterprise expects to invest three-quarters of such a sum in any one year—and for a population less than half as large. But in India it is a revolution, none the less.

The bare statistics are impressive enough. The index of industrial production has risen by an average of 10 percent a year in the last decade, and this rate masks a much more powerful thrust in all the newer industries. The chemical industry has more than doubled; the crucial sector of machine building—which is at the center of India's strategy for growth—has increased by over 300 percent. Some 6,000,000 new industrial jobs have been created, although even this level is too low to counter the steady flow of new entrants into an economy in which population moves inexorably up by over 8,000,000 a year. New skills have been introduced and workers who in 1955 took four or five times as long as their European counterparts to produce a given article—an Oerlikon lathe, a Mercedes truck, a railway coach—can now do the work in little less than twice the European time, and the gap is still being narrowed. At the other end of the industrial scale, a new class of business managers has come into being. In the next ten years their numbers may have increased tenfold, and this expansion is introducing a new, liberal and professional outlook into industry at a point where, in the past, attitudes have been dominated by the old speculative, "get-rich-quick" philosophy of India's dominant trading caste, the Marwaris.

The thrust of expansion is strong at every level. In the public sector investment has been more than doubled between the First and Second Plan for such basic services as power, communication and transport and for a number of new public ventures in mining, steel making and heavy industry. In the organized private sector, too, investment is twice as large and has run at a level consist-

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ently higher than any laid down in official forecasts. But it may well be that growth is most lively in the sector which escapes most easily from the formal records—the new, bustling, thrusting sector of small-scale production.

Statistics here are hard to come by. They cover artificially-fostered uneconomic village crafts as well as the new modernized workshops using power and a few machines. The new small entrepreneurs are too busy finding markets to provide figures for official use, and a healthy suspicion of the tax gatherers tends to deflate any figures they do report.

One must therefore rely on a whole mass of indirect evidence—the eagerness with which small businessmen look to public agencies such as the State Bank for loans, the pressure on space in the 60 new industrial estates, of which there are to be 600 in the Third Plan. When, for instance, a few months ago, 80 new sites were advertised in the Ludhiana industrial estate, 800 applications came in before nightfall. But perhaps the best evidence of the lively expansion is simply visual. A decade ago, a drive from Delhi to Umbala along the Grand Trunk Road was still a drive out of the pages of Kipling. The bullock carts moved slowly through the dust, camels padded silently by, and at dusk a blue haze of pungent smoke hung over the villages and sent the aromatic smell of burning cow dung across the quiet, empty highway. At any corner one might have met Kim and his Lama or settled down to eat and sleep by the camp fires of the old Rani's caravan.

Today, the trucks and trailers hurtle by, day and night. Bicycles in swarms show that the first of the consumer durables has reached the Indian village. Great roads are often the epitome of a society. One thinks of America's shining fleets of private cars and Russia's mile upon mile of empty strategic highways. The Indian roads today are the roads of a society in the first forward thrust of modernization, where the bullocks still hold up the mammoth trucks, carrying nuts and screws and bicycle parts and machine tools from the busy little workshops of the Punjab to Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay. These crowded thoroughfares, these growing transport services, make up perhaps the most striking visual evidence that the Indian economy has discovered the biggest single spring of expansion in the mixed economy—a large and growing class of entrepreneurs.

It is one thing for the Government to determine on development and to provide basic investments and inducements. But it

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is quite another to be certain of the consequences. What will be the community's response? Will there be citizens ready to seek the risks and rewards of making guesses about the market and acting on them? Such men are not always forthcoming. Some societies are so entrenched in traditional modes of work and prestige that the entrepreneurial faculty does not appear. No carrot of gain tempts them. If the stick of total state discipline is not used as an alternative, nothing happens, as is the case in large parts of Southeast Asia or in upland South America. The best news in India's first decade of planned growth is, therefore, that enterprise exists, irresistibly and unquenchably, that it is growing at a speed to create a whole new climate of opinion favorable to development and to provide the interlocking expansion and external economies by which enterprise in one field assists it everywhere else.

II

Admittedly, the picture of growth is not so clear in the countryside. There, change has to be grafted straight onto the oldest, most encrusted, most valued traditions of human living. On the Gangetic plain or the rice delta of Tanjore, land has been cultivated continuously for thousands of years, not as a means of buying and selling and making money, but as a source of food for the household and of prestige in the community. Men whose forefathers have followed the same devout cycle of agriculture and religion for generation upon generation are not easily persuaded that the new methods may not be risky or useless or impious or worse.

And resistance to new methods is only half the problem. Better seed, more water, the use of fertilizer—all these imply some investment and in any village at least half the families have no savings at all. The man with 25 acres, even the man with 5 acres, some of them irrigated, has a little capital which can be coaxed into a new pesticide or a better strain of wheat. But the little man with a couple of acres or less gets only a bare subsistence from his land. The landless laborer has nothing. Thus poverty, even more than tradition, holds the countryside back from change.

In the last decade, the Government has made a sustained effort to break down these rural barriers of conservatism and indigence. Its chief instrument of change is the Community Development movement which attempts to push and prod and tempt the

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farmer into every kind of beneficent village activity, from better crop-growing to better hygiene. And one aspect of the movement is to prepare the way for a more vigorous coöperative system in which the little man will be able to lay his hands on the credit he needs to take advantage of new opportunities in farming and to have some control over the processing and marketing of his improved crop.

These efforts have not been as unsuccessful as some critics of the Government's rural policy now suggest. Agricultural output as a whole has increased by about 40 percent in the last 10 years and commercial crops, such as cotton and jute, have nearly doubled. This is not negligible, especially when the hazards of weather and water are taken into account. India has about 300,000,000 acres that can be cultivated, but only 50,000,000 are irrigated so far; the Third Plan aims at adding another 20,000,000 acres. For the rest, the monsoon rains determine everything and a bad monsoon such as that of 1957–1958 can stop all progress in its tracks and reduce food production by over 6,000,000 tons in a season.

Yet the advance has been undeniable. Some farming groups have long been known to include men of enterprise and innovation. They took to growing commercial crops in the later decades of the nineteenth century—cotton and ground nuts in Saurashtra, tobacco in Gujerat, wheat in the Punjab. Today in these more enterprising areas, and in a scattered way all over India, some peasants are eagerly taking up the new techniques encouraged by Community Development. The pressure of demand for fertilizers grows each year; three times more is now consumed than in 1955. The figure could probably be five or six times greater. About 80,000 miles of new roads connecting villages with major roads have been built under the auspices of Community Development and 100,000 miles more improved; and one can argue that nothing stirs up the entrepreneurial instinct more speedily than having a market within reach.

In short, once the opportunities are available, the pioneers begin to exploit them. Let us say that two or three men in a village make a start with planting rice according to the Japanese method, each seedling spaced and manured, the lines between carefully and continuously weeded. If, as a result, output goes up by 25 percent, other villagers tend to follow suit. As one small farmer put it: "I used to plant and harvest in the ways of my

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father, but now I *think* about farming." In a country in which in the past farming methods have had the sanctity of unchanging ritual, this may be the greatest revolution of all.

Nor has the attack on rural poverty entirely failed. Land reform has removed the large rent-collecting intermediaries, the Zamindars and Jagirdars. Perhaps 70 percent of India's country people own some land. The number of farmers' coöperatives has grown from 5,000,000 to 12,000,000 in the last decade and the coöperatives' share in rural credit is now 10 percent, compared with 3 percent before the Plans. Thirty percent of the country people—the men with five acres and more—are probably better off. Another 30 percent have kept pace, in spite of more mouths to feed. Primary education, the village boy's first rung of the ladder, will soon be extended to all India's children. But the root of the problem remains. At the bottom of the scale, especially among the landless and the Untouchables, poverty is growing more intense.

These uneven results reflect the Government's rural achievement as a whole. Those who profess to see only failure miss the unmistakable improvements and points of growth. But the critics are right in estimating that the pace is too slow. India's country people—and they make up nearly 80 percent of the population—must, like the Red Queen, run fast even to stay where they are. To get ahead of themselves, they have to sprint. This means in practical terms a production of food grains increasing not by 3 percent but by 8 percent a year, to grow from 75,000,000 tons today to between 90,000,000 and 100,000,000 tons by 1966. It means much more emphasis on the provision of fertilizers and better seeds, far more detailed plans for land and water use, more efficient mobilization of rural labor for the ditch digging, field levelling and road building, which intensive agriculture demands. It means devoting a larger share of India's best brains to agriculture and providing higher prestige and salaries for rural work. It means a much larger injection of State credit into the coöperative system so that the little man can be staked and released from his bondage—still a bondage covering 90 percent of rural credit—to the local money lender. It means an assured market for food grains with both floor and ceiling prices and this in turn requires a public grain reserve of both wheat and rice. American generosity under Public Law 480 has pretty well assured the needed reserve for wheat, but probably half a million more tons of rice

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would be necessary to give security to the rice growers. And all these things need to be done energetically and at once.

The Indian Government admits the need. More capital is set aside for agriculture in the Third Plan than in the Second. Concentrated schemes making use of all the techniques of expansion are being prepared for a specially selected pilot district in each state. More emphasis on food production, less on cultural frills, is forecast in Community Development. The production and possibly the importing of fertilizers are to be expanded. Even if farming is the laggard sector, there is no complacency about it now, and the next five years promise to be years of renewed and strenuous effort.

III

When this pressure is added to the thrusting growth of the industrial sector, the full scale of the problems facing the Indian Government begins to emerge. The chief issue in India in the next years is not, as many critics suggest, any controversy about the role of the public or the private sector. Save on a very few points, there is no essential conflict between them. On the contrary, India is going through the experience Western Europe underwent during the Marshall Plan, or France under the Monnet Plan—the process of learning that there is no greater aid to the lively development of private industry than a large, sustained and well directed program of public investment. The profound question is whether government in all its manifestations—cabinet, party structure, bureaucracy—can carry the tremendous weight which economic success is loading on to it.

The dominant men in the Indian Government are still the leaders formed by the long struggle for independence. They are men of generous vision. They are committed to the idea of a modernized Indian economy. Certainly, no one should underestimate the part played by Pandit Nehru in making the aim of a modern, socially just and economically expanding India the ideal of the Congress Party—and indeed of the Indian nation—in the first decade after independence. But equally the leaders of Congress, apart from Sardar Patel who died in 1950, show few signs of profound interest in administration. Years in jail under the British were hardly designed to draw out whatever innate capabilities they may have had. They came relatively late in life to the direct tasks of government and were plunged almost at once into

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policies of economic expansion which put a premium on powers of decision, delegation and follow-through. It is not surprising that these are sometimes lacking in the cabinet. Yet the consequence is to lessen drive and direction at the very top.

In the country at large, the Congress Party is also not especially well fitted for the local tasks of economic leadership. Congress resembles either one of the great American parties in that it is a coalition of regions and interests, not the single instrument of an agreed ideology. For the give-and-take of democracy, such a party is eminently well suited. It can construct the local bargains and compromises by which divergent interests are reconciled and voters tempted along new ways. But it is not a very suitable instrument for rallying vast unified popular effort or for exacting great public sacrifice. It follows that India cannot mobilize savings and direct energies as the Chinese Communists claim to do, and Congress as a political party can survive only so long as really heroic sacrifices are not needed from the Indian people. Provided growth goes on, the Congress Party, for all its local feuds and splits, will probably continue to be India's chosen instrument in politics, but it does not contribute much to the dynamism of economic growth and, at times, its incoherences and regional jealousies actually impede expansion.

As a result of this relative lack of drive in the political direction of the country, much more responsibility falls on the Indian Civil Service. Its virtues are immense. It inherited and has largely continued a unique tradition of probity, devotion, intelligence and service. It includes in its higher ranks some of the world's ablest public servants. It has coped bravely with an almost unbelievable expansion in its work and is now preparing without too much complaint to shoulder even more. Yet the virtues it displays are not always the virtues most needed in the new India in which the aims of government are very different from those of the old British administration. Economic expansion and social welfare are now the watchwords in place of the old "law and order," and both aims entail a vast increase in government action—and action of a quite new type. Achievement is now worth more than equity, risk-taking more than slow, secure inquiry, a half-right answer today more than a complete answer next year. The old tradition demands care and the avoidance of mistakes, but it can encourage indecision and buck-passing. The old tradition upholds careful Treasury control and sanction over all public expenditure. But

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this leads all too easily to "rupee pinching," to dangerously slow and detailed audit, and to what is in effect a perpetual flurry of intervention in agencies to which genuine authority should have been delegated.

These dilemmas of bureaucracy are not new. Britain itself went through a comparable crisis of administration in the nineteenth century when the new needs of an industrial society caught up and pulverized the old machinery of an agrarian and mercantile state. Florence Nightingale's description of the War Office in 1859 could be applied to several Ministries in Delhi a hundred years later: "a very slow office, an enormously expensive office, a not very efficient office, and one in which the Minister's intentions can be entirely negatived by all the sub-departments and those of each of the sub-departments by every other." And the reasons for the criticism are the same—an old machine floundering over new tasks. But the Indian dilemmas have been exacerbated by the amount of extra responsibility piled on to the civil servants.

They are not only loaded with the normal expansion of work entailed in providing a new framework of welfare. They are not only subject to the new pressures generated by the very rapid expansion going on in the economy at large. On top of this, they are vested with sweeping powers of control over private industry and with direct responsibility for all the giant ventures which the Plans entrust to the public sector. These include three new steel mills of a million tons each, all to be fully functioning early in the Third Plan, and all to be expanded again before 1966; most of the new pits needed to increase coal output from 32,000,000 to 53,000,000 tons in the first Plans and then, by 1966, to 97,000,000; the bulk of the expansion in fertilizers, communications, equipment and railway-engine building. And in the next Plan the public sector is to include at least six major projects in the largest of large-scale industry—heavy machine building—and each plant promises to be a mammoth. Almost any bureaucracy would have been strained to the utmost with such tasks and there are signs that the Indian Civil Service is getting near to the limit of endurance.

Symptoms of strain are apparent everywhere. Private industrialists chafe under the regulations and controls by which a distrustful Government seeks to oversee their operations; and markets may vanish for good while the businessman waits for a permit in the civil servant's outer office. There are delays and hold-

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ups in the commissioning and functioning of the new public ventures because the managerial and technical skills needed to run them are not yet available, at least not in the numbers needed and all at once. A game of musical chairs seems to be developing in which some senior bureaucrats move with disconcerting speed from post to post in the public sector. And their lack of experience encourages the Ministries to continue to intervene in the day-to-day running of the new ventures, thereby adding to their own burdens and disrupting lines of authority below.

But the widest symptom of the malaise is the relative failure of some of the most vital public services to keep pace with the demands generated by India's great thrust of growth. Delays at the steel plants make it unlikely that there will be anything like the flow of steel forecast for the first years of the Third Plan. These delays turn on a shortage of coal, which is already 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 tons behind its target, on the unavailability of railway rolling stock and even on some dislocation in the supply of iron ore. Power production—as in every developing economy—is lagging behind demand, and in the Damodar Valley, India's future Ruhr, it looks as though supply will still fall short of needs by at least 170,000 kilowatts in 1966. The railways have been saved from serious bottlenecks only by the unexpected liveliness of road transport; yet the road building proposed in the Third Plan is probably at least one-third less than the estimated needs of expansion.

Such interlocking shortages in the sectors mainly controlled by the Government reflect not only the degree to which expansion has taken it by surprise. It reflects, too, a certain failure in the mechanism of planning itself. There are no agencies specifically empowered to follow decisions down through the lazy, lower echelons of administration. In Army parlance, "Q Plans"—the Planning Commission—is not balanced by "Q Ops"—say, a tough Cabinet sub-committee demanding a regular account of work in progress, not simply in terms of money spent but of physical targets actually achieved, and giving no quarter until every backlog is made up. Only some such agency with overriding powers to follow up decisions can avoid the present delays and harassments and ensure that all the interlocking needs of expansion roll forward together and do not develop into as many brakes.

It must be repeated: these are the costs of success, not failure. If no pressures of growth were pressing up urgently from below,

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the shortages in basic services, the breakdowns in planning, the delays in decision-making would not loom so large; but India would be much further from its chosen target of self-sustaining growth. And since they are the pressures of success, there is every likelihood that they will be remedied by effective and relevant action. In a democracy, some decisions cannot be taken until popular dismay is sharp enough to force the issue. Very soon in India lack of power or lack of coal or lack of fertilizer will become a political issue, with farmers and small businessmen—the core of the Congress Party's political support—asking angry questions and threatening to change their vote.

Already there are signs of greater awareness and concern. It seems likely that the private coal industry will be allowed to increase its expansion in order to make up for the manifest short-fall in coal. Managerial and technical staff are being looked for abroad for the public steel plants. There is new understanding of the scale of managerial training and recruitment needed in the next decade. New procedures to ensure "follow-up" are being discussed in the Planning Commission. A certain amount has been done to shorten the formalities by which licenses and permits are issued to private industry. It now seems possible that the problems of *administering* the Plan—over and above the question of its aims and content—will, rightly, hold the center of the Government's attention in the next five years. If so, there is no domestic reason why the Third Plan should not produce a new and even greater surge of growth.

IV

But there is one consequence of the great thrust of expansion over which the Government has little or no control—and one which could conceivably destroy all the hope and momentum developed so far. This factor is the shortage of foreign exchange. India's long-term strategy is to reduce its dependence on outside supply. Endowed as it is with vast reserves of iron ore, adequate coal and a wide range of other minerals, it is only following the path of good sense in basing its large industrial expansion upon machine making and general engineering. Its future economic pattern will more nearly resemble the internal, continental market of America than, say, the trading economy of Japan. But at this early stage of growth, its dependence upon foreign supplies for machines, for the tools for building them and for the materials

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they use, is still very great and will grow greater in the next decade of rapid growth.

Every developing economy tends to face this dependence. By definition an undeveloped society lacks the means of development—the machinery and the skills—which are the fruits, not the forerunners, of successful growth. Foreign exchange cannot be produced domestically. But domestic expansion cannot get under way without it. This is why foreign investment or the development of a strong export sector has been again and again the prelude of domestic growth, as it was with British investment in the United States and American investment in parts of Latin America or with such lively export trades as Swedish lumber and Canadian wheat.

But India faces daunting handicaps in its search for a greater flow of foreign exchange. The climate of private international lending is not what it was in the nineteenth century when Britain, with its narrow domestic resources, dominated the world economy. America, the new lynch-pin of world trade, is a much more self-sufficient giant and today, if oil exploration were not so heavily financed from the West, private capital flowing to the undeveloped economies would be little more than a trickle. It is not expected to exceed $210,000,000 of investment in India in all the five years of the next Plan.

The outlook for a sharp increase in Indian exports is not much more promising. India's staple exports—tea and jute and cotton goods—are all inhibited in one way or another: tea by high excise duties in the West, jute by alternative methods of packaging, cotton goods by stiff Asian competition and by Western quotas designed to protect the West's own higher-cost producers. India's present exports and invisible earnings are expected to provide $7,492,000,000 over the next five years, but this figure covers only the normal imports needed to keep the present economy moving. The whole foreign exchange component of planned expansion—about $5,456,000,000 in the next five years—must come from new sources, and since a vast expansion in either exports or private investment is ruled out, this is roughly the sum which India has to seek in economic assistance from abroad. Without it, the economy will either cease to grow sufficiently to keep pace with the built-in accelerator of expanding population, or the Government will have to impose so severe a program of domestic austerity as to be almost certainly incompatible with free choice and free consent.

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Either way, the liberal society will be shown to have no future in Asia.

In short, India in 1961 resembles in some measure the nations of Western Europe in 1947. At that time, most of them had made a most strenuous attempt to drag themselves up from the pit of wartime destruction. Their farmers, their workers, their managers had accomplished a vast effort to convert war industry back to peacetime uses and to restore war-ravaged agriculture to full production. But over one factor they had no control. The raw materials, the food, the capital they needed for further advance were available only in North America; but their dollar reserves had been run down to almost nothing and they still lacked the goods to export to North America in return for its supplies. Such was the deadlock from which they were rescued only by the vision and foresight of the Marshall Plan.

Today, in its relation to the whole Atlantic world, India stands caught in something of the same contradiction. Years of effort have set its economy in motion as never before, but for further expansion the essential component of foreign exchange is simply not available. It neither can be earned by exports nor imported by means of normal commercial loans. The whole momentum of the first thrust of growth is thus at stake and turns upon an obstacle which cannot be hurdled from the Indian side. Only the Western powers have the means at this stage to see to it that the obstacle does not force the Indian experiment to a full stop.

So far, the powers have generously but intermittently supported India's great experiment of growth in freedom. But the kind of sustained decision underlying the Marshall Plan—the decision to see the effort through to success—has yet to be made. Until it is, the Indian effort, great as it is, must remain precarious. As the Third Plan begins, the pressures, fully as much as the promise, generated by India's growing economy suggest that a decision should not be delayed too long.

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PLANNING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE STATE OF THE ART

By George Allen Morgan

PLANNING is thinking ahead with a view to action. It is thus an organic ingredient in the whole process of conducting foreign affairs, not the monopoly of a cloistered few. Indeed, most planning, and some of the weightiest, is neither so labelled nor done by planners so called. In the interest of furthering progress in the art, it may be useful to discuss the nature of planning in foreign affairs and some of the practical problems involved.

The urgency of planning in our age of international flux and danger needs no argument. It is perhaps less often remarked that the difficulties tend to increase with the urgency—in the field of disarmament, for example. A better understanding of those difficulties should be helpful in the effort for better planning which must never cease.

The basic function of planning in foreign affairs is to provide a timely evolution of policy. It is for this purpose that the planner must look as far ahead as the mind's eye can usefully see. He is the apostle of the future. He must speak for the changes that are coming, the problems we must one day confront and should now be getting ready for.

In foreign affairs as elsewhere the future and the past fight an endless battle over the present. The past has its claims too: a policy which ignores them will be capricious, unstable, unrespected and disastrous. Yet the pull of the past increases with the square of governmental size; so the claims of the future have to be put with increasing energy in the world of today, where the inertial momentum of bureaucracy is deflected with difficulty from established orbits.

The need for new ideas in preparing for the future is often stressed, but it is more an expression of discontent than a definition of what is wanted. The important thing is *relevant* novelty, as Alfred North Whitehead used to insist. Creative advances in planning as in science often lie in devising not so much new abstractions as fortunate adaptations of familiar ones to new problems. In any planning shop there are likely to be a number of ideas lying about which have repeatedly been tried out in one

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context or another and laid aside: then one day a different problem emerges, and somebody picks up one of those unemployed ideas, gives it a slightly different twist, and slips it deftly into place as part of a winning strategy. This weaving of ideas into the fabric of action is particularly the function of the governmental planner because he is close to the scene.

Another aspect of getting policy to evolve in time rather than too late is not at all a question of new ideas but rather of making people face up to what they really know already. Much of the inertia of government derives from the weight of vested interest, consisting partly in natural identification with existing policy on the part of those who fight daily for its success, partly in the amount of time, effort and money invested in carrying out a given policy, which it seems unbearable to write off. Thus the obstacle to timely change often lies not in lack of ideas but in unwillingness to focus on them, because to do so would jeopardize too much that is held dear.

In this respect the planner's job lies not so much in producing new thoughts as in reworking the same ones until they finally sink in. It is a difficult task because too much hammering merely leads people to discount the advocate as hopelessly biased. This side of the planning art calls for an internal diplomacy armed with the skills of a Hebrew prophet, Machiavelli and a ward-heeling politician rolled into one. As always, the vital question is timing—to seize the moment when some turn of events or fortunate mood disposes key people to listen and the public to support.

From these observations it is understandable that anonymity is vital for the planner as such. If he performed his gadfly role in public his position would rapidly become as intolerable as Socrates' did. The leaders responsible to Congress and the nation for the conduct of foreign affairs rightly receive the credit for the successes of foreign policy, including its planning, as well as answering for its failures. The anonymous planner may be forgiven if he relishes the irony of sometimes being most effective just when the press is describing him as moribund.

Planning like any other intellectual inquiry can be viewed as a process of problem-solving. As such it involves selecting and formulating a problem, gathering and sifting relevant data, developing hypothetical solutions, and—in the successful case—concluding with the solution judged best. If the outcome is a plan, *i.e.* a design for attaining a stated goal, the problem be-

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comes how to achieve the proposed goal, and the chosen solution is the pattern of action recommended for its attainment. In other cases the outcome of planning may be simply a change in the direction of policy, or the more effective programming of an existing policy or plan.

Stated in such abstract terms, nothing could sound duller or more pedantic. But planning in foreign affairs needs to shun pedantry like the plague. The worst of its occupational diseases, in or out of government, is the routine reshuffling of platitudes. Certain problems, such as the acute polarization in the Near East, are so important that they must be studied again and again even if the results are persistently negative. But when standard topics are rehashed and elaborated for the sake of going through the motions, such as "having a plan" for country X or fashionable subject Y, the result is not merely failure but to give aid and comfort to the enemy by dissipating national assets.

In contrast, the scouting phase of planning, the restless search for the live problems that are ripe for solution—or imperative whether ripe or not—is one of its most vitally creative tasks. Problems come at the planner in countless guises and from many angles. Some are assigned by his superiors; others may be suggested by a harried desk officer, a Congressional debate or lunch with a military colleague. They may consist of difficulties to be overcome or opportunities to be exploited. But they almost never arise in finished form. Often they go through a long period of incubation—the worrying stage, in which they are repeatedly scrutinized, experimented with and quietly mulled over until a formulation is discovered which gives promise of results. Even after systematic planning is begun, the problem is apt to undergo further development as new insights show how it can be made more precise or broken down into pieces which the planner can take hold of. The art of making the problem manageable is neither easy nor reducible to formula, but it is essential for success.

Lest it be thought that foreign affairs planning is intrinsically a slow-moving business, I should add that some problems have to be shot on the wing: an opportunity for their solution may appear only briefly, never to return. Some of the turning points of history in our century offered such evanescent choices, as when we decided to resist the North Korean invasion in 1950.

Realism in problem formulation bears fruit in a realistic relationship between means and ends in the plans produced. This is

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the proper meaning of "clarifying objectives," so often stressed as a part of the planning process. Grandiose goals, however emotionally appealing, which merely float in the sky like so many Platonic ideas, are an unmitigated vice in serious planning. But it is a hard one to eradicate because of the human propensity for wishful thinking which at times threatens to reduce planning to cheer-leading. For example, a projection of the world in 1965, which sought to be realistic by contrasting the world as it is *tending* to become in 1965 with the world as it *could probably* become given efforts that are feasible, was resented in some quarters because it seemed to aim at less than perfection.

Too much of the talk about "objectives" in foreign affairs is really a mere luxuriating in aspirations. Unless applied to something we can realistically propose to accomplish in finite time, the term is a misnomer. It seems in fact to have been borrowed from military planning, for much of which the tangible accomplishment of stated results by a fixed time is both feasible and essential. In foreign affairs we have far less control of men and events, therefore far fewer occasions when it is sensible to use the word "objectives." More modest expressions such as "aims," "interests" or "directions of effort" are usually more accurate names for the vectors of policy.

As the conceptions of ends and of means grow by interaction throughout the planning process, ends take the lead in general, but it is the increasing grasp of means which shapes the pattern in detail because it is the key to solving the problem. The formulation and exploration of various possible courses of actions thus makes up the main content of planning.

The planner's tools are put to work both in selecting problems and in developing solutions. His most indispensable tools are his own qualities of mind and experience. He needs an original and inquiring turn of mind, imaginative in projecting and combining new policies and tracing the chains of probable action and reaction out ahead of the immediate situation. But equally he needs balanced judgment, common sense and a shrewd eye for what is possible—remembering Bismarck's definition of politics. He must be good at analyzing emerging trends and the implications of alternative ways of dealing with them. He also needs intuitive flair, a sixth sense for relevance and timing.

By way of background, the planner requires much that can be acquired only by practicing his own art. But to it he should

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bring a variety of knowledge and skills in one or more major fields of foreign affairs, political, economic or politico-military, including some operating experience both abroad and in Washington. Experience in or with other agencies of government is also desirable. A professional or business background can likewise be useful, as can scholarly attainments in science, the humanities or social disciplines. No individual can combine all these things, but any planning group should possess a stimulating and balanced assortment of them.

Another planning tool of great importance is conversation with people known to be most provocatively thoughtful, whether in government or private life. Reflection and conversation in turn are nourished by the vast body of reports, analyses and ideas which are produced in Washington, or stream thither from all quarters of the nation and the world as nowhere else on earth.

More formal tools are afforded by systematic consultation with the wide array of government experts—scientific, political, economic, military, intelligence—who have relevant knowledge and may supply contributory studies. In addition, the planner is increasingly profiting by the collaboration of outside consultants and the work of the leading centers of foreign affairs research. These sources can be of use both in the preliminary phase, when relevant hypotheses are being developed, and later on as conclusions shape up and need to be tested against the judgment of persons representing a variety of backgrounds.

The end product of planning is as varied as its problems. Sometimes the product is zero. To work honestly at planning in foreign affairs is to learn many lessons in humility, and to admit again and again how many requirements exceed capabilities. It is also to see some events mock prudence and reward folly, and to wonder whether it would have been better not to plan. The random element bulks large, the options are often few and narrow, and no man by taking thought can hope to swing the ship of state more than a few degrees, at a time at least.

Fortunately failure is not the rule, particularly when the problem has been reduced to manageable dimensions. The rule is varied measures of usefulness, which depend in good part on how well the nature and limitations of the task at hand have been understood. It may be helpful to discuss these with regard to some of the main kinds of planning.

Long-range planning is in great demand today. It is widely

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developed in certain aspects of military and industrial planning, and many feel there should be more in foreign affairs. To a considerable extent this is justified, and not as a passing mood but as a constant imperative. Planners need continually to tell themselves, and be told by others, not to let the press of current problems crowd out the slower-moving, less insistent but often more basic questions that lie out ahead. The path of least resistance is always toward worrying about what everybody else is worrying about, instead of about what nobody is but somebody should.

Moreover, human foresight is short at best. We must keep trying new ways of increasing its range and grasp. In this connection it is useful to learn what is applicable in foreign affairs from the methods of industrial and military planning, as well as to be alert for novel applications of research techniques such as game theory and operations analysis.

But there is a great deal more long-range planning in foreign affairs than appears to be generally recognized, for a number of reasons. One is that people seem to expect a blueprint of the future, stating what will be done in year X, year Y and so on. Such scheduling of the future is possible where the relevant factors are largely under our control, *e.g.* in planning new weapons generations or space vehicles. But in foreign affairs they are by definition for the most part not under our control, nor are they predictable except in broad terms. It was possible to foresee many problems and opportunities in regard to emerging Africa, including particularly the Congo, but hardly the unique actions of individual leaders such as Colonel Mobutu or Mr. Lumumba.

Another widespread expectation is that long-range planning can be a prophylactic against trouble. Thus the Baltimore *Sun* in an editorial last October called for "a real effort to bring long-range care and coherence into our country's international relationships," thereby preventing such things as chaos in Cuba, or at least not letting them come as nasty surprises. Careful planning does indeed reduce the element of shock in diplomacy, and the main intent of the editorial is of course well taken—although it is only fair to add that crises prevented seldom make headlines. But given the uncontrollability of the foreign environment and the stormy character of our age, no conceivable amount or excellence of planning can hope to avoid frequent rough times in the years ahead. That would be true even if the Soviet threat did not exist. What the planner can and does do is to anticipate

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the *sorts* of rough time and the most likely *ways* of dealing with them, rather than the shape and date of particular events. The trend toward social revolution in Latin America is a case in point.

The kinds of long-range planning which are in fact widely and usefully practiced in foreign affairs are chiefly three, with many shadings and interminglings. One is a development of the socio-political implications of non-political changes. Some fields in economics, engineering and military technology afford relatively hard data supporting projections for five, ten or more years on which foreign policy planning can climb out into the years ahead, as it were, and go to work.

Another viable kind of long-range planning is analysis of present forces or trends considered likely to determine the framework of some aspect of the future over an extensive period. Thence are derived courses of action, many of which should be started now in order to deal most effectively with the forces analyzed and the problems they will tend to create. Planning of this type has evident value, and a great deal has actually been done. A number of examples may be found in published material such as the Rockefeller panels' reports, the studies prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and books sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and other centers of foreign affairs research. Ten-year planning for NATO and the studies which prepared the way for the Development Loan Fund and for United States sponsorship of the Act of Bogotá may differ in precision or sensitive detail, but scarcely as regards illustrating the scope and limitations of this kind of planning. It seeks those perspectives of the future which are most important to bear in mind while conducting foreign affairs today—"the futurity of present decisions," in Peter Drucker's phrase.

A third kind of long-range planning that has proven productive lies in creating a comprehensive philosophy and strategic concept for the national effort as a whole. Here the foreign affairs planner has a central contribution to make, although it extensively involves and must be coördinated with the thinking of social, economic and military planners. President Griswold's discussion of five revolutionary forces at work in the world of today, in last October's FOREIGN AFFAIRS, gives an excellent idea of the scale of problems with which such planning has to grapple.

The craving for some more redeeming image of the future is characteristic of times of trouble. The acute limitations of human

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forethought in our day are implied in the frequent question, "Can you see light at the end of the tunnel?" This question is a reminder that planning in foreign affairs is a passionate as well as an intellectual process. Its task is to energize as well as analyze. Inspired planning that conveys a sense of knowing where we are going is preëminently a function of the national leadership, but others can participate, as do the thoughtful public and indeed the whole ". . . wide world dreaming on things to come." So an ordinary planning team must be sensitive to the stirrings of a new spirit in the land, and may even share in its birth.

Contingency planning is akin to long-range planning in that it may reach years ahead, though against an unspecified date rather than across an approximate time span. Plans are seldom used unchanged in an emergency, but the fact that at least some of the problems likely to be faced have been thought out in a period of relative calm makes action more likely to be prudent and effective.

It is mistaken, however, to expect a plan for every contingency. The number of theoretically possible crises in the years ahead is virtually infinite. Even to try to plan systematically for all that are moderately likely would be a questionable expenditure of resources, for the same reason that it is bad business to over-insure against risks. One can spend so much time chasing possible fires in the future that little is left for the problems that demonstrably exist, including fire prevention. While general watchfulness should constantly scan the whole horizon for trouble spots, the selection of contingencies for intensive planning has to be a matter of judgment, estimating urgency and fruitfulness.

To conclude, planning is urgently necessary in foreign affairs today, and the quest for improvement must be pursued with vigor. More has been achieved than is publicly recognized, however, and a good deal has also been learned on how to go about it. Anonymity is usually essential. The best planning like the best car makes the least noise. Its finest fruit is the troubles that never happened.

At the same time planning is no panacea. We must shun delusions of omnipotence which project habits of domestic mastery into expectations of perpetual prosperity abroad. Our strongest effort, however brilliantly planned, can be only a fractional factor in the total sweep of historic causation. But that fraction may make the difference between success and failure.

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PROGRAM PLANNING: THE MISSING ELEMENT

By Franklin A. Lindsay

IT is now generally accepted that in the last 15 years the conduct of our foreign affairs has undergone a fundamental revolution. The United States has progressed from an era in which foreign policy was executed only through negotiations between an ambassador and a foreign minister to an era in which the broadest and most active contacts are maintained at all levels within a foreign country. In many areas of the world, we are actually helping to build new nations from the ground up.

Before World War II, our concern with foreign affairs was much more limited. The active issues of policy requiring foresighted planning were confined almost entirely to tariff and disarmament negotiations and these occasional activities could be handled by a small corps of professional diplomats, aided by a few professional soldiers. All that was required was: first, broad policy decisions on the positions to be taken; second, diplomatic negotiations with other interested powers; and possibly third, treaty ratifications if negotiations were successful. This was the totality of foreign affairs. Even Sir Harold Nicolson, in his classic book "Diplomacy," written in 1939, treated diplomacy as the sole means available to a nation for the peacetime execution of foreign policy.

In today's world, the tools for carrying out policy have multiplied. In addition to diplomacy, they include information and propaganda; economic aid; technical assistance; scientific discovery and development; educational and cultural activities; monetary, trade and tariff controls; foreign military assistance and the maintenance of military power in being. Under these circumstances, the conduct of foreign policy becomes incredibly more complex. Today 16 separate departments and agencies of government have a major concern with foreign affairs and 20 more have a somewhat lesser concern. Each of these organizations conducts its own programs, either directly or indirectly in contact with foreign governments and peoples. Each competes for limited resources of money, facilities and skilled manpower.

The need to coördinate these many activities has been seen since the end of World War II, and many proposals have been

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made to cope with it. But they have not dealt with a related problem which may be even more responsible for the many shortcomings now generally recognized in our foreign policy. The second weakness is the inadequacy of planning, or perhaps more precisely of program planning, at all levels of government.

Program planning is the process by which policy objectives are translated into action programs of the scope, magnitude and timing required for their realization. Because today's policies require massive applications of manpower, money and facilities—and because it takes time to bring these assets into being—we must increasingly *anticipate* the needs posed by our objectives. It takes years to train a public information officer capable of working effectively in, say, Southeast Asia, to bring into being a new investment bank capable of wisely directing the flow of capital investment, to build a competent corps of public administrators in a newly developing country, or to create a limited-war military force capable of moving at a moment's notice by air to a distant point of danger. We are doing this job inadequately today because we are not anticipating sufficiently our needs for these instruments of policy execution. Hence our foreign policy often must be "reactive" simply because we have not created in advance the assets needed to take the initiative.

Last fall, for example, the Government asked for outside assistance in recruiting from private life no less than 15 financial advisers for 15 new countries, mostly in Africa. The sudden requirement was the result of a failure to foresee this need and to train a corps of financial advisers who were competent to deal both with the technical and with the political problems of underdeveloped nations. The jobs had been open for several months, and at that time there had been no success in filling them. When a likely candidate is found who is reasonably competent professionally, he undoubtedly will be shipped off to Africa immediately. But he almost certainly will not have had any special training in the economics, politics or social structure of the country to which he is assigned. And this lack of background will hamper his effectiveness as a financial adviser, as well as his ability to help prepare the country to mature politically within the free world.

This is not an isolated case of lack of planning. None of the principal agencies of government concerned with foreign affairs foresaw the emergence of new independent states in Africa even to the extent of starting special training programs for their

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own career personnel. As a result, posts in Africa are either entirely unmanned or filled by officers hastily reassigned from other areas of the world, and by new recruits fresh out of college.

In the field of disarmament the record of the last 15 years is largely of one makeshift improvisation after another. In April 1958, for example, the President proposed to the Soviets that a conference of technicians be convened to consider the problems of preventing surprise attack. On September 15 the Soviets accepted the proposal and asked that the conference begin on November 10. As of the date of Soviet acceptance, almost no preparations had been made, and it was not until October 2, when William C. Foster was appointed chairman, that work began on the preparation of policy positions. Groups were hastily assembled, both from within and outside government, to work for the remaining month before the conference. At the end of the conference, which reached no agreement, Mr. Foster reported to the Senate, "I doubt that we have up to this time really given the intense study of the kinds of measures which will make the [prevention of surprise attack] possible . . . I think that with hard work and deep thought and putting together competent people to work on this, not on a part-time basis but on a full-time basis, something very valuable could be accomplished."

Again in 1959 the same thing happened. In January, the United States proposed that a group of qualified scientists be convened to study the technical possibilities of detecting underground tests. The Russians delayed for nearly a year and then announced that they were ready to meet immediately. A scientific team under Dr. James Fisk, President of the Bell Laboratories, was assembled and departed almost immediately for Geneva. Most of the preparations were carried out in Geneva concurrently with the negotiations. At this conference, agreement was reached that it would be possible to detect underground explosions above 5 kilotons with 160–170 seismic stations located throughout the world. Only later did we discover that perhaps ten times this number of stations would be required to achieve a reasonable probability of detection. This predicament was the result of inadequate planning and of inadequate research to back it up. Had an agreement been reached on the basis of the technical report, we could have found ourselves in the position of having either to live with an inadequate agreement or to suffer the political and propaganda consequences of abrogating the treaty.

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The lack of program planning in the foreign field probably can be laid to two underlying causes: (1) skepticism about the value of planning—owing at least partly to a misconception of its role—on the part of many career Foreign Service officers; and (2) the inevitable operational orientation of most of the top foreign policy officials.

The essential unpredictability of the future is often used as the principal argument for not planning. A Foreign Service career officer, when asked why the State Department did not put more emphasis on planning, replied, "How can you plan foreign policy when no one can possibly know what Castro is going to do two years, or even two days, from now?"

This of course is a distortion of the purpose of planning. The purpose is not to prepare rigid programs that will apply only if predictions about future events have been accurate to the point of clairvoyance. Rather, the purpose is to prepare broad, flexible programs with room for manœuvring as events take shape. One need not have been able to predict the revolt of the *Force Publique* in the Congo to foresee that there would be serious political instability and that political officers would be needed who were thoroughly acquainted with the forces at work there and who had, by their personal knowledge and acquaintanceship, covered all reasonable political bets, including both those who did and those who did not attain power.

Perhaps the skepticism with which some in the State Department regard planning stems from the career officer's traditional concept of diplomatic negotiation as the sharp cutting edge of foreign policy. Success as a diplomat is the ultimate in career success and usually is rewarded with assignment to the highest posts in the service. Diplomacy is an art that should by no means be depreciated, and we shall have great need for this skill over the years ahead, no matter how well we plan. But skill in diplomacy depends on an approach to problems that is quite different from that of a good planner. The diplomat must be able to make the best of day-to-day developments over which he has little or no control. The planner, in contrast, must try to anticipate future situations by building capabilities in advance to meet them.

A second reason for the lack of planning is that agency and departmental chiefs are forced by circumstance to devote practically all of their energies to operating problems. This is because

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the operating problems are the hot issues that demand immediate attention. They are played up in the press and are the subject of Congressional inquiries. They are the subject of urgent messages from foreign governments demanding immediate telegraphic replies. They are the latest bombshells of Khrushchev and Mao that require immediate attention. Planning, in contrast, has no day-to-day deadlines. Nor does planning bring immediate rewards. No one will know until years later whether or not a given plan has been adequate.

Even if there were no pressures of operating problems, the incentive to plan far in advance would be weak. The creation of the modern tools of foreign policy—whether they be technical systems for the verification of arms-control agreements or a corps of professionals skilled in nation building—often requires years of planning and preparation. A particular administration in Washington is thus dependent almost entirely on the assets that have been created by previous administrations and must make the best of it when these assets are inadequate to do the jobs at hand. Equally, the effort of any administration to plan and build new instruments of national power is a form of investment that will pay most of its dividends in subsequent administrations. For this reason the planning processes require greater institutionalization to ensure that future interests are not neglected by those who may never themselves enjoy the fruits of their planning.

Whatever the underlying causes of the lack of planning may be, however, the immediate cause is an inadequate organization for planning, both in the National Security Council and in the various departments having foreign policy interests. It is true that "planning bodies" exist. The N.S.C. has a Planning Board, and the State Department has since 1950 had its own Policy Planning Staff, now headed by an Assistant Secretary reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Under the N.S.C. there is also the Operations Coördinating Board, which is charged with coördinating the operational planning of the responsible agencies in their execution of N.S.C. policies.

The titles of these three organizations suggest that the planning function is adequately recognized, in both the White House and the State Department. Unfortunately titles are often misleading, and that is true here. The Planning Staff of the N.S.C. plans only in the sense that it prepares the groundwork of the N.S.C. It is composed of the deputies of the N.S.C. representa-

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tives, and its function is to steer first drafts of national security policy statements through the shoals of interdepartmental interests. It is thus no more concerned with actual program planning than is its parent body, whose function is to establish national policies. These policies are, of necessity, broad and general statements of the problems confronting us, and of our objectives in coping with them. Moreover, the N.S.C. is more concerned with short-range than with long-range problems.

A hypothetical N.S.C. policy dealing with an underdeveloped country in which we are strongly interested might read something like this: "It shall be the policy of the United States to assist Country X in establishing a stable and effective government capable of maintaining public support, of progressing in a sustained and orderly manner with economic and social development, and of avoiding the extremes of Communism or right-wing dictatorship. The United States should be prepared to assist in improving public administration, in fostering economic development, and in upgrading general education."

Before approving a policy of this sort, the Council should be provided with a reasonably accurate estimate of the magnitude of the program that must be undertaken, the time required and the costs involved if the proposed policy is to have a reasonable chance of success. For without such an estimate, the Council cannot properly weigh the costs and urgency of implementing this program against the costs and urgency of implementing other programs in other areas.

Admittedly, many of the N.S.C. policy papers do carry financial appendices that purport to be the price tags of the policies advocated. But these projections usually are not backed up by specific plans and hence do not accurately reflect the actual costs of the program if it were carried through in the magnitude needed to achieve the stated objective. More often these financial projections are based on last year's budget, increased or lowered by 5 or 10 percent, depending on the shift in the urgency of the problem. This lack of adequate plans for arriving at the real cost of any individual program affects our total foreign policy. For without such information, the Executive Branch and the Congress cannot make informed decisions on the total amount of resources that should be allocated to foreign policy objectives, or on the division of these resources among competing programs.

The real decisions controlling the size and direction of foreign

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programs—and therefore many of the real decisions on basic policy—are made instead as a part of the annual budget process. In theory, the budget is expected to reflect and implement national security policies. In practice, these are so broadly drawn that a correspondingly broad range of alternative budgets can be accommodated. Because of the lack of adequate plans to implement these policies—and thereby to define more closely the dollar costs—the budgets can often be jiggered substantially in support of any one program at the expense of others. The result is that the budget sets the real scope of a program, and the plans—such as they are—are then made to fit that budget.

The budget-making process may even set the direction of a program. Since that process is an affair largely between the agency concerned, such as I.C.A., and the Appropriations Committees of Congress, with the Bureau of the Budget looking in to be sure that an over-all ceiling is not exceeded, there is no direct control to see that budgets reflect N.S.C. policies. Further, the Committees of Congress are not privy to National Security Council policy documents, and it is highly doubtful that they would consider themselves bound by them in any case.

In the State Department, the Policy Planning Staff performs an important planning function—but it does only a small part of what is needed. Essentially the role of the Policy Planning Staff is to prepare papers from time to time on important problems over the horizon. The purpose of these papers is to call the Government's attention to a particularly serious situation that might be overlooked by those concentrating on a particular area or country. The staff considers its work done when it has flagged for attention such a newly emerging problem.

The other operating departments concerned with foreign affairs have limited program-planning activities. And nearly all of their efforts are similarly directed to the preparation of the annual budget. As a consequence, planning is largely limited to one-year periods. Once a budget is approved and funds provided, individual expenditures, other than regular and continuing expenses for such things as staff salaries, are approved primarily on a project-by-project basis. While the Operations Coördinating Board has responsibility for coördinating the operational planning of the departments, it lacks authority to direct such planning, it lacks an adequate staff, and it cannot concern itself with any problem that has not been specifically referred to it by the President.

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Some progress is being made toward better coördination of some of the Government's activities in the foreign field. As a result of the recommendations of the Draper Committee, the State Department now approves all military aid programs to foreign nations. Also, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon has begun to coördinate economic aid programs and to assemble a staff for this work. And in our embassies abroad, there has gradually evolved the concept of a country team headed by the Ambassador and including heads of the local information, economic and military-aid staffs.

These developments help to create a framework in which planning can take place. But coördination is still largely in terms of day-to-day operating decisions and such planning as is done is geared to yearly, and therefore short-term, budgets. These plans are thus more likely to be concerned with policies and programs for the use of assets already in being rather than with the estimation of over-all future needs and with the development of new programs to meet these needs. Moreover, the Government's over-all effort in one country or area is not examined as a single program so that the activities of the many separate agencies can all be evaluated for their completeness and balance. Instead, they are approved in small pieces over the year by a variety of agencies acting with only limited knowledge of each other's decisions.

In summary, without a clear-cut and generally understood plan bringing together the programs required in each of the essential fields of activity, the President and the Secretary of State cannot be sure that the responsible departments and agencies will start their programs soon enough or provide the magnitude of effort that is needed to realize objectives. Indeed, the record in many areas of the world is that of being too late and providing too little of those things that are vital to the success of our policies. To improve this record it will be necessary not only to revise our concept of planning, but to draw into the Government men with the background and experience to make planning effective.

We are confronted with formidable adversaries in the Soviet Union and Red China. While we should not embrace a tool of the cold war just because the Communists do, we should not deny ourselves such a tool because the Communists do use it effectively. Planning is a tool they appear to employ to great advantage. For example, one cannot imagine the Soviets finding it impossible to fill 15 jobs of financial adviser to foreign govern-

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ments. They would not only be able to provide technicians competent to advise new governments in the Soviet approach to financial management, but those selected would be persuasive political advocates of the advantages of the Soviet system to the underdeveloped countries.

The Communists have demonstrated their ability to foresee future problems and opportunities and to plan well in advance to meet them. They have, for example, operated university-type training schools for potential political leaders of virtually all the uncommitted countries. In 1945, when they reinstituted these political academies, they did not know when Africa—or Southeast Asia—would be ready for a stepped-up program of political action. But they went ahead with comprehensive training programs with confidence that they would find the opportunity, sooner or later, to throw their trained cadres into the conflict.

III

To illustrate the type of planning needed, let us look again at the hypothetical N.S.C. policy for Country X, which called for assistance "in establishing a stable and effective government . . . in improving public administration, in fostering economic development, and in upgrading general education." In developing a government-wide program plan to carry out that policy, the following sequence of steps might be taken.

1. Preparation of a preliminary estimate of what will be needed to establish a stable and effective non-Communist government. This estimate must first identify those key needs that must be met if our policy objective is to be realized. In this example, the key needs might be a corps of public administrators, a police and public security force, public information media, and a program for economic growth. This estimate would include such things as numbers and types of skilled administrators needed; the investment requirements for economic growth; the needs for public information through books, magazines, radio, newspapers; the requirements for technicians and skilled workers; and the police forces needed to maintain order. Planning should then concentrate only on these key elements for "success" and should not be encumbered with nonessentials.

As a result of experience gained by American advisory groups who have served in underdeveloped countries, such as that to Pakistan headed by Professor Edward Mason of Harvard, we now have the resources in the United States to enable us to make

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reasonably accurate estimates of the initial critical needs in building a new nation.

2. An estimate of the degree to which these essential requirements can be met from the resources already available within the country. This would include personnel trained by the former government, European technicians and administrators likely to remain, and the graduates of technical and professional schools within the country and abroad.

3. An estimate of the remaining needs that must be met by the West if the minimum objectives are to have a reasonable chance of success. A part of these needs may be met by other nations, by the World Bank and possibly by the United Nations. The remaining critical needs will have to be provided by the United States.

4. At this point a preliminary estimate of costs and time required will provide a test of the feasibility of achieving the N.S.C. policy objective. If it appears that requirements are substantially beyond our capabilities in the light of our resources and of other competing requirements, two alternatives are open: to shift resources from other programs or to cut back our policy objectives. If the latter is decided, an important function will have been served by putting ourselves on notice that actual or implied commitments to foreign governments beyond our limited resources must not be made.

5. A next step is the development by the responsible departments and agencies of more detailed but still long-term plans. For example, the need for public administrators in the African countries may be so great that a major program must be established to create new institutes of public administration in Africa in addition to bringing increased numbers of Africans to the United States and Western Europe for further training. If a country has only 15 or 20 college graduates, as is actually the case in some of the new African republics, it will not be enough to spend a few thousand dollars—as we are, in some cases, doing now—to send an expert in public administration to the country or to bring a half dozen people to the United States for a limited period of training. While such a program might meet the letter of an N.S.C. policy, it would not contribute very much to the solution of the problem. Similarly, the need for public information media may be so urgent—and the dangers of Communist infiltration and control so great—that U.S.I.A. would be called

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upon to develop a program by which the Africans can be helped to set up locally-owned radio stations, a news agency, one or more book publishing houses and a series of newspapers.

The special importance of the planning process is that it provides an estimate of the magnitude of a problem early enough to do something about it. If instead we wait until the problem is breaking around our heads, it may be too late.

6. At this point planning should be tied integrally with the budget-making process. This will require a shift from the annual budget to longer-range commitments of funds. The approval of the policy program by the N.S.C. and the approval of the budget to be submitted to Congress must be part of a single, consistent process. The present practice of preparing budgets only incidentally related to policy decisions clearly leads to breakdowns in the execution of policy.

7. Continuing central guidance and coördination of planning will be needed to be sure that the programs will be mutually supporting, and in the aggregate will give the best chance of success while making the minimum drain on scarce resources. Revision, modification and extension of plans will be a continuing process as new situations unfold and as we learn from initial successes and failures. Finally, at each step of the way we must work in close association with our allies, especially in those areas where they have important interests.

As the cold war develops during the 1960s, we must be increasingly prepared to seize opportunities as they occur. This means that we must think through in advance both the types of opportunities that might reasonably be expected and the actions we will have to take if we are not to let them slip by unexploited. By so doing we can create in advance assets that will be available when needed. For example, revolts such as those in East Germany and Hungary may occur in the next decade. If we fail to anticipate the different ways that events might unfold and to evaluate both the risks and opportunities of any action we might take, we will not know what preparations must be made in advance. If no preparations are made, there probably will be little or no freedom of decision at the moment the event occurs. As was the case in 1956, we shall have foregone the opportunity to exploit the break because we have not prepared for it. If, instead, we have made reasonably adequate contingency plans and have the necessary assets on hand, such as trained manpower,

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food, communications, medicines, air transport and weapons, we shall be free to decide at the time whether and to what degree we should intervene.

Obviously we cannot make plans for every conceivable contingency. Judgment must be used in identifying those possibilities that contain the greatest opportunities and dangers. Equally we cannot create assets to meet every contingency, but it is often possible to create assets that can be used in a variety of ways. A final question is, how shall comprehensive planning be organized? To this decision, the following criteria should be applied:

1. Centralized over-all direction and supervision of planning, to ensure completeness, balance and timeliness.
2. Decentralization of detailed planning, to ensure that plans are grounded in reality.
3. Full-time attention to planning by a small but highly competent group.
4. Accurate estimates of costs as plans are made, to provide adequate bases for budget decisions.
5. Follow-up and review, to ensure that plans are in fact carried out.

Clearly, to meet these criteria, a central planning staff will be needed. Its functions will be to provide continuing leadership within the Government in the field of planning, to prepare over-all plans, to allocate responsibility for more detailed plans to departments and agencies, to review the adequacy of their plans and to see that approved plans are carried out. In all the operating departments and agencies, it should have small counterparts reporting directly to their agency heads but having day-to-day working contacts with responsible line officers, as well as with the central planning staff.

Many pieces of such a program already exist. What is lacking is central coördination and direction, and a philosophy to make it work. Through improved planning, we can significantly increase the probabilities that our foreign policies will be successful and that the vast resources we are now committing to these policies will be effectively used. Without it, there will be lost opportunities, half-effective programs and waste of resources. Program planning is not a strait jacket that commits us to a particular course of action, no matter what new circumstances arise, but a means of increasing our freedom of action and our ability to grasp the initiative in the long, cold war.

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THE COMING SHOWDOWN IN CENTRAL AFRICA

By N. M. Shamuyarira

AFTER the Congo and Algeria, the next trouble spot in Africa is likely to be the British-controlled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Flanked on the south by Dr. Verwoerd's racist Republic of South Africa, on the east and west by Dr. Salazar's undeveloped provinces of Mozambique and Angola, and on the north by strife-torn Congo and self-governing Tanganyika, it is a major battleground between the protagonists of white rule in Africa and the surging tide of African nationalism. On the eve of a Constitutional Conference which will determine the shape of events in the immediate future, racial tensions have mounted dangerously. The riots in Southern Rhodesia last summer and the repressive legislation which followed, the Monckton Commission report calling for fundamental changes in the Federation, and the British decision to grant legislative majorities to the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have all contributed to a sense of grievance in one group or another.

Rhodesian Europeans seeking to rally support for Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime Minister, are putting stickers on their car windows bearing a large letter "W" (for Welensky—or possibly White supremacy). Their comparatively few white opponents apply the stickers upside-down, showing an "M" for Macmillan, Macleod and Monckton. But by far the strongest opposition to Sir Roy Welensky within the Federation comes from Dr. Hastings Banda, the Nyasaland leader of the Malawi Congress Party, and Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of Northern Rhodesia's United National Independence Party, who want to secede from the Federation.

In the Federation, there are in general three schools of thought. First, there are those who want Federation to proceed basically unchanged but with minor alterations to the prompt attainment of full independence. The chief spokesman of this opinion is of course Welensky. Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, agrees, but under pressure from the more segregation-minded Opposition adds that Southern Rhodesia may choose to secede if full independence is not granted. Secondly,

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there are those who think that Federation is economically of such importance to the three territories that they are willing to pay a considerable price politically to maintain it. Variations in this body of opinion range from those who want to see a liberal white government in which Africans play an increasingly prominent part to those who advocate a black federal government with safeguards for white interests. Considerable weight has been added to this opinion by the far-reaching recommendations of the Monckton Commission, presented in October. In brief, the Commission recognized the need for economic ties among the three territories, but advocated increased representation of Africans in the 59-member Federal Parliament, the right of a territory to secede after a further trial period, the return of certain powers to the territorial governments and the need for a wider territorial franchise, especially in Southern Rhodesia. The third viewpoint, which is held strongly by the Africans themselves, is that the present Federation must be broken up.

It is clear that the Federation cannot continue in its present form without widespread and severe violence, comparable in scope if not in character to the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya. Hostility to Federation among Africans, particularly in the two Northern territories, is intense and not altogether unfounded. It is built on and buttressed by the mistakes of the Federal Government in the last seven years, the speeches of its leading spokesman and the actions of its officers.

The first major failure was in the implementation of the policy of partnership or multi-racialism on which the Federation was founded. After seven years, senior positions in the Federal Civil Service are still occupied exclusively by whites; there is only one African Parliamentary Secretary in a Cabinet of nine men; the Federation's government-owned airline employs Africans only as janitors, drivers and the like; and, with the exception of doctors and some nurses, the principle of equal pay for equal work is by no means honored, even by the Government. In matters for which the territorial governments are responsible, discrimination is still extreme, especially in Southern Rhodesia, aptly referred to as the "nigger in the woodpile" of Federation. There the Civil Service can be entered only by Europeans (an amendment has been promised); residential segregation is so sharp that even the African Cabinet Minister could not be accommodated in the white suburbs where other Ministers live; African businessmen

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cannot trade in the center of the main towns; passes are still enforced; wages are disproportionate; cafés and restaurants are closed to non-whites. Several breaches in the color bar have been made in respect of common services in post offices, in trains and at airports, and at the University College at Salisbury. But the fundamental issues of the land and the vote have not been tackled, although the evils of the land policy in Southern Rhodesia have at last been acknowledged by an investigating committee of the legislature.

The major blow to African hopes of partnership came in 1955 when the Federal Government rejected a motion by an African Federal Member of Parliament from Northern Rhodesia, Mr. Dauti Yamba, to the effect that discrimination should be outlawed in public places. Sir Roy Welensky, speaking for the Government, said the solution to this apparent human problem could be found only in economic progress—a point of view he has reiterated on many occasions. At about that time, a Cabinet Minister, pressed by angry white farmers at a meeting in Bindura to state whether partnership meant an alteration of the status quo, likened it to the partnership of a donkey and its rider—obviously with the same goals, travelling on the same road, but not equals.

As a result of segregation and the absence of communication between the two races, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, the Federal Government has been out of touch with African opinion, and Federal Ministers out of touch with African leaders. Although Dr. Banda, Mr. Kaunda and Mr. Joshua Nkomo, all Presidents of the largest African political parties in their respective territories, have discussed the Federal situation variously with Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Macleod and other British M.P.s, they have not exchanged a single word on the same problems with Sir Roy Welensky or his strong Cabinet colleagues, Sir Malcolm Barrow and Mr. Julius Greenfield. None of these Federal Ministers has had an African in his home for an evening, although Sir Roy has an "open stoep" for all his old friends in the all-white Rhodesia Railway Workers' Union, and others, most Sunday afternoons. It is important to emphasize this human aspect which has been so sadly neglected in Federal affairs, hampered as they are by law and traditional prejudices. Confidence and understanding, so necessary in negotiating a new constitutional agreement, cannot be achieved in such circumstances.

In 1957 a further blow was dealt to African confidence in fed-

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eration when the Federal Government enacted a franchise law, the intent of which was obviously to keep power in the hands of 3.7 percent of the population, namely the whites. (There are 300,000 Europeans and 8,000,000 Africans in the Federation.) By setting high income and educational qualifications, it has been possible to keep 97 percent of the Common Voters' Roll in white hands, although it is supposedly non-racial. Africans see no possibility of ever having a decisive influence on this roll, for as their wages rise and education becomes more widespread they have no doubt that the qualifications would be raised, as has been done in Southern Rhodesia twice in the last ten years.

Africans throughout the Federation cannot see why such stringent requirements should be set for them, when in India illiterate men and women vote by symbols, and in Nigeria they vote merely by throwing a stone in a bucket below a party symbol they recognize. White Federal politicians lay much emphasis on the need for voters to be responsible and civilized, but Africans interpret this as a mere device to deprive them of political power and influence—the more so as these arbitrary standards of civilization and responsibility can be raised whenever the white man feels his political control is threatened.

Last but by no means least important, Africans in the Federation cannot and will not crouch in submission with arms folded when all around them they can see their fellowmen governing themselves. The advent of Ghana, Nigeria and other states as free and independent nations, represented at the United Nations, and of Tanganyika as a self-governing state, is obviously an exciting idea to every African. Southern Rhodesia boasts of the highest literacy rate south of the Sahara; it has more than 100 university-trained Africans. But, paradoxically, it has not a single African in its 30-member legislature, and not one has entered the Territory's Civil Service in the 37 years since self-government was granted to Southern Rhodesia. This applies even to the Department of Native Affairs which looks primarily after African interests.

Americans often ask whether the Federation has trained Africans who can do better than the Congolese, if given self-rule. In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are British Protectorates, the Colonial Office policy of "African Paramountcy" has led to a more serious effort to train Africans for the Civil Service. There are now several Africans in top executive posts, and four are in the Executive Councils (Cabinet). It is Southern Rhodesia

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that is perpetuating conditions similar to those of the Congo before June 30, although it has the largest number of Africans equipped for administrative responsibility.

The third and most popular viewpoint toward Federation—that of unqualified opposition—stems from the Africans' fear that the policies and attitudes of Southern Rhodesian whites will be permitted to dominate the larger political association. In principle, Africans certainly do not want Africa to be balkanized. Kwame Nkrumah, the leading exponent of Pan-Africanism, said recently, "African States must federate and survive, or remain divided and disintegrate." George Padmore's books preach endlessly about the dream of a United States of Africa. The objections to the present Federation are not, then, based on opposition to the concept of unity but on the understandable dislike of the retrogressive racial policies of Southern Rhodesia. The Monckton Commission established this point beyond doubt. It discovered that the most vocal critics were those Africans from the north who had visited Southern Rhodesia to find work, and had been forced to carry passes on big tobacco farms owned exclusively by white settlers.

The economic argument for Federation is, however, a valid one, although many Nyasas and Northern Rhodesians do not want to admit it lest they weaken their strong political position. If the Federation were broken up, the economic consequences would be extremely grave, except perhaps for the Northern Rhodesians. In unity, Northern Rhodesia's coppermines, Southern Rhodesia's growing industries and Nyasaland's labor force complement each other's needs. The Kariba Dam has been built at a cost of nearly $660,000,000 which must be repaid by the territories either jointly or singly if the Federation is broken up; customs tariffs for manufactured goods have been lowered; and direly needed transportation is being expanded on a Federation-wide basis.

If more development money is to be found, the confidence of monetary institutions like the World Bank, the largest investor in Africa, will have to be maintained, and if possible increased. It is hard to imagine how this can be done if the Federation breaks apart entirely. Further, we will have lost the opportunity to plunge straight ahead with the development of what is one of the very few states in Africa with a broadly based industrial economy. The pressing problems of unemployment, low wages, health, transportation to exploit more natural resources, and lack of technical skills—problems which will be with us even at the end

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of the century, regardless of political status—would be accentuated if the Federation is dissolved.

What the forthcoming London Conference must agree to is that Africans shall have a decisive political influence in the Federation. Three measures are required. First, the franchise must be made broad enough so that Europeans no longer predominate at the polls. If universal adult suffrage is rejected, the purpose could be accomplished by establishing six years of education as the only voter qualification. Second, a Bill of Human Rights should be enacted to ensure the safety of the person and property of every individual in the Federation. Such a Bill would be of immediate advantage to the Africans, but in the long run it will be of tremendous advantage to the Europeans. Under this provision, the individual territorial governments would be compelled to outlaw many forms of racial discrimination which now exist. Third, the two northern territories, which have already been assured African majorities, should be placed in a position of political equality with Southern Rhodesia so that they can object effectively to arrangements they find restrictive and distasteful. One bargains best from a position of strength.

A Federation in which Southern Rhodesian Europeans were no longer dominant in the Federal Assembly and Cabinet, in which the obvious economic advantages were combined with a universal (or broadly qualified) Federal franchise and civil rights for all—such a Federation would, I believe, be acceptable to African opinion, even in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

What chances of success has such a plan? Nil, at present, because of massive resistance from the Europeans of Southern Rhodesia who are afraid of losing their jobs, land and general position of privilege. Politicians like Sir Roy and Sir Edgar have gone far to promise the white electors that there will be "no retreat" and "certainly no sell-out." Several African Uncle Toms support them in this contention, thereby giving the tough line a semblance of African support. For its part, the British Government is afraid of a Boston Teaparty on the Zambezi or Lake Nyasa. Yet it knows that, unless the plan emerging from the London Conference is far-reaching, Africans will reject it out of hand, thereby threatening a more prolonged and violent "teaparty." Soon Dr. Banda and Mr. Kaunda will have Legislative Council majorities. They will then be in a position to resist effectively Federal connections with race-conscious Southern Rhodesia.

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Who, then, can initiate the drastic constitutional reforms so necessary even to begin meeting the mounting aspirations of the African people? The answer, of course, is the British Government. It must act decisively and courageously if violence is to be avoided and if today's moderate African leadership in the Federation is not to be replaced by more radical men, who may even lean to the East. Fortunately, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Macleod enter the difficult negotiations with one big advantage —the confidence of the African people; Dr. Banda has repeatedly poured glowing praise on the Colonial Secretary, who has clearly had the Prime Minister's full support. Further, in recent months when Belgian policy in the Congo has been under heavy fire, British colonial policy has benefited by comparison and has frequently been praised. After Mr. Macmillan's high-flown declarations about colonialism in reply to Mr. Khrushchev in the United Nations, the British Prime Minister cannot now afford to do less than his utmost to save the situation in Central Africa.

A showdown with Welensky and Whitehead seems inevitable. In the final analysis, the resolution of the Federation problem depends entirely on the ability to deal with the Southern Rhodesian Europeans, who form the strongest single political force in the country, electing as they do both the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments. If they feel that the changes being made are too drastic, they will attempt to secede. However, the fear that Southern Rhodesia might join the Union of South Africa is unfounded. This threat is being used by Europeans as a stick with which to beat the British Government into acceptance of their policies. But it is out of the question, particularly since South Africa voted to become a republic. Afrikaaner domination would be as objectionable to most Southern Rhodesian Europeans as black domination. Furthermore, it is quite improbable that South Africa would agree to add a hostile English-speaking bloc and 2,250,000 rebellious Africans to its already acute racial problems. The most that Southern Rhodesia can do is to try to go it alone.

The 200,000 Europeans of Southern Rhodesia are now engaged in a last-ditch struggle for the maintenance of white supremacy. The all-white administration and legislature have sent police to occupy the African townships, 20 lives have been lost, and 550 Africans have been arrested under an increasing volume of security legislation which has led to the resignation of the Federal

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Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold. Rhodesian-born and widely respected, Sir Robert may lead a new liberal political party; one hopes that his fate is not that of Garfield Todd, a former Prime Minister who is now in the political wilderness. It will take far more than a Tredgold, a Todd or further African rioting to convince Rhodesian whites to make the necessary concessions. Only the British Government can accomplish this, and to do so it may have to go so far as to remind Sir Edgar Whitehead and his colleagues that it still has powers to suspend the Southern Rhodesian constitution, as was done in recent years in Malta and British Guiana.

Yet many fears of the consequences of an African majority are groundless. It cannot be overemphasized that Africans do not intend to drive Europeans away or dispossess them arbitrarily. The doctrine of "Africa for the Africans" has long been abandoned, and replaced with "one man one vote" or—more tellingly—"government of the people, by the people and for the people." We know that each skilled European who comes into any part of Central Africa creates eight jobs for Africans. Therefore, no African Prime Minister in his proper senses would squeeze Europeans out lest he be faced with a grave unemployment problem. Contrary to the alarmists' view, Europeans will be encouraged to stay in the Federation and others will be urged to come, as has been the case in Ghana where the white population has doubled since independence. Dr. Banda, who was painted as an arch-enemy of Europeans, now wants Europeans to fight the next election under the banner of his own party; Mr. Kaunda could be expected to behave in the same way once his goals are achieved in Northern Rhodesia. The struggle is against the régime, not against Europeans; Africans ask only for equality—at the ballot box, on the land and in terms of opportunity. Only then can the much-publicized concept of a multi-racial state succeed in Central Africa.

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THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN SOVIET RUSSIA

By Paul B. Anderson

CHRISTIANITY entered Russia from Byzantium. In the year 988, Prince Vladimir was baptized in the River Dnieper, with all the inhabitants of Kiev, and the pagan statues were destroyed. Thus was born the Russian Orthodox Church, and thus Byzantine theology, liturgical forms and church-state relationships were established as basic characteristics of popular religion in Russia. Since this missionary enterprise took place at the height of the quarrel between the Patriarch of the East and the Pope of the West, the Russian Church and people inherited the Eastern Church's antagonism to Rome and the West and shared its isolation from the Renaissance, the Reformation and the rise of modern concepts of social Christianity. Instead, the Russian Orthodox Church entered the twentieth century with the religious outlook developed no later than the Seventh Ecumenical Council, held in 787. The Russians claim with pride that the Orthodox Church is the true Church of the Apostles, the Scripture, the creeds and the canons accepted in the first seven Councils, and they look gingerly at all other churches, which, they say, separated from it at the time of the Great Schism.

What is the present status of this Russian Orthodox Church in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? Statistics are meager, but the Patriarchate has declared that there are now 22,000 churches, served by about 25,000 clergy. There are 73 diocesan bishops, 69 monasteries and convents, eight lower and two higher theological schools, with more applicants each year than classroom seats. The Soviet census omits the item of religious affiliation, and the Patriarchate has been persistently hesitant when asked about the total number of adherents; estimates run from 25,000,000 to 50,000,000 Orthodox faithful. It is easier to reconcile these figures with the impression held abroad that the Church has been driven underground when we remember that from 1918 to World War II the Communist Party's efforts to destroy the Church were violent and effective, but that the change in policy in 1941 has resulted in a significant resuscitation. It was Stalin who directed both the policy of destruction and the change.

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When the Nazi armies opened their attack on June 21, 1941, the once mighty Russian Church barely existed. Yet underneath the bleak exterior lay a broad and deep yearning for religious expression. It was natural, therefore, that when the invading forces announced a crusade to "restore religion," great masses of the people, in the Red Army and in the occupied villages, deserted to the enemy. Stalin was astute enough, however, to foil the Nazi ruse. If Hitler could cause desertions through the offer of religion, Stalin could help preserve the country by the same tactic. Let the voice of the Church itself be heard.

Two days after the invasion started, therefore, Stalin opened the Soviet press and radio to the Metropolitan Sergius, head of the Russian Orthodox Church. When he spoke it was like the voice of the ancient prophets. He told of the way in which the Church had supported the Russian people in repelling the invasions of the Tartars, the Teutonic knights and the Lithuanian-Polish grandees; he called on the faithful to rise to the defense of the Fatherland. The people hearkened, lent their spirit and offered their bodies to the fight. The invaders were driven out.

The Metropolitan's response to Stalin's invitation marked not only the beginning of popular resistance to Hitler, it inaugurated a revival of Church life, the restoration of the ecclesiastical apparatus, the resumption of relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the other heads of Eastern Orthodox Churches, and, to a limited degree, the establishment of contact between Russian Orthodox faithful and Christians in other lands.

The Great Patriotic War, as it was called by both secular and religious leaders, provided four years for testing and proving the reality of common interest. The military chaplaincy was not restored, but it was symbolic of the Church's interest and influence that money was collected at church services to pay for an entire battalion of tanks, which were formally dedicated by Metropolitan Nicholas. Regimental commanders are known to have led in prayer before battle. Many churches which had been closed during the campaign of the Society of Militant Atheists were now allowed to reopen for worship. Priests who had been in hiding or put to work in factories returned to their parishes. Ikons reappeared from chests or under beds to hallow the common tasks of the household from behind the "lampadka" in the ikon corner.

The tide had turned for the Church. From having been suppressed or terrorized nearly to extinction, it was now given status.

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On September 5, 1943, Stalin received in audience the Metropolitans, Sergius of Moscow, Alexis of Leningrad and Nicholas of the Ukraine and Galicia. Four days later 19 bishops gathered and raised Sergius to the office of Patriarch. This office had been vacant since the death of Tikhon, who himself had been the first Patriarch since the days of Peter the Great, and whose tenure from 1918 to 1924 had been marked by the almost complete destruction of the Orthodox Church as an administrative body.

In the same way that the watchword for this resuscitation had been patriotism, so the external expressions of church life have been characterized by the common interest of church and state in history and national culture. Holy Russia was by no means holy in the sense that all her tsars or all her people were at the zenith of moral perfection. Nevertheless, the concept of Russian nationality, statehood and culture was, from the tenth century, impregnated with the idea of a sacred calling and destiny.

Today the Soviet youth who visit the modern Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism in the desecrated Kazan Cathedral in Leningrad, with its crude portrayal of the faults of religion, go also to the National Museum and to the Tretyakoff Gallery, or to the great cathedrals (now museums) in the Kremlin. They stand in respect if not in reverence before the beautiful fourteenth century ikons of Andrei Rublev and the modern painting of Christ Appearing to the People by A. A. Ivanov. All of these religious elements enter into the concept of Russian nationalism, which is the solid foundation without which Communist ideas of grandeur would be merely theoretical.

It is a confusing situation. Many American visitors to the Soviet Union return with the report that the Orthodox Church is only a great show of brocaded vestments, deeply intoned chants and a theatrical moving about with incense pots and candles for two or three hours before a vast congregation silently watching. They are impressed with the ceremony and music, but fail to find religion in it. It is readily understandable, they say, that modern Soviet people will not like such long services, particularly as the congregation must stand throughout. Some have inquired about the Church's program of activities, Sunday schools, women's groups, and so on, and learn that the Church has none, but only holds services of worship. They conclude that such a church cannot long survive. And yet, there it is, and seemingly holding its own.

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Rome emphasizes the word Catholic, or universal, the Greeks emphasize Orthodox, or right doctrine, and the Russians say *Pravoslavny,* or right praising. The essence of Russian Orthodoxy is glorifying God, with services of worship which elevate the spirit while impressing the mind. Humility, hospitality to strangers, help to the needy, but above all *kenosis,* the emptying of one's self in service to God—these are Orthodox virtues. A sense of the pervading presence of God in man, in nature and in created things is characteristic, and is expressed in reverence for ikons, which are images of Christ, of the Ever-Virgin Mary, the saints, or events in their lives. Spiritual life revolves around prayers before ikons at home and in the liturgical cycle of the Church. Ethical concepts grow out of the spiritual experience of God, rather than being a primary element of religion, as in Protestantism. It is in terms of this kind of religion that the status and practices of the Orthodox Church under the Soviets must be understood.

However, the nature of Orthodoxy is not the only reason for its emphasis on worship rather than on parish activities. Worship is the only "activity" permitted. Article 17 of the law of April 8, 1929, reads:

> Religious associations are forbidden: (a) to establish mutual aid funds, coöperative and productive associations, and in general to use the property at their disposal for any other purpose than the satisfying of religious needs; (b) to give material aid to their members; to organize either special meetings for children, youth, women, for prayer and other purposes, or general meetings, groups, circles, departments, biblical, literary, handworking, labor, religious study, and so on, and also to organize excursions and children's playgrounds, to open libraries and reading rooms, to organize sanatoria and medical aid. Only such books as are necessary for the performance of services are permitted to be kept in the church buildings and houses of prayer.

This law must be read in light of the provisions of the Soviet Constitution, Article 124:

> In order to insure to citizens freedom of conscience, the Church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the State and the school from the Church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

The Patriarchate's book published during the war, entitled "The Truth About Religion in Russia," commented on this article in the Constitution as follows: ". . . it may be said with complete objectivity that the Constitution, guaranteeing full

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freedom of religious worship, definitely in no way restricts the religious life of the faithful and the life of the Church in general." This is a hard saying for Western Christians to accept, feeling as they do that every Christian child should have an opportunity for systematic instruction in the faith and its meaning in life, that the congregation should be free to organize for activities by age or interest groups and for charity, and that the Church as well as individual Christians should be free to publish, and bookstores to sell, literature for the interpretation of religious truths as applied to community and world problems. When asked about these restrictions, Russian churchmen tend to say that such things are unnecessary—worship is the thing. Yet there is an occasional shrug of the shoulder or other indication of private longing for the pre-revolutionary possibility of expression recorded in countless books, pamphlets and church magazines, and in the thousands of buildings of former Church schools, charitable institutions and social service enterprises which covered the country in days gone by.

The existence of these varied and widespread activities of the Russian Church under the tsars is little appreciated in the West. Rather, the impression abroad is that the "corruptness" of the Orthodox Church and its subservience to the tsars was the reason the Communists turned against the Church and restricted its life and work. Venality and subservience there were, yet there also was a constant struggle within the Church by village priests, sincere bishops, theologians, ascetics and great writers, working for its purity and service to humanity. Rasputin is often referred to as a "type" of Orthodoxy, although he was not Orthodox, but a member of a proscripted sect.

Actually, the Communist Party's hostility to the Orthodox Church, to all churches—for Roman Catholics, Lutherans and Baptists are under the same Soviet laws—stems less from the past faults of ecclesiastics and synods than from the basic atheism of Marxist philosophy. When Karl Marx used the phrase "religion is the opium of the people," he had little knowledge of the Russian Orthodox Church. On the other hand, his studies of philosophy and science had convinced him that the idea of the supernatural was false, irrelevant and indeed harmful. Engels in "Anti-Duehring" and Lenin in "Materialism and Emperiocriticism" developed Marxist thought and established the Party's atheism: there is no God. Since that time an important task of

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the Party has been to wean individuals and society away from the idea of God, though if possible without offending popular sentiments and convictions to such a degree that willingness to share in the productive processes is weakened and social solidarity is reduced.

The restoration of the Patriarchate in 1943 represented a complete reversal of policy on the part of government and party. Instead of scattering the parishes, let them unite; instead of arbitrary action by local organs of government, maintain control from Moscow; instead of independence of local congregations, facilitate the establishment of a centralized and disciplined hierarchy under the Patriarch; instead of suppressing worship, sanction it and even permit training of priests; instead of stimulating the crude activities of the Society of Militant Godless, concentrate on scientific education in the schools, and on social atheistic influence in the Comsomol and the Pioneer movement; instead of literature emphasizing the faults of the tsarist church, produce books, pamphlets, magazines which portray religion as natural to the old class society, but unnatural, wasteful and harmful in the new classless, scientific society. In brief, sanction worship, eradicate religion.

This dialectic practice is under the control of the Council on the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church attached to the Council of Ministers, with agents throughout the country, paralleling the entire church structure. The president of the Council explained to the writer that his task was to see that Soviet law is observed by all concerned, whether church or state. A similar Council exists to regulate the affairs of all other religious organizations in the Soviet Union—Christian, Jewish, Moslem, etc.

The constitutional line of separation of church from the state might seem to be abrogated by this arrangement. High church officials, however, insist that the government does not interfere in the internal affairs of the church. Does the church seek to influence government? We know of one instance. On February 19, 1930, Metropolitan Sergius presented to Comrade Smidovitch, then head of the Kremlin's commission on religion, a memorandum listing 21 points on which the Church requested relaxation. In this document, and possibly in others, appeal was made for modification of state practices affecting the Church itself. We know of no appeal or declaration or proposal suggesting a change in policy on social or international affairs. No article in the

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Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate has ventured criticism of government or party policies or actions. However, on February 15, 1960, Patriarch Alexis delivered a remarkable speech at a Kremlin meeting, calling attention point by point to the contributions which the Church throughout history had made to the Russian nation.

In one field the Church has been a direct partner with government. The Patriarch issues occasional statements in support of the Soviet "peace policy." Metropolitan Nicholas, until last July President of the Church's council on foreign relations, has been even more active. His impressive appearance in his white "klobuk" (monastic headdress), his eloquence and his air of conviction made him an effective platform orator, and by speaking as a churchman he has given a moral tone to what otherwise would have been a purely political movement. There can be no question of the authentic desire of the Orthodox faithful for peace, but the Metropolitan's unswerving adherence to the Soviet line for its achievement raises the question whether the Church has considered and formed an independent judgment on international affairs. Perhaps participation in the "peace" movement is one of the gauges of loyalty to the régime without which the Church might lose such toleration as it now enjoys.

Through the centuries the Russian Orthodox Church undertook only two ventures which could be called foreign missionary activity in the sense in which this term is used by the Roman Catholic or the Protestant Churches—the mission to the Aleuts of Alaska in the eighteenth century and the mission of Archbishop Nicholas in the nineteenth century which led to the foundation of the Japanese Orthodox Church. Other missions were to non-Christians in the Russian Empire. However, the Holy Synod throughout the nineteenth century took great interest in the Holy Land and in Mt. Athos, and was also active in establishing chapels and chaplaincies for Russians residing or travelling abroad, particularly in Western Europe and the United States. They also developed considerable friendly intercourse between Russian theologians and prelates and their counterparts in the Anglican communion, in both England and the United States.

In 1943 Stalin agreed to welcome an official delegation under the Archbishop of York to bring greetings from the Church of England to Metropolitan Sergius and the Orthodox Church in Moscow. This visit thrust the Russian Church again into the

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diplomatic arena after 25 years of isolation. During the war years, Church dignitaries were sent on various visits abroad—to Sofia, Tehran, Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria. Ostensibly, and probably authentically from the Church's standpoint, these visits were intended to renew and strengthen the ties which bind the Orthodox Churches together. In this they were successful. Yet no one can doubt that Stalin had well in mind the fact that Russia under the tsars had considered herself the Protector of Christians living under the yoke of the Sultan, and that it was advantageous for the Soviet Union at least to intimate a continuance of this policy. Events in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon during the past five years tend to confirm this hypothesis.

Relations with the Phanar, where the former American Greek Archbishop Athenagoras is now enthroned as "Patriarch of Constantinople, New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch," deserve special comment because of the historical claims on the part of the Russian state, whether tsarist or Soviet, as well as of the Russian Orthodox Church itself. The right of the Russian fleet to free exit to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea was a claim put forward frequently in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Perhaps the age of airplanes and missiles has modified the Soviet interest in this matter. The Russian Church, however, has made no radical change in its policy regarding Constantinople. There is still an ambiguity in relationships. On the one hand, the Moscow Patriarchate publicly acknowledges the Ecumenical Patriarch not only as "brother in Christ," but as *primus inter pares* among the patriarchs of the Orthodox Church. At the same time, ever since the coming of the new deal for the Moscow Patriarchate, hints or rumors or even articles in its monthly journal point up the relative merits of each, to the advantage of Moscow.

After the Patriarch of Constantinople became a vassal of the Moslem Sultan in 1453, his movements and influence were restricted and his flock was more and more reduced as one Balkan nation after another gained independence. At the close of World War II he had less than 100,000 followers in Turkey, plus disputed authority over certain dioceses in northern Greece. To these should be added the Greeks of the Diaspora, no small number; in the United States alone the Greek Church claims about 2,300,000 in some 300 parishes, besides scores of thousands in South America, Europe, Africa and Australia, perhaps a total of 3,000,000. By comparison, the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate now can claim

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25,000,000 to 50,000,000 faithful in the Soviet Union. In terms of numbers, therefore, Moscow is well ahead. Yet the Ecumenical has the advantage of antiquity, recognized primacy among all Orthodox Churches and, in the last decade, the vigorous leadership of a truly great churchman who is pressing forward along the whole front of ecclesiastical policy represented by the word "ecumenic."

In 1948 a test of strength came when the Moscow Patriarch issued a call for a conference of the heads or representatives of Orthodox Churches. The occasion was the 500th anniversary of the autocephalicity of the Russian Church, that is to say, its declaration of independence from Constantinople and therefore of parity with it. The Moscow Patriarchate's intention to assert a right to leadership equal to that of Constantinople in the Orthodox world was scarcely veiled. Constantinople reacted vigorously, making clear its stand that only the Patriarch on the Bosporus had the right to summon an all-Orthodox meeting. This position was confirmed when the Patriarch's delegates announced in Moscow that they had come only for the celebration and refused to participate in the conference.

In addition to their formal canonical and administrative relationships within the Orthodox fold, both Moscow and the Phanar are now showing increasing interest in relations with other confessions. As lately as 1948 the Moscow Patriarchate had denounced the World Council of Churches; yet now it has entered fully into the Council's work. It sent two representatives, a priest and a layman, for two months of study at the World Council Headquarters in Geneva and then to attend as observers a meeting of the Central Committee on Rhodes in August 1959. A staff delegation from Geneva was entertained for a fortnight in the Soviet Union the following December. A strong Anglican theological delegation headed by the Archbishop of York met in Moscow with a corresponding Russian Orthodox delegation in a conference lasting ten days in 1956. Many exchanges of theologians between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Evangelical Church of Western Germany have increased the feeling of mutual interest between Lutherans and Orthodox.

A basic question is the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church toward the Vatican. The break between East and West which occurred in 1054 has never been healed. But the question of Christian unity is being much discussed at present because of

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the prospective "Ecumenical Council" announced by Pope John XXIII in 1959. Will the Orthodox be invited? Should they accept if invited? Both Moscow and the Phanar agree that the Orthodox must continue to reject papal claims to be the Vicar of Christ and the various heresies which they charge to Rome. The Phanar, however, feels that the time has nevertheless come to seek grounds for common action in the world by all the Christian Churches, and that a discussion of such matters with Rome will not harm Orthodoxy. Moscow is silent except for repeating historical grievances against Rome.

In all of the Patriarchate's foreign contacts the Soviet state must have had a conscious interest, since without its consent no Soviet citizen can travel abroad and no foreign delegation can enter the country. The interest is apparent—propaganda value. There can be no doubt that such contacts have in a measure modified the popular notion abroad that Christians in the Soviet Union are persecuted, and to that extent hostility toward the Communist régime is reduced. For its part, the Church can say that its foreign contacts are authentically religious, aiming to strengthen the cause of Christianity at home and abroad. Certainly the Russian Church itself has been strengthened.

The internal life of the Church is governed by the Constitution adopted at its Sobor (Assembly) in 1945. At the head is the Patriarch. He is assisted by a Holy Synod of six diocesan bishops, three being permanent members, *viz.* the Metropolitans of Krutitsk and Kolomna, of Leningrad and Ladoga, and of Kiev and Galicia, the other three being chosen in rotation. The dioceses generally conform to civil geographic units. The Church is held together by the requirement of strict canonical and liturgical conformity and by traditional spiritual unity. Pilgrimages are also important. Vast numbers of pilgrims visit the sacred monasteries and shrines at Kiev, Zagorsk, Pochaev in Volhynia and Pechorsk near Pskov. Indeed the passion of the Russian Orthodox for pilgrimages unquestionably is a great sustaining force for the Church. Ikons which have special historical significance or which venerate especially beloved saints have their annual days for crowded celebrations. Chief among them at present is the ikon of the Virgin of Kazan, now found at the right of the royal door in the ikonastasis of the Patriarchal Cathedral in Moscow. It is venerated for the part it played in the recovery of Moscow from the invaders in 1612.

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The number of churches in use is far less than before the Revolution. Thus Moscow has about 50 churches for a population of 8,000,000, and there are half that number for the 5,000,000 inhabitants of Leningrad. The rule seems to be that the great cathedrals and a few historic churches should be maintained in each city. Since there are no seating facilities in Russian churches, great numbers may attend. Thus in St. Nicholas Cathedral in Leningrad there are two completely separate churches, one above the other, each with the capacity of 5,000 to 6,000 persons. The small number of churches in use, particularly in cities of large populations, accounts for their being filled at each service; in fact two or more liturgies may be celebrated on a Sunday or a Holy Day. Most city churches have daily services, one very early at six or seven, another in the evening. Contrary to pre-revolutionary practice, a sermon at each service is the rule. These sermons are generally brief, 10 to 20 minutes, and emphasize the spiritual and moral interpretation of the gospel for the day.

A program exists for the reconstruction of disused or war-damaged churches with funds provided by the faithful. On the other hand, few new churches have been built. It is likely that some of the great new industrial cities have no churches at all except as there may be a previously existing church in a nearby village. As regards the villages it is explained that whereas formerly nearly every "selo" had a church, this is no longer necessary, since members of the collective farms supposedly have means of transportation to functioning small churches which are conveniently located.

Do only old people go to church? The great majority attending do appear to be old, but this appearance may be partly the result of the sufferings and hardships of recent years. Of the generation now in their forties, a large proportion were killed in the war. But of course the absence of young people results chiefly from the strenuous Soviet effort to detach them from religion and train them in Communism, using formal education and atheistic indoctrination in youth organizations as well as millions of anti-religious books and pamphlets.

One offsetting aspect is the widespread practice of infant baptism. In one Leningrad church, about 200 are baptized on a single Sunday. At a suburban church the writer found young godparents bringing 72 infants for baptism on a Sunday morning. Church weddings are less frequent, and if a member of the Comsomol is

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involved he will be censured or even expelled. As regards burials, it is explained that even though there may be no priest for the funeral, requiem prayers will be sung for "nearly everybody" who dies, on the request of some member of the family on the customary fortieth day.

Plainly there are elements of both strength and weakness in the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. A believing Christian would say that its greatest strength lies in the sense of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the worshipping church and in the hearts of the faithful; in worship there is a dialogue between man and God which creates a feeling of sharing in the power of the Almighty. The elaborate, traditional liturgical services provide a psychological framework binding worshippers together with each other and with all elsewhere who may be praying, and with those who have gone before. The celebration of the sacraments is literally "an outward and visible sign" of Divine action in the world.

The weaknesses of the Church do not lie so much in the areas designated by Western Protestants—lack of specialized forms of religious education for youth, or the absence of parish activities. Rather they lie in the enforced insulation of the Church from the main streams of life and growth in the Soviet Union, and in the economic affluence of the higher clergy, which could both reduce their spiritual vitality and create a cleavage between them and their less favored flocks.

Characteristic of the first is the complete separation of religion from science, economic life and social studies. Professors and graduate students in theology write only on church history, usually patristics, or on doctrine. The first collection of five such dissertations was published in 1959. No religious works dealing with problems of modern society (except "peace") are published. In fact, the only regular publications of the Church are the official monthly journal of the Patriarchate, liturgical manuals and occasional collections of sermons by the top prelates of the Church. Even these publications can be distributed only within the Church; they cannot be sold in bookstores.

As regards the economic status of the higher clergy, it must be remembered that large sums accrue at each service of worship out of the sale of candles and other liturgical items. This income amounts to millions of rubles in each diocese annually. The Church is forbidden to spend money for charitable, educational or missionary purposes, but only for the maintenance and em-

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bellishment of churches and monasteries, for the ten theological schools, and for the salaries of clergy and choirs. The Church pays no taxes, although each priest or bishop pays a stiff income tax.

What must we conclude as to the eventual future for religion in the Soviet Union when we consider the ubiquitous and vigorous processes for weaning children and youth from religion, the prohibition against public sale of Christian literature, the voluminous production of anti-religious propaganda, the restriction on parish activities, and what critics consider the irrelevant or anachronistic character of Orthodox worship? The Soviet Constitution and legislation imply that religion will continue indefinitely. The struggle to eradicate belief in God is vigorous, yet it has been held under restraint since Khrushchev's decree to that effect in 1954. The Roman Catholic Churches, largely confined to Lithuanians, Latvians and Byelorussians, show no signs of weakening. The Lutheran Churches in Estonia and Latvia have made a comeback approximately in the same degree as the Orthodox. The Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists maintains its level of between 500,000 and 600,000 baptized persons. The Orthodox are confident that the Holy Spirit is still at work in the Church and that religion as a spiritual force has wide influence among the people. Even though Christianity seems to be eclipsed by Communist doctrine, they believe that God will not only sustain but will strengthen His Church in Russia and the world.

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STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT IN SINKIANG

By A. R. Field

SINKIANG has traditionally acted as a transit zone between East and West and at the same time has been deeply isolated in the Central Asian heartland. From 1940 until the Battle of Midway in 1942, Sinkiang supply routes were of greater significance to Nationalist China than the more publicized Burma Road. Today, transportation development in this vast border region of the Chinese People's Republic is currently influencing the international politics of half of Asia.

Many Western observers suggest that the long-term interests of the Soviet Union and Communist China are bound to clash in this ancient area of tension. However, the placement and development of new industries in Sinkiang do not appear to be bearing out these predictions. For example, at a time when the Chinese economy is in desperate need of industrial fuels, the first oil pipeline built in Sinkiang does not run eastward but extends 200 kilometers west of Urumchi, the regional capital. As early as 1950, planning experts recognized the abnormal concentration of industry along the China coast as irrational both from an economic and from a national defense point of view. Might it not be just as irrational to develop primary industrial bases close to the Soviet border? For clearly, the growth of new industrial sites along this border involves a good deal more in this instance than merely building up population in a frontier zone.

The placement of industries in Sinkiang is predicated upon the simultaneous development of national and local industries and must be in line with national planning requirements. Prior to "liberation" there were only 14 factories in the entire province. At the end of the first decade of Chinese Communist rule it contained 1,166 large modern factories, and if medium and small industrial and mining enterprises at the *hsien* and commune level are included, the figure is 18,643. Corrected statistics up to September 22, 1958, during the period of the first Five Year Plan, give the following picture for the five main industrial areas:

NEW FACTORIES BUILT IN SINKIANG

Area	*Planned Figure*	*Factories Built*	*Percent of Fulfillment*
Kashgar	9,600	4,727	49.24
Ining (Ili District)	5,000	3,033	60.66
Urumchi	1,800	841	46.72
Sharasume (Altai District)	720	176	24.44
Hami	600	300	50.00

It is noteworthy that Kashgar, Ili and the Altai sectors are all located within

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the frontier zone of Sinkiang. From 1958 through the last quarter of 1959 the pace of industrialization in Sinkiang has markedly increased. It seems unlikely that during a period of capital scarcity the central government would continue to build basic industrial complexes close by the Russian border if Sino-Soviet tensions were considered to be assuming serious proportions.

The industrial decentralization which is taking place in China and the Soviet Union is a basic requirement in the nuclear age and accords with expert American military thought. The Chinese are in the process of erecting a series of industrial islands as far away from any sea approach as possible.[1] Atomic-powered Polaris submarines would find it very difficult to reach targets in Sinkiang, located as it is midway between the Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic and Indian oceans. The Kazakh Republic adjoining Sinkiang to the northwest is well supplied with power bases. The city of Karaganda is the second largest coal-producing area in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union. Chinese and Soviet industrial complexes appear to be slowly shifting closer together—not further apart—a fact which suggests that such mutual fears and antagonisms as may exist are being kept within bounds.

Since 1947 there has been persistent talk of the discovery of uranium deposits in Sinkiang. Indeed, the province is believed to be the major source of uranium for both China and the Soviet Union. It is believed that an atomic explosion occurred in the wastelands of Sinkiang as early as 1955 and, according to testimony by Dr. Carl Romney, an Air Force seismologist, the United States detected an 8 kiloton blast "in China" during 1958. While Soviet and American diplomats and technicians were carrying on a series of talks at Geneva on the detection of underground nuclear explosions, the Indian Government completed and put into operation in 1959 one of the finest seismological observations in Asia. The Soviet Government has established a "Physicists Town" in the Pamirs region which borders southwestern Sinkiang and northeastern Afghanistan. Special cosmic radiation observatories and laboratories are a part of this complex. All these facts suggest Sino-Soviet coöperation in this area of traditional conflict.

By virtue of its isolation, elevation and distance from United States bases, Sinkiang and its environs provide ideal sites for intercontinental missiles. The first Soviet Sputnik was launched from a "Rocket City" believed to be located somewhere in the Barsuki desert, northwest of the Aral Sea. The ill-fated U-2 flight, "downed" over the Sverdlovsk industrial island, is known to have crossed over the Aral Sea area. During Mr. Khrushchev's series of denunciatory statements regarding the U-2 flight, he referred to an earlier flight of April 9 by an unidentified aircraft and specifically mentioned the Pamirs region adjoining Sinkiang. It is logical to assume that flights have been carried out over Sinkiang as well as other selected portions of the Chinese mainland.

[1] Colonel Shelton, an Air Force expert tactician in I.C.B.M. defense, has discussed "island" strategic concepts with regard to the United States. He suggested that "we could conceivably decide to defend only a number of 'islands' of comparatively modest area rather than such large parts of the country as a broad east-west band extending across the northern border." ("The United States Air Force Report on the Ballistic Missile." Garden City: Doubleday, 1958, p. 144.)

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

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It is a truism that a developed transportation system is basic to any serious economic, scientific and military exploitation of a region. In the case of Sinkiang, this development began in 1952 when the Chinese People's Republic announced its decision to launch construction of a railway starting from Lanchow and terminating in Urumchi. Actual work was begun during the month of October, hardly the best time of the year. The second objective was to extend this line from Urumchi to Hoerhkwosze on the Sino-Soviet frontier. After Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Peking in October 1954, the terminus of this railway was shifted to the Kazakhstan city of Alma Ata where it would link up with the Soviet Transiberian line. Then, directly after Mr. Mikoyan's visit to Peking in April 1956, the western terminus was changed for a second time. The plan adopted was to cross the border at the Alashan Pass and connect with the Russian system at Aktogai—considerably north of the original route.[2] The geological structure of this region definitely indicates the probability that large deposits of pitchblende, the richest form of uranium ore, are to be found along this route.

Shortly after the Mikoyan visit, it was announced that "8,400 youths" would be sent to eastern Kazakhstan of whom "2,000 will build the railway to connect with the Lanchow-Sinkiang" line; what the socialist task of the other 6,400 persons might be was not defined, but they were probably sent to help create another industrial island east of Karaganda. By mid-1958 the Soviet section of the railroad was completed. This trans-Sinkiang railroad will eventually be connected with Hanoi, the capital of Northern Viet Nam.

During the first Five Year Plan a third of all new railway construction in China was laid down in Sinkiang. New Chinese plans call for the development of north-south lines within Sinkiang. In mid-1958 surveying began for the Turfan-Kashgar route to link both sides of the Tien Shan (mountains). This projected 1,000-mile line will run through Kuche, from which rail links will be built to Khotan (south) and to Ining (north), the capital of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou.[3] When Sinkiang and Tibet are eventually linked by rail, the defense of India will be immeasurably more difficult.

Kashgar and Urumchi seem to be centers in the over-all development of Sinkiang. The Kashgar administrative district has been expanded to cover all of southwestern Sinkiang up to the Endere river, more than 200 miles east of Khotan. It contains a population of about 3,000,000. Since 1955 about 1,250,000 Chinese have "migrated" to Northwest China. Hami has increased its population in recent years from 10,000 to 100,000. The "pre-liberation" population of Urumchi was 69,275; it is now nearly 200,000. As of June 30, 1953, the total population of Sinkiang was officially recorded at 4,873,608. An informed guess would place the present population at well over 6,000,000. A central Government directive issued early in 1959 suggests that this growth will continue and that during the second Five Year Plan many Chinese of

[2] Dr. Lawrence Krader, an American academician who travelled through this region in 1960, reported that Westerners are not permitted within 100 miles of Aktogai.

[3] The Chinese are effectively using "a radio elevation indicator" as part of a new technique developed in the Soviet Union to build up models of difficult terrain without the necessity of actual land surveying.

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young and middle age will "come to take part in Sinkiang's socialist construction."

Water, like transportation, is one of the bottlenecks in the further populating of Sinkiang. Water mains are being laid into Urumchi from seven miles to the north. A reservoir is being built to store 70,000,000 cubic meters of water. In the south, detailed general surveys of the desert regions are being carried out. Already completed is the survey of the southwestern part of the Takla Makan, a desert region whose name means in the Uighur language "once in, difficult to get out." In many places underground water was found and at some places good drinking water was discovered. Large scientific parties are undertaking hydrological surveys and are carrying out ice-melting experiments on the Tien Shan. Mountain ice and snow in seven areas lying between 13,000 and 20,000 feet above sea level are being utilized to expand the acreage of irrigated farmlands. The Chinese are elaborating on an idea that has had practical application in Western Tibet for many years: the creation of artificial glaciers to form sources for seasonal irrigation schemes.

In southern Sinkiang the communes are coördinating their efforts in building new channels and paved beds for the Yarkand and other rivers. This is done during the winter and spring when the water flow is small. Studies indicate that only 30 to 40 percent of the water reaches areas in which it can be used before it seeps underground. In the summer, rapidly melting ice and snow create torrents of water—much of which has been wasted in the past. The Chinese are now attempting to devise ways of melting ice and snow during the winter so that run-off may be better controlled during the summer months.

III

As railroads are extended westward, a network of motor highways is also being developed. The old caravan routes running across Sinkiang between China, Russia and India are being adapted to modern truck travel. Repairs and reconstruction are being pushed on nearly 2,000 miles of what is known as the "dry line" from Urumchi via Kashgar to Khotan. At the same time, secondary roads are being surveyed and constructed to service the newly industrialized regions. The Chinese use the slogan "walking on two legs" to signify the construction of local roads simultaneously with major modern highways. A road has been constructed through the Tien Shan from Urumchi to Kuerhlei, and, in 1958, 3,500 miles of roads were built to provide communication with various modern and primitive iron-smelting plants. For the trucks to use these roads, the Government leans heavily on imports from Czechoslovakia, in spite of the expanding production in China. The Chinese have gone in for large-scale construction of trailers which they hitch up in series to increase the pay load of each motor unit.

In 1956 only "sixteen Skoda buses" were in use in Urumchi. It is now possible to take a bus from Urumchi to Kashgar—a trip that takes about a week. By the beginning of 1959 all streets in Urumchi were paved, and there are asphalt highways leading out of the city in at least three directions. There are also asphalt roads leading out of Kashgar toward Khotan and beyond.

From a strategic standpoint, the most important of the new roads are those pushing into western Tibet and toward the frontiers of India and Pakistan.

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The Aksai Chin road which crosses into the Ladakh region of Indian Kashmir has recently been much in the news. But another road in southwestern Sinkiang, started in March 1957, carries much graver implications and deserves attention. It links Kashgar with Puli, capital of the Tashkurgan region —a distance of nearly 200 miles—and for two-thirds of its length it runs along the edge of the Little Pamirs. This is a key road which can have great influence upon the international politics of central Asia; it almost certainly involves SEATO members, and therefore the world. Unfortunately, the significance of this road has been pushed into the background by India's border disputes with China. Whatever else may be said about the Aksai Chin road, it fits comfortably into the logic of the developing Sinkiang road net. Such cannot be said for the Pamir road. At the national transportation conference held at Peking on January 27, 1959, Lien Pai-shen, Chief of the Highway Bureau in the Ministry of Communications, stated that there would be continued emphasis on the construction of highways in the frontier regions to meet "national defense needs." Is this Pamir road being extended southwestward beyond Puli? Tashkurgan boasts a population of about 10,000 persons of whom 78 percent are Sarikoli Tadzhiks. The Hunza Valley of Western Pakistan has been sealed off from trade with these Sarikolis for about the past eight years.

One may reasonably wonder why the Central People's Government is going through all this bother to construct a very difficult road in such a remote region. Conceivably the relationship between religion and "local bourgeois nationalism" might account for it—but only to a degree. The Muslim peoples of Sinkiang are known for their "parochial nationalism." When the first announcement of railway construction was made by Peking, there was an intensification of this local nationalism throughout Sinkiang. Uprisings and sabotage have been reported. The Muslim people of southwestern Sinkiang look for succor to their co-religionists in Pakistan. The Sarikolis, who inhabit the frontier zone between Tashkurgan and Pakistan, are a caucasoid people belonging to the Ismaeli sect of Islam and their spiritual leader is the Agha Khan. During December 1959, Zamin Shah, a representative of the Sarikolis, managed to elude Chinese checkposts along the frontier and reached Baltit, the capital of Hunza. He asked the Mir of Hunza, who is the head of the Ismaeli community in Central Asia, to apprise the Agha Khan of the plight of his people in Sinkiang. On October 3, 1960, the Agha Khan left Karachi for a northward inspection trip that would take him to the frontier of Sinkiang. It is doubtful that the Ismaeli leader could undertake such a trip without the approval of the Pakistan Government.

IV

Sooner or later the border between Pakistan and China is bound to come into dispute, unless the matter can first be negotiated successfully. Chinese maps show the Gilgit Agency, which includes a portion of Hunza, within the territorial limits of the Chinese People's Republic. The Chinese boundary line begins just below the point where the Soviet, Afghani, Chinese and Pakistani frontiers meet. This line includes Kilik, Mintaka, Khunjerab and Shimshal—all major passes between Sinkiang and Pakistan. Thus the

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Chinese claim affects the whole northern frontier of the pre-1947 state of Jammu and Kashmir. In contrast, the most recent official Pakistani maps designate this area with a green wash capped with a red "Frontier Undefined."

The Pakistani Foreign Office has managed to divorce any future Chinese claim against Pakistan from the current Chinese claim against India in Ladakh—which is also a part of the old state of Jammu and Kashmir. This was accomplished by stipulating that the Gilgit Agency is not a part of Azad Kashmir, but a part of Pakistan proper. In designating the Gilgit Agency an integral part of Pakistan, the Government has also involved SEATO, whose members might have preferred to interpret their commitments as excluding territories not an integral part of a member state. From an Indian point of view, Pakistan has manœuvred itself into a bargaining position somewhere between the respective contentions of India and China. Pakistani diplomacy has been forced into this position by the failure of India and Pakistan to reach a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

President Ayub Khan, immediately before the opening of the 1959 session of the Central Treaty Organization in Tehran, suggested that Pakistan would soon ask the Chinese Government to define the Pakistan-Sinkiang border. "Pakistan," he said, "is anxious to prevent a dispute similar to that which led to a border clash between China and India." The Indian press reported that preliminary negotiations were even then under way in Peking, although this was denied by the Pakistani Foreign Minister. In any event, through its treaty obligations, the United States is involved in the issue.

The Defense Ministry of Pakistan has announced that violations of its airspace have occurred over the Gilgit Agency—the first on July 12, 1959. This was ten months prior to the more famous U-2 overflight. Other jet penetrations into Pakistani airspace occurred on September 21, 22, 23, 27 and 28, 1959. President Ayub interpreted these flights as undoubted reconnaissance missions "because the Russians and the Chinese have some strange notion that we have United State bases in West Pakistan and they want to pinpoint them." The Pakistani President has stated that the Chinese are maintaining infantry forces along the Sinkiang frontier.

Of all the nations along the whole rimland of China, Pakistan is the only nation to have been directly threatened by both the Soviet Union and China. In the light of this, it is significant that the final communiqué closing the sixth annual SEATO conference in Washington did not mention the potentially precarious position of Pakistan while it did mention the Kingdom of Laos. Yet it would appear that a serious international incident may be building up somewhere along the Tashkurgan road leading to the Hunza valley of Pakistan.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

COUNTDOWN FOR DECISION. By MAJ. GENERAL JOHN B. MEDARIS WITH ARTHUR GORDON. New York: Putnam, 1960, 303 p. $5.00.

General Medaris, formerly in command of the Army's ballistic missile program, reports on his group's achievements in this field and also presents his criticisms of governmental policies and ineptitudes in matters of general strategy, research and development. He is particularly critical of the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon civilians.

SEA POWER: A NAVAL HISTORY. EDITED BY E. B. POTTER. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1960, 932 p. $14.65.

A massive collaborative survey of navies, naval warfare and the role of sea power in history.

THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By CHARLES J. HITCH AND ROLAND N. MCKEAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 422 p. $9.50.

In this RAND Corporation study the authors are chiefly concerned to set forth a way of looking at and solving military problems in order to maximize the attainment of objectives with the given resources. They see strategy and cost as being "as interdependent as the front and rear sights of a rifle." Their most illuminating discussion deals with such themes as the availability of resources for defense, the analysis of efficiency in their use, and some applications of their general models to specific problems.

DETERRENT OR DEFENSE. By B. H. LIDDELL HART. New York: Praeger, 1960, 257 p. $4.95.

A collection of Captain Liddell Hart's articles over the last decade, the principal themes being the "fading deterrent" and the need to reconsider the strategy and means of effective defense.

AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE. EDITED BY WALTER F. HAHN AND JOHN C. NEFF. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, 455 p. $1.45.

A selection of papers presented at the first National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers in July 1959, as well as materials appearing in various periodicals and journals, dealing with the broad subject suggested by the title.

FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES. By ANATOL RAPOPORT. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960, 400 p. $6.95.

In this work Professor Rapoport, a mathematical biologist, discusses from the perspective both of games theory and of semantics the problem of human conflict and its various modes of operation.

AMERICAN MIGHT AND SOVIET MYTH. By JAMESON G. CAMPAIGNE. Chicago: Regnery, 1960, 218 p. $3.95.

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A rather strident criticism of United States foreign policy vis-à-vis the Communist powers, arguing that Soviet strength has been vastly overrated.

ON ALIEN RULE AND SELF-GOVERNMENT. By John Plamenatz. New York: Longmans, 1960, 224 p. $5.00.

A very useful essay that attempts to clarify some of the confused arguments that have raged about "self-government" and "alien rule," especially in the context of European rule over non-Europeans. A Montenegrin by birth, and now an Oxford don, Mr. Plamenatz is singularly well equipped to deal with this tormented issue.

THE DIPLOMACY OF APPEASEMENT: ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS AND THE PRELUDE TO WORLD WAR II, 1931–1938. By Arthur H. Furnia. Washington: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1960, 454 p. $6.00.

A study of the disastrous vicissitudes of Anglo-French relations during the mounting crises of the 1930s, making extensive use of American diplomatic correspondence for those years.

AMERICA AND THE RUSSO-FINNISH WAR. By Andrew J. Schwartz. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 103 p. $3.25.

A monographic study of American foreign policy with respect to the two parties in the Russo-Finnish conflict between 1939 and 1944.

ELECTIONS ABROAD. Edited by D. E. Butler. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 280 p. $5.50.

Studies of general elections in France, Poland, Ireland and South Africa in 1957 and 1958.

ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By T. E. Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 278 p. $6.75.

A study of electoral procedures in tropical Africa, Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, but organized functionally rather than regionally.

THE REBELS. By Brian Crozier. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, 256 p. $3.95. (London: Chatto and Windus, 21/.)

In this anatomy of rebellion the author inquires into "the origins and causes of the major armed insurrections since the end of the second world war; to introduce the major rebel leaders; and to describe certain techniques of rebellion and repression." A timely study that includes among its cast of characters Ho Chi Minh, Colonel Grivas, Jomo Kenyatta and Fidel Castro.

A HISTORY OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT. VOLUME V: SOCIALISM AND FASCISM, 1931–1939. By G. D. H. Cole. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 350 p. $8.00.

This final volume of his last major work, virtually complete at the time of Cole's death in 1959, deals with the depressing experience of the 1930s—years when Socialism and social democracy were on the defensive or in retreat. Despite the title this volume is perhaps more concerned with movements and people than with ideas.

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. By Adam B. Ulam. New York: Random House, 1960, 307 p. $5.00.

A fruitful appraisal of Marxism in its historical setting, as a doctrine stimulated by, and apparently most relevant to, the mood of a society suffering the pangs of nascent industrialization.

MARXISM: THE VIEW FROM AMERICA. By Clinton Rossiter. New York: Harcourt, 1960, 338 p. $6.75.

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An exposition and critique of Marxism from the explicit perspective of the American experience of liberal democracy.

DER VERRAT IM 20. JAHRHUNDERT. By Margret Boveri. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956–1960, 4 v. DM. 9.

This major study of treason in the twentieth century, individual volumes of which have appeared over the last four years, includes both open and secret opposition, defectors to and from Communism, and, in the fourth volume, events on the American scene.

HOW UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS ARE MADE. By John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1960, 144 p. Florins 13.50.

The authors, former members of the Canadian and Netherlands Permanent Missions to the U.N., describe the machinery and procedures of that organization for considering economic questions and offer a series of case studies in illustration.

LE PROBLÈME DES LACUNES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL. By Lucien Siorat. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1959, 479 p. Fr. 4670.

An inquiry into the means of dealing with cases lacking precedent in treaties or custom, and the judicial function in this regard.

THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Robert K. Woetzel. New York: Praeger, 1960, 287 p. $9.00.

An inquiry into the basis for the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal and for the declarations on criminal organizations.

THE EAST AND WEST MUST MEET: A SYMPOSIUM. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959, 134 p. $3.00.

Lectures on East-West relations by Cora Du Bois, John Sherman Cooper, Ali Sastroamidjojo, S. Radhakrishnan, Kenneth W. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller 3rd, John Kenneth Galbraith and Barbara Ward.

COMMON SENSE ABOUT RUSSIA. By Robert Conquest. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 175 p. $2.95.
COMMON SENSE ABOUT CHINA. By Guy Wint. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 176 p. $2.95.
COMMON SENSE ABOUT AFRICA. By Anthony Sampson. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 175 p. $2.95.
COMMON SENSE ABOUT INDIA. By K. M. Panikkar. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 174 p. $2.95.
COMMON SENSE ABOUT THE ARAB WORLD. By Erskine B. Childers. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 192 p. $2.95.

These are the first volumes of a series of popular introductions to the countries or regions in question.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1955–1956. By Geoffrey Barraclough and Rachel F. Wall. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 327 p. $8.00.

This volume of the well-known survey goes up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in mid-1956.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1957. Selected and edited by Noble Frankland assisted by Vera King. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 539 p. $11.20.

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This volume in the annual Chatham House series of documents bears particularly on the cold war and on the Middle East.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE ECONOMIC WORLD BALANCE. By Thorkil Kristensen and Associates. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1960, 377 p. Kr. 46.

An ambitious effort to appraise the present economic status and possible economic trends of the main regions of the world in the hope of forecasting in some measure the likely changes in the balance 20 years hence. The chairman of the research group is Professor of Economics at the Copenhagen School of Economic and Business Administration.

BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE. By Gunnar Myrdal. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, 287 p. $4.50.

Mr. Myrdal discusses in these lectures the implications of the welfare state—which seems to be here to stay and destined to expand among underdeveloped countries—for international economic relations, especially with regard to the concomitant growth of economic nationalism.

THE RICH AND THE POOR. By Robert Theobald. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1960, 196 p. $4.50.

In an easy, untechnical style, a young English economist sets out his views of the major problems afflicting the rich countries and the poor ones as a basis for a set of proposals about the aid, trade and investment policies that will make for economic development.

OUR DEVELOPING WORLD. By L. Dudley Stamp. London: Faber, 1960, 195 p. 21/.

This second edition of the author's "Our Undeveloped World" (1953) reflects the rapid demographic, economic and social changes going on in the world.

SWISS-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. By Paul Erdman. Basel: Kyklos; Tübingen: Mohr, 1959, 173 p. DM. 16.80.

A study of the changing setting of Swiss-American economic relations in the years since 1936.

CO-OPERATIVE ORGANIZATION IN TROPICAL COUNTRIES. By Sheila Gorst. Oxford: Blackwell, 1959, 343 p. 25/.

A study of the coöperative movement in 28 non-self-governing territories under U.K. administration since the end of the Second World War.

THE TWO-WAY MIRROR. By Richard T. Morris. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960, 215 p. $4.50.

A monograph on the attitudes received and reflected by foreign students in the U.S. with regard to the image of their own countries held here.

The Second World War

THE TASTE OF COURAGE: THE WAR, 1939–1945. Edited by Desmond Flower and James Reeves. New York: Harper, 1960, 1,120 p. $10.00.

A skillful and effective compilation of a wide variety of writings—by combatants, statesmen, correspondents and novelists—which creates a vivid panorama of the Second World War, on the fronts and in the queues at home.

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THE WAR: A CONCISE HISTORY, 1939–1945. By Louis L. Snyder. New York: Messner, 1960, 579 p. $7.95.

An excellent one-volume history for the general reader.

THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL LORD ISMAY. New York: Viking, 1960, 488 p. $6.75.

This book deals chiefly, though not very revealingly, with the war years, 1939–45, when Lord Ismay was Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence and Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet—a position that gave him access to most of the major wartime decisions and debates.

THE FRAMEWORK OF HEMISPHERE DEFENSE. By Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960, 470 p. $4.25.

CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS. By Philip A. Crowl. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960, 505 p. $6.50.

Two further volumes in the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II. Conn and Fairchild deal with preparations and measures for hemispheric defense, including military coöperation with Brazil, Mexico and Canada. Crowl's study, a companion piece to the "Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls," deals with the capture of Saipan, Tinian and Guam.

THE SKY SUSPENDED. By Drew Middleton. New York: Longmans, 1960, 282 p. $4.50.

Mr. Middleton here reviews the heroic Battle of Britain, one of the decisive turning points of the war, which he witnessed as an American correspondent.

VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC, 1945. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1960, 407 p. $6.50.

With this volume Admiral Morison completes his vast and impressive "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II." It treats of the capture of Iwo Jima, the Okinawa campaign and the final struggle with the kamikazes.

ROMMEL UND DIE INVASION: ERINNERUNGEN. By Friedrich Ruge. Stuttgart: Koehler, 1959, 286 p. DM. 18.50.

The story of Rommel's effort to strengthen the Normandy defense prior to D-Day.

FREIES DEUTSCHLAND. By Bodo Scheurig. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1960, 268 p. DM. 17.80.

A well-documented history of the Free Germany movement in the Soviet Union in the two years after Stalingrad.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939–45. POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. By Brigadier Rajendra Singh. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan), 1958, 317 p. (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, Rs. 21.)

This volume, the seventh in the series, deals on the whole with peaceful activities, except for the beginnings of conflict in Indonesia.

The United States

THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1960, 749 p. $6.95.

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This volume is the third of Mr. Schlesinger's "The Age of Roosevelt," and perhaps the best so far. Dealing with the years 1935–1936, it encompasses the shift from the First to the Second New Deal, the appearance of some of our more colorful demagogues (Huey Long, Father Coughlin and Dr. Townsend), the conflict with the Supreme Court, and concludes with F.D.R.'s landslide victory in 1936. An extraordinarily interesting narrative of an extraordinary era.

THE NATIONAL PURPOSE. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, 146 p. $2.95. (Paper, $1.50.)

A number of American intellectuals conscientiously undertake to meet the awkward assignment of defining the American National Purpose: John K. Jessup, Adlai Stevenson, Archibald MacLeish, David Sarnoff, Billy Graham, John W. Gardner, Clinton Rossiter, Albert Wohlstetter, James Reston and Walter Lippmann.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II. By John W. Spanier. New York: Praeger, 1960, 234 p. $4.50.

A critical review stressing the hampering effects of what the author sees as a prevailing "liberal dichotomy between peace and war."

DUEL AT THE BRINK. By Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, 240 p. $4.50.

A good interim assessment, by two able journalists, of the late Secretary of State's role in American foreign policy in the Eisenhower Administration. The appraisal of performance is mixed, but there is little doubt of the dimensions of the man.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SOLDIER FOR PEACE. By Deane and David Heller. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, 328 p. $4.50.

A very appreciative but hasty and rather journalistic life of the late Secretary of State, who warrants a major biography.

THE POLICY MACHINE. By Robert Ellsworth Elder. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1960, 238 p. $4.50.

A description and analysis of the policy-making processes within the Department of State: desk officers, intelligence analysis, legislative liaison, public information, etc.

THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY. By Rexford G. Tugwell. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, 508 p. $6.95.

A discussion of the ever-widening powers of the Presidency. In Mr. Tugwell's judgment "we have seen the institution of the Presidency reach what would appear to be very nearly its maximum expansion without some sort of radical breakthrough." He suggests the possible need for a "plural Presidency."

THE 1956 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. By Charles A. H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1960, 382 p. $5.00.

A close examination of the electoral process as a whole, using the 1956 presidential election as a case study. Includes preconvention activities, the conventions, the campaigns and the structure of the vote itself.

GREAT PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS. By Richard B. Morris. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960, 413 p. $7.50.

A selection of state papers demonstrating the vital role of presidential decisions, from Washington's action against the Whisky Rebellion to Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal.

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1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. By Walter Johnson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960, 390 p. $6.00.

An account of presidential leadership under Hoover, F. D. Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower—the styles of the men and their relation to the people of the nation.

WILSON: THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY, 1914–1915. By Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 736 p. $10.00.

This third volume of Mr. Link's authoritative biography of Woodrow Wilson covers the critical first 15 months of the First World War, between the outbreak of hostilities and the American note to Britain of October 21, 1915.

BARUCH: THE PUBLIC YEARS. By Bernard M. Baruch. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, 431 p. $6.00.

This second volume of autobiography (first volume noted here January 1959) deals with the years from 1910 when Mr. Baruch turned to public service, as advisor to presidents, especially to Woodrow Wilson.

TURMOIL AND TRADITION: A STUDY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY L. STIMSON. By Elting E. Morison. Boston: Houghton, 1960, 686 p. $7.50.

An admirable biography, by a professor of history at M.I.T., of a leading public servant of the old school: District Attorney under Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of War under Taft, Governor General of the Philippines under Coolidge, Secretary of State under Hoover, and again Secretary of War under F.D.R.

POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNITED STATES, 1870–1950. By Simon Kuznets and Others. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1960, 289 p. $5.00.

This second of three volumes prepared by the University of Pennsylvania Studies of Population Redistribution and Economic Growth deals chiefly with the economic aspects: labor force trends, redistribution of manufacturing, regional growth of income.

Western Europe

LE MARCHÉ COMMUN ET LE DROIT PUBLIC. By Louis Cartou. Paris: Sirey, 1959, 199 p. NF. 13.

Reflections on the relation between domestic and international law and the provisions of the treaty for the European Common Market.

DE GAULLE'S REPUBLIC. By Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison. New York: Longmans, 1960, 279 p. $4.50.

Two English scholars look into the mechanics and driving forces of the Fifth Republic; a well-balanced study of a régime that has successfully met a number of problems but still faces some extremely difficult challenges, some implicit in the régime itself.

FRANCE: STEADFAST AND CHANGING. By Raymond Aron. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 201 p. $4.75.

In these informal reflections M. Aron considers the current scene in France, the reasons for the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the problems confronting de Gaulle.

THE DE GAULLE REPUBLIC: QUEST FOR UNITY. By Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown. Homewood (Ill.): Dorsey Press, 1960, 400 p. $6.65.

A study of the origins and institutions of the Fifth Republic and its prospects for

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survival. The authors are skeptical of the soundness of the institutional solution.

MÉMOIRES. I: VENU DE MA MONTAGNE. By Paul Reynaud. Paris: Flammarion, 1960, 506 p. NF. 17.

In this first volume M. Reynaud reviews his early life and political career up to Hitler's 1936 occupation of the Rhineland.

LE DRAME FRANÇAIS. By Paul Combe. Paris: Plon, 1959, 230 p. NF. 6.90.

An effort to identify, diagnose and prescribe remedies for various shortcomings in the French economy that have developed over the last half-century or more.

L'ÉCONOMIE FRANÇAISE. By Jean Chardonnet. Paris: Dalloz, 1959, 407 p. Fr. 2200.

This second volume (Volume I noted here April 1959) is concerned with agricultural production, foreign trade and some general considerations of the present state of the French economy.

THE SAAR CONFLICT: 1945–1955. By Jacques Freymond. New York: Praeger (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, European Center), 1960, 395 p. $10.00.

A translation of an able study, noted here October 1960.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH. By William L. Shirer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, 1,245 p. $10.00.

In this enormous book Mr. Shirer returns to the subject he dealt with as a correspondent, in "Berlin Diary," two decades ago. In the years since then he has read much and reflected much; the present work is a remarkably successful effort to write a major history of Nazi Germany. A serious work of scholarship that reads well despite its length.

MITTELDEUTSCHLAND, "MOSKAUS WESTLICHE PROVINZ." By Ullrich Rühmland. Stuttgart: Vorwerk, 1959, 353 p. DM. 18.50.

A report on the D.D.R. and the S.E.D. in the last decade.

BERLIN—PIVOT OF GERMAN DESTINY. Translated and Edited by Charles B. Robson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960, 233 p. $5.00.

A translation of lectures by West Berlin officials and educators in the summer of 1959, and dealing with local as well as international issues.

GERMANY DIVIDED: THE LEGACY OF THE NAZI ERA. By Terence Prittie. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1960, 381 p. $6.00.

The author, for a number of years head of the German bureau of *The Manchester Guardian*, discusses present-day Germany, its internal problems and its prospects. He is quite critical of the "disengagers."

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Essays on the thought and career of Antonio Gramsci, one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party, who died in prison in 1937.

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The second volume of the valuable series of annotated Comintern documents covers the period from the French occupation of the Ruhr through 1928.

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This solid monograph, one of the studies of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, traces the history of differences and oppositional currents within the Communist movement from the formation of the Bolshevik Party up to the enforced unity of the Stalin era.

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On the basis of much research and personal observation Mr. Barghoorn, Professor of Political Science at Yale, discusses the background, purpose and impressive organization of Soviet "cultural diplomacy" as an important facet of foreign policy. A valuable source of information for those interested in the implications of "cultural exchanges"—one of the most active areas of engagement with the Soviet Union.

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A very substantial collection of documents on Communism since the beginning of the century, with particular emphasis on thought and doctrine.

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A selection of readings—chiefly of Soviet speeches and articles—dealing with various facets of Soviet foreign policy since 1917.

SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY. By John N. Hazard. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 534 p. $9.50.

This study in the series of the Russian Institute at Columbia discusses the Soviet procedures for handling civil disputes in the early years of the Bolshevik régime.

LE POUVOIR SOVIÉTIQUE. By Henri Chambre. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1959, 168 p. Fr. 1100.

DE KARL MARX À MAO TSÉ-TUNG. By Henri Chambre, S.J. Paris: Spes, 1959, 338 p. Fr. 1600.

Two recent studies by a leading French student of Marxism and the Soviet Union. The first is a concise introduction to the organization of the Soviet system; the second is a critical survey of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

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THE CONSPIRATORS. By Geoffrey Bailey. New York: Harper, 1960, 306 p. $4.95.

An interesting account of cloak-and-dagger activities—kidnapping, infiltration, false information—by the Bolsheviks against various Russian and other opponents in the years after the Revolution.

THE CHANGING SOVIET SCHOOL. Edited by George Z. F. Bereday and Others. Boston: Houghton, 1960, 514 p. $6.50.

An informative report on a study visit to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1958 by some 71 American educators.

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This volume, the first in a planned series of publications on Soviet economic growth, is a discussion of the quality of Soviet industrial statistics: how they are collected, processed and published, the nature and extent of their reliability.

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A valuable survey and analysis of Russian and East European collections in American libraries.

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A study of worker participation in the management of a textile factory in Lodz, based on field work and interviews in the summer of 1957.

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A Hungarian writer's account of imprisonment and A.V.H. interrogation in the years before the 1956 revolution.

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An introduction to Jugoslavia's present constitutional and political system, by a professor on the faculty of law at Belgrade.

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An account of the Cyprus revolt and its antecedents, with an optimistic conclusion concerning the future of the island.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

IMPERIALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM. By Bernard Semmel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 283 p. $4.50.

A study of British "Social-Imperialism" between 1895 and 1914. Includes such disparate figures as Joseph Chamberlain, Karl Pearson, Sidney Webb and Sir Halford Mackinder.

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This is the fifth in the Nuffield College series of election studies.

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A concise and competent general treatment of British economic development since 1920. The author is Professor of Economic History in the University of Edinburgh.

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A collection of Mr. Massey's speeches while he was Governor-General of Canada, 1952–1959.

CANADIANS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Fred Alexander. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960, 160 p. $3.95.

An Australian historian offers an interesting, personal appraisal of Canada's external relations and of the Canadian attitude toward foreign policy.

A DECADE OF INDO-BRITISH RELATIONS, 1937–47. By K. P. Bhagat. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1959, 521 p. Rs. 25. (New York: Heinman, $8.00.)

A very close study of the background to partition and independence, by a professor of political science in Ahmednagar College.

The Middle East

CHALLENGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Harry B. Ellis. New York: Ronald, 1960, 238 p. $4.00.

A Middle Eastern correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor* discusses the problem of American policy in the area, especially with regard to Arab-Israel relations. He concludes that the Arab leaders are aware of the Communist danger and that a community of interests between the United States, Israel and these countries exists and should be developed.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ARAB INDEPENDENCE. By Zeine N. Zeine. Beirut: Khayats, 1960, 297 p. £ Leb. 17.50.

A study of British and French policy and the struggle of the Arab nationalist leaders during and immediately after the First World War. The author, professor of the modern history of the Near East at the American University of Beirut, has made extensive use of Arabic as well as European sources.

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A general geography of the Middle East.

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A personal record of Palestine and Israel by a dedicated pro-Zionist British officer and civil servant of many years' standing.

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A brief but often penetrating review of Israel's development and status since 1945, by a British Labor M.P. with a good deal of first-hand experience.

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THE ROLE OF INDIAN MINORITIES IN BURMA AND MALAYA. By Usha Mahajani. Bombay: Vora (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1960, 344 p. Rs. 20. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, distributor, $5.00.)

A dissertation dealing with the role played by Indians in Burma and Malaya, and with the interrelation of emerging national feelings in the last half-century or so.

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A selection of the author's writings on economic development in the light of Gandhian thought.

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An analysis of Gandhi's ideas on international relations.

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The author's impressions of a year (1956–57) in Pakistan as Fulbright lecturer.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN INDONESIAN ELITE. By Robert Van Niel. Chicago: Quadrangle Books; The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1960, 314 p. $6.75.

An examination of cultural changes in Indonesia from 1900 to around 1927 with particular attention to the leading groups in the society.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

TEN YEARS OF STORM. By Chow Ching-wen. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, 323 p. $6.00.

A former leader of the China Democratic League, which collaborated for a time with the Communists, tells of his experiences in China until 1957 when he left the country. The book is of considerable interest for its first-hand information, less satisfactory in its generalizations.

PRE-COMMUNIST CHINA'S RURAL SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY. By Jen-Chi Chang. Boston: Christopher, 1960, 116 p. $3.75.

A study of rural school-community relations in the period 1935–1945 in Kiangsi province.

CHINA CROSSES THE YALU. By Allen S. Whiting. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 219 p. $7.50.

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A serious inquiry into the motivations and considerations that may have led Communist China to intervene in the Korean War. In the absence of hard evidence the author is forced to weigh various possibilities, but in doing so sheds a good deal of light on the problem of Chinese Communist behavior in war and strategy.

KOREA AND THE FALL OF MACARTHUR. By Trumbull Higgins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 229 p. $5.00.

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KOREA'S SYNGMAN RHEE. By Richard C. Allen. Rutland (Vt.): Tuttle, 1960, 259 p. $3.75.

A very critical review of Syngman Rhee's role as President of South Korea.

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A very useful reference for those reading Japanese.

Africa

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This is a major contribution to our much-needed store of information and understanding about tropical Africa. Making use of the skills of numerous contributors Dr. Kimble, Professor of Geography at Indiana University, has achieved a massive survey of the economic and human geography of the area, its social changes and economic progress, and recent political and governmental advances.

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This book, in effect a sequel to the author's earlier "The Birth of a Dilemma" and Richard Gray's "The Two Nations," deals with problems in Rhodesia and Nyasaland since the beginning of Federation.

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This volume in the trilogy sponsored by the Institute of Race Relations deals with developments in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland between 1939 and 1945.

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An inquiry into the economic effects of federation on Nyasaland, based in good part on materials gathered in the area.

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMERGENCY. By Clyde Sanger. London: Heinemann, 1960, 342 p. 30/.

A discussion of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and a useful exposition of the reasons for the growing opposition on the part of the Africans.

EAST AFRICAN CHIEFS. Edited by Audrey I. Richards. New York: Praeger, 1960, 419 p. $10.00.

This collaborative study of political development in selected Uganda and Tanganyika tribes was designed to illuminate the transition from traditional systems of chieftainship to more articulate and regular forms of local administration.

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An introduction to Uganda and a discussion of the significant developments during the period of Sir Andrew Cohen's spectacular governorship.

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An interesting and sympathetic report of a visit to the rural African land units of Kenya, with special attention to the problem of land reform and reclamation.

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An analysis of the successive constitutional experiments of 1946, 1951 and 1954.

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A young English journalist supplements her travel experiences with a good bit of concise information about the country.

GHANA AND THE NEW AFRICA. By Douglas Warner. London: Muller, 1960, 181 p. 16/.

An Englishman, who worked for a year on the African periodical *Drum*, discusses the prospects for Ghana.

CONGO 1959: DOCUMENTS BELGES ET AFRICAINS. Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, 1960, 319 p. Belgian Fr. 195.

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A Canadian journalist's exceedingly discouraging report on conditions, attitudes and prospects in South Africa, which he visited just after the Sharpeville riot.

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Essays and reflections by a fervent Malagasy poet and patriot.

Latin America and the West Indies

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It is not always easy to see how social change affects international relations. In this book six authors, who are all anthropologists or sociologists, examine recent developments in a number of Latin American countries with an eye first to their effect on the local society and then to their implications for relations between the United States and each of these countries. The papers were originally presented to a study group at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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A leading Mexican economist, with extensive experience in government and in the Economic Commission for Latin America, gives a concise account of the current state and future possibilities of the trend toward common markets and free trade areas in Latin America. Throughout the book he relates the proposals on trade to Latin America's basic problems of finance and economic development and shows their relation to Latin America's place in the world economy.

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The author sees Guatemala's case as legally very weak.

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A lively and informative report on the very encouraging economic and cultural progress in Puerto Rico in the last two decades, including a doubling of the real per-capita income and a reduction of the death rate by two-thirds.

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By Donald Wasson

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

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

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

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